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संस्कृत्रिमासु व्यवहारवत्सु ।
दिग्भ्यः समेतेषु नरेषु तेषु
सौवर्गवर्गो स्वजनैरचिह्नि ॥ २५ ॥

(नैषध १०.३४)

काश्मीरे जन्मभाषावत् संस्कृतं प्राकृतं तथा ।
स्त्रीणामपि मुखेष्वासीदित्येवं बिल्हणोऽब्रवीत् ॥ २६ ॥

ब्रूमः सारस्वतजनिभुवः किं निधेः कौतुकानां
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यत्र स्त्रीणामपि किमपरं जन्मभाषावदेव
प्रत्यावासं विलसति वचः संस्कृतं प्राकृतं च ॥ २७ ॥

(विक्रमाङ्कदेवचरितम् १८.६)

The Importance of Sanskrit

Sanskrit is one of the most important languages of the Indo-European family and has a very rich and continuous history of nearly five thousand years. As a result of the patient and laborious comparative study of the various languages like Sanskrit, Old Persian, Greek, Latin, German, and English in the beginning of the 19th century, it has been shown by scholars that all these can be traced back to a common source which is termed Proto-Indo-European (PIE). It is generally believed that the original home of the Indo-Europeans was somewhere in Eastern Europe north of the Black

Sea and Western Asia and that the ancestor language (PIE) common to the sub-families was spoken in a fairly unified form with minor dialectal variations. This ancestral language must have resembled some of its more archaic descendants such as Greek and Sanskrit rather closely.

The 'discovery of Sanskrit' by the West is usually associated with the memorable utterance of Sir William Jones in his third annual address before the Asiatic Society, Calcutta, on February 2, 1786 (*Asiatic Researches*, vol. I. 1788, pp. 422 f) :

> The Sanskrit language, whatever be its antiquity is of a wonderful structure ; more perfect than the Greek, more copious than the Latin and more exquisitely refined than either ; yet bearing to both of them a stronger affinity, both in the roots of verbs and in the forms of grammar than could possibly have been produced by accident ; so strong indeed that no philosopher could examine them all three without believing them to have sprung from some common source which, perhaps, no longer exists ; there is a similar reason, though not quite so forceful, for supposing that both the Gothic and the Celtic, though blended with a different idiom, have the same origin with the Sanskrit ; and the Old Persian might be added to the same family.

This statement of Sir William Jones is considered as the starting point of comparative Linguistics of the Indo-European languages. He came to India as the

Judge of the Supreme Court of India in 1783 ; he founded the Asiatic Society on February 2, 1782. He translated Kālidāsa's *Śākuntala* into English in 1789 on reading which the great German poet philosopher Goethe went into raptures.

The year 1990 was declared 'the Sanskrit year' by the Government of India to celebrate the bicentenary of this translation and to focus attention on the value and significance of Sanskrit culture. A seminar on Sanskrit literature was conducted by the U.K. centre of the Bharatiya Vidyabhavan at London on October 20 and 21, 1990. Mathur Krishnamurthy, Executive Director of the Bhavan, was the moving force behind the seminar. The late Professor K. Krishnamurti gave the keynote address. Among Indian scholars who participated were Ramaranjan Mukherji (Calcutta), the late R.C. Dvivedi (Jaipur), K. Kunjunni Raja and the late S.S. Janaki (Madras). Indian High Commissioner Mr. Kuldip Nayar said in his inaugural address : 'Sanskrit was once proposed as the *lingua franca* of India, but for various reasons never became so. Nevertheless, the spirit of Sanskrit still today represents the hidden heritage which looks at the man rather than at his station in life.'

Sir William Jones also made a conjecture that Sandracottos of the ancient Greek writers was Chandragupta Maurya of the Purāṇa-s ; this has been accepted by almost all scholars, and this has proved to be a pivotal one for ancient Indian history and chronology.

The 'discovery of Sanskrit' by Sir William Jones led to the comparative grammatical studies of Sanskrit, Greek, Latin, Old Persian and other languages. Bothlingk and Roth published the Sanskrit-German Dictionary in several volumes (*St. Petersburg Dictionary,* 1852-75). H.H. Wilson, the first Boden Professor at Oxford translated the *Ṛgveda* and *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* with notes and wrote on the Indian Theatre.

Professor Max Müller's contribution to the popularization of Sanskrit has been the most important in the nineteenth century. He made a critical edition of the entire *Ṛgveda* with Sāyaṇa's *Bhāṣya* in about 25 years (1852-75). He also conceived a project of translating into English, with the collaboration of many scholars, the *Sacred Books of the East* in a series of 49 volumes with a 50th volume of Index by Winternitz. He wanted to include the Old and New Testaments also in this series, but did not press for it because of objections from orthodox Christian scholars. Max Müller introduced three major academic disciplines in England — Comparative Philosophy, Comparative Mythology and Comparative Religion. As a Sanskritist he translated the *Hitopadeśa*, *Meghadūta*, part of the *Ṛgveda*, the *Dhammapada* and some Upaniṣad-s. Among his popular books are *The six systems of Indian Philosophy*, *Vedanta Philosophy*, *India — What can it Teach us* ? (Lectures for candidates of I.C.S.).

Although Max Müller was suitable for Boden Professorship after H.H. Wilson's retirement, he was not selected partly because he was a German and not

pro-Catholic. Monier Williams, the rival candidate was selected by a majority of votes. After the critical edition of the *Ṛgveda* and the series of the *Sacred Books of the East* of which 31 were devoted to the Indian texts alone, he retired in 1875 as Professor of Comparative Philosophy, for completing the preparation of the *Sacred Books of the East*. He died in 1900.

Max Müller did not visit India. He said he did not want to go to Benaras, for he was sure to be disillusioned if he saw the city as it was then. Vivekananda visited him in England. Max Müller appreciated the work done by Tilak. Relying on Vedic reference to Orion (*Mṛga*) as the place where the Vernal Equinox was, Tilak suggested B.C. 4500 as the date of the *Ṛgveda* ; in the Brāhmaṇa-s, it had receded to Pleides (*Kṛttikā*) showing its date as c. B.C. 2500. On receiving Tilak's book Max Müller wrote to him that he was a bit sceptical, but it might be that he was not responsive to new ideas because of his old age. Tilak was released from prison because of the intervention of Max Müller who wrote a petition to Queen Victoria. His love for Sanskrit prompted him to have his name in Sanskrit as *Mokṣamūla*.

Max Müller's Death centenary will be celebrated in December 2000 at Calcutta under the auspices of the Max Müller Bhavan of India and the Government of India.

Col. H.S. Olcott, Founder President of the Theosophical Society, got the inspiration to specialize in the publication of the Upaniṣad-s by the Adyar Library

from a letter written to him by Max Müller in 1888 (Later published in *The Theosophist*, December 1888) :

> It seems to me considering the higher object of the Theosophical Society, that you ought to publish a complete and correct edition of the Upaniṣad-s...The Upaniṣad-s are after all the most important portion of the Veda-s for philosophical purposes, and if the Theosophical Society means to do any real good, it must take its stand on the Upaniṣad-s and on nothing else. At present the issue of a beautiful and correct edition of the text seems to me almost a duty to be performed by the Theosophical Society.

From the affinity between the Avestan language and the Vedic Sanskrit, it is inferred that the forefathers of the Vedic Āryans and of the Iranians lived together and spoke a common language, Indo-Iranian. Hence the history of the evolution of Sanskrit has to be traced through the Old Indo-Iranian. Eventhough it is assumed that nomadic bands of Āryans migrated into India through the Northwest passes in successive waves, there is no reference to this migration in the *Ṛgveda*, the first recorded document of the Indo-Āryans. The Sanskrit language preserves many of the ancient features of PIE in its phonology and morphology, and Indian grammarians like Pāṇini (B.C. 500) have analyzed the language into its constituent elements and described the structure so thoroughly as to make the language almost transparent.

Sanskrit served as a link language not only within

India but even outside in the South-east Asian countries. Its influence on foreign languages and even on modern Indian languages has been vast and immense. Sanskrit was a polished language of the elite Brahmins, the Śiṣṭa-s of Āryāvarta and was confined to the orthodox literary circles, but it was propagated throughout the mainland of Asia up to Japan and China by the Buddhists, and to South-east Asia through Śaivism and Vaiṣṇavism by Brahmins, though some Smṛti texts prohibit sea-voyage to the Brahmins as against their *varṇāśramadharma*.

The first epigraphical documents available to us are Asoka's inscriptions in the third century B.C. which are in Prākṛt with various peculiarities on the basis of geographical locations. Sanskrit is found replacing Prākṛt gradually ; and Rudradāman's inscription in the second century A.D. is the first Sanskrit inscription available. But in Indo-China the earliest inscription known is the *Vocanh inscription*, found in the Champa country, which is in Sanskrit. No Prākṛt inscription is found outside India. Among Middle Indo-Āryan languages it is only Pāli that has spread outside India from Ceylon as the language of Hīnayāna Buddhism. In India inscription in mixed Sanskrit and Prākṛt, and literature in Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit began to appear.

Pāli and Ardhamāgadhī developed as the special languages of Hīnayāna Buddhism and Jainism respectively ; but for the sake of prestige, Sanskrit began to be used especially in Māhayāna Buddhism. In India along with the various Prākṛts, Dravidian languages,

especially Tamil, developed and became popular.

Facing such a diversity of language a common means of communication became necessary. During the period of Buddhist propaganda and later of Hinduism this link language was Sanskrit. In spite of its sophisticated nature, Sanskrit was regularly taught in schools not only in India, but even abroad, mostly by Brahmins. In India also Sanskrit was the link language used in the different regions. Post-Vedic religious texts as well as texts on medicine, astronomy, philosophy, art and architecture, and important literary works were written directly in Sanskrit itself in spite of the development of regional languages.

Itsing in the seventh century studied Sanskrit at Palaṁbang in Sumatra on his way from China to India. Many foreign scholars could communicate in Sanskrit, though their command in the language was not perfect. Sanskrit MSS. were brought from India to Central Asia, and Tibet. The propagation of Indian culture abroad has been through Sanskrit. Pāṇini's grammar, Daṇḍin's *Kāvyādarśa* and the *Aṣṭāṅgahṛdaya* were taught and translated in Tibet and Mongolia. Sanskrit was also used for inscriptions, perhaps for prestige. They were in *kāvya* style. Sanskrit inscriptions of Cambodia are rich and vast. Brahmins married princesses there and their children were considered as Brahmins. Śaivāgama-s and Pāñcarātrāgama-s were popular. The local languages were influenced by Sanskrit loan words.

The importance of the study of Sanskrit goes far

beyond the aesthetic value of its literature. Sanskrit is the key to most of the branches of the study of Indian civilization, and the contribution of this civilization to the development of human thought and culture are considerable. The study of Indian classics is the foundation for the study of one of the major and ancient civilizations of the world.

One special feature of this Indian cultural inheritance is the unbroken continuity between the most modern and the most ancient phases of Indian thought extending for nearly 5000 years. Again, it is not an isolated existence. India had continuous and timely contacts with Babylonians, Iranians, Greeks, Egyptians, Chinese and Arabs, and has absorbed and assimilated the best from their civilizations without losing her own individuality. 'If her basic culture survived these contacts, there must have been something in the culture itself which gave it the dynamic strength to do so, some inner vitality and understanding of life.' (A.A. Macdonall)

Unique Features of Sanskrit

Sanskrit is universally recognized as the language containing the earliest literature in the world ; one or two other languages may contain some earlier inscription, but not a whole literature. It has been established as one of the ancient branches of the Indo-European family of languages, an elder sister of the ancient classical languages of Europe like Greek and Latin ; modern North Indian languages are derived from it,

and even the South Indian languages are saturated with Sanskrit loan words. For expanding the vocabulary to cope with the development of civilization, all languages of India and some of the neighbouring languages like Singalese, Burmese and Malaysian depend heavily on Sanskrit loan words. The discovery of Sanskrit as a sister language of the West made it an essential tool to understand the origin and early stages of the European languages, and European scholars began to study Sanskrit as their own language.

It may be said that there is more awareness and a growing interest in the West for Sanskrit studies than in India. This is because Sanskrit is recognized as the earliest member of the Indo-European family.

When studying languages with the help of computers there are two levels to be distinguished — the word level and the sentence level; the former deals with the total amount of information contained in separate words, irrespective of where and how they are used; the latter deals with sentences which give information on the basis of the syntactical aspects, like their position in the sentence. For languages like the English, the syntactic pattern is used for getting the maximum information possible; but for languages like Latin, Greek and Sanskrit the word level approach is more suitable than the other, since they have a highly detailed morphological system, where the syntactic elements are included as part of the words themselves, through declensional and conjugational suffixes. Of these Sanskrit has the most detailed morphological

system and is ideally suited for computer programmes of such classical languages. These programmes consist of pattern recognition — unambiguous recognition of significant patterns of words. The phenomenon of *sandhi* in Sanskrit, effecting alteration of word endings under the influence of the beginning of the next word, makes the task more complicated ; the machine has to be taught these rules, so that the elements can be got in their neutral form.

Sanskrit has also been found the most suited as a universal language. The *kāraka* system in Sanskrit grammar lends itself for transformation into other languages. In ordinary sentences of the statement type indicating an action, the agent, the instrument, the object which undergoes change, the location etc. are all definite (named as *kartar*, *karaṇa*, *karma adhikaraṇa* etc.). A sentence in any language can be first transformed into the Sanskrit pattern, and then translated into any other language. The universal nature of the *kāraka* system helps Sanskrit to play an important role in modern programmes using the computer.

Another interesting feature about Sanskrit is that its simplicity and flexibility do not depend on reducing the vocabulary (as in Basic English), but in a plethora of possible forms to convey an idea. The possibility of building up new words from smaller units as in compound words, or even in *kṛt* and *taddhita* formations, and of the componential analysis of larger units into smaller semantic units makes Sanskrit a sort of transparent language. There are several words for water

(*salilam*, *jalam*, *vāri* etc.) ; if the suffix *ja* is added to any of them, it becomes a word for the lotus ; if *da* is added, it becomes word for the cloud. Any word for 'cool' added to any word for 'ray', makes a word for the 'moon'. These could be stored in a computer, and pressing a word for 'hot' and then for 'ray', will give several words for the sun (the *sandhi* problem has to be taken care of). A Sanskrit student is never at a loss for finding the appropriate word for any idea he has.

The apparent diversity and plethora of vocabulary may baffle the novice, but helps the scholar with a rich and abundant storehouse for proper choice and accurate usage.

The New Catalogus Catalogorum

The *New Catalogus Catalogorum* project of the Madras University in the Sanskrit Department was started in 1935 with Dr. C. Kunhan Raja as its editor and its first volume was published in 1949. After his retirement Dr. V. Raghavan became the editor. He published the second volume in 1966, and the revised version of vol. I in 1968. Dr. K. Kunjunni Raja was appointed its Associate editor in 1966 to help Dr. Raghavan and volumes III, IV and V were published in 1967, 1968 and 1969 respectively. After Dr. Raghavan's retirement in 1969 Dr. Kunjunni Raja became the editor and volumes VI, VII, VIII, IX and X were published in 1971, 1973, 1974, 1977 and 1979 respectively.

The *Catalogus* attracted international and national

cooperation. The Rochfeller Foundation was associated with it for some time ; and then the University Grants Commission assisted it for ten years during the third and fourth plan. The International Council of Philosophy and Human Science of the UNESCO held at Mexico in 1976 gave it strong moral support. In 1977 the financial commitment was stopped ; and the project would not have continued but for the timely initiative of the Vice Chancellor Malcome Adiseshaiah. Volume XI edited by Kunjunni Raja and Veezhinathan came in 1983, Volume XII edited by Veezhinathan was published in 1988. Volume XIII edited by Veezhinathan, with C.S. Sundaram and N. Gangadharan as joint editors, was published in 1991. Volume XIV will be published in September 2000.

The present Vice Chancellor, Pon Kodandaraman, has constituted a five member Advisory committee with Dr. K. Kunjunni Raja as the convener to plan and execute expeditiously the remaining ten volumes of the *New Catalogus Catalogorum.*

S. KALYANARAMAN

REVIVAL OF THE LEGENDARY RIVER SARASVATI

A historic event unfolded in Jagadhri, (Yamunanagar Dist, Haryana State) on 24 July 1999, which will have long-term beneficial impact on major parts of North West India and revive memories of over 5,000 years ago.

Three projects to revive the legendary river Sarasvati were inaugurated; one was to link and re-activate the ancient channels of the river from Adh Badri (Yamunanagar Dist.) to Pehoa (referred to as Pruthudaka in the Great Indian Epic, *Mahābhārata*); the second was to provide a piped feeder from the Bhakra main canal to Pehoa, using the perennial waters of the Sutlej emanating from the Mansarovar glacier in Mt. Kailash; the third was to map the course of the river over a stretch of 1600 kms. from Bandarpunch massif in Western Garhwal (Har-ki-dun glacier) to the Arabian Sea near Somnath (Prabhas Patan, Gujarat) using the remote sensing application centre in Jodhpur, Rajasthan and to delineate the groundwater sanctuaries and palaeo-drainage system of North-West India.

Shri Suraj Bhan, Governor of Uttar Pradesh (who was an M.P. representing Ambala constituency) inaugurated the Sarasvati Shodh Sansthan, Haryana. Dr. S. Kalyanaraman, Sarasvati Sindhu Research

Centre, Chennai was a keynote speaker. The occasion was graced by the presence of Shri Moropant Pingalay, Sanrakshak, Akhila Bharatiya Itihaasa Sankalana Yojana, Shri Darshan Lal, Sarasvati Shodh Sansthan, Haryana and Shri Haribhau Vaze, National Organizing Secretary of the Yojana. A highlight of the occasion was the proposal to create a Sarasvati River Basin Authority to coordinate the development efforts for ensuring water security in four ecological zones: Himalayan glaciers, foothills of the Siwalik ranges, semi-arid zones of Rajasthan and marshy terrain in Gujarat.

The initial stage of the revival of the river Sarasvati begins with the re-activation of the channel from Adh Badri to Pehoa is mentioned as Sarasvati Nadi on the survey of India topo-sheets. This project is financed by the World Bank as part of the package of $139 million US Dollars for rejuvenation of the water systems of North West India. The reactivation of this section will keep the river flowing all 365 days of the year upto Pehoa and beyond. Pehoa has the ancient Vasiṣṭha *āśrama* where the river Sarasvati becomes east-flowing and at Sarasvati Ghats homage to ancestors (*pitṛ tarpaṇa*) is offered by pilgrims. The ghats are more ancient than the pilgrimage ghats in Varanasi on the river Ganga. This pilgrimage site was also visited by Balarāma during his pilgrimage from Dwaraka to Mathura along the course of the Sarasvati river as described in the Śalya-parvan of the *Mahābhārata*.

The *Ṛgveda* describes the river Sarasvati in 65

hymns and extols it as a mighty Himalayan river and several myths have been woven around its existence and disappearance. Now, thanks to the work done by an array of scientists and scholars, in a superb multi-disciplinary effort, the entire course of the river has been mapped traversing a distance of over 1,600 kms. from Himalayan glaciers to Gujarat and fresh water resources called groundwater sanctuaries have been identified. Even in the desert region of Jaisalmer, the scientists of Bhabha Atomic Research Centre have established that the subterranean water-courses of the river (called aquifers) still maintain their headwater connection with the Himalayan glaciers and form potential groundwater sanctuaries for exploitation. The entire Sarasvati river basin will prove to be beneficial for over 200 million people in the states of Haryana, Punjab, Rajasthan and Gujarat and provide an opportunity for the entire world community to recall that this river basin constitutes a great world heritage site which has over 1200 archaeological sites dated between B.C. 3300 and 1500.

The economic importance of these projects on this river basin are further heightened by the possibility of extending the Rajasthan canal (which draws waters from the Himalayan glacier source of Mansarovar, Mt. Kailash, through the river Sutlej) beyond Jodhpur upto the Rann of Kutch to provide freshwater resources to this salty and marshy terrain and enable recharging of groundwater resources.

A superb website has been created with over

30,000 files related to the river Sarasvati, archaeological finds, ancient languages of the region, glaciological, palaeovegetation and other earth science studies, multi-media presentation of the *Ṛgveda* and the complete corpus of inscriptions found in archaeological sites. The website Universal Resource Locator (URL) is : http://sarasvati.simplenet.com.

A number of organizations are involved in the research and project work : National Remote Sensing Agency, Geological Society of India, Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, Central Water Commission, State Water Resources Agencies, Central Arid Zone Forest Research Institute, Indian Space Research Organization. Satellite images from LANDSAT, EOSAT, IRS 1-A to 1-D have been put to extensive use in the research studies. The participation of the scientific community in the studies is highlighted by the recent publication (Feb. 1999) by Geological Society of a book titled *Vedic Sarasvati* describing the paleo-drainage system of North-West India.

Reappearance of River Sarasvati

Excerpt from the News report in The Daily, Nov. 12, 1999 : The Sarasvati emerged as a mighty river from the Himalayan glaciers about 10,000 years ago. It coursed through north-western India and drained into the ancient Arabian Sea before vanishing into oblivion after 4,000 years of glorious existence. But a favourable climatic condition can switch on the rebirth process of Sarasvati in future, says the report in the

latest issue of the journal *Current Science* that reviews earlier research works in this field. However, it does not indicate how long it will take the process to start. The climatic swing that led to changes in North-western India thousands of years ago was triggered by variations in the earth's orbit and tilt.

Both the events have no parallel in the entire history of civilization (1) that a river of the magnitude of Sarasvati had been desiccated c. B.C. 1900-1500 and (2) that like the Bhagīratha story of the emergence of the Ganga, the perennial River Sarasvati will come alive soon to benefit the present and future generations. Both the discovery and the ongoing project should make every Indian feel proud of his and her heritage and the technological competence we have acquired with hard work and diligence.

S. REVATHY

VALIDITY OF KNOWLEDGE : Intrinsic or Extrinsic?

NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE

Gautama in the first aphorism of his *Nyāyasūtra*: *tattvañānāt niḥśreyasādhigamaḥ* has stated that *tattva-jñāna* is the means of liberation. In the second aphorism : *duḥkhajanmapravṛttidoṣamithyājñānānām uttarottarāpāye tadanantarāpāyād apavargaḥ* he states that *tattvajñāna* removes *mithyājñāna*. The latter could be removed only by valid knowledge. Hence *tatttvajñāna* which is said to remove *mithyājñāna* is valid knowledge or *pramā*. In other words valid knowledge is that which has for its adjectival feature the attribute that is present in the substantive.

In the commentary on the third aphorism of the *Nyāyasūtra* Vātsyāyana states that *pramāṇa* is *upalabdhisādhana*.[1] From this it is known that the word *upalabdhi* stands for *pramā*.

The *Nyāyasūtra*: *buddhir upalabdhir jñānam ity anarthāntaram* (I.1.15) states that the words *buddhi*, *upalabdhi* and *jñāna* are synonyms. Since contentless cognition is an impossibility, we must take that knowledge relating to a particular object is valid. But

this definition is applicable to recollection and illusory cognition too, as they also are forms of cognition and they refer to objects.

Vācaspatimiśra seems to have felt the above difficulty, for he defines *pramā* as knowledge which is distinct from recollection and which does not lack correspondence with its object.[2]

Viśvanātha in his *Kārikāvalī* gives two definitions of valid knowledge. The first one is : Valid knowledge is that which is different from illusory knowledge.[3] This definition suffers from the fallacy of *avyāpti* in the following case : nacre and silver are mistaken for two objects of silver. But as far as the silver-element is concerned this cognition is valid. But it is not different from erroneous cognition. Thus the definition of valid knowledge that it should be different from erroneous cognition is not applicable in the genuine case of valid knowledge of silver-element. Hence, this definition is given up and another definition is given which is as follows : Valid knowledge is that which has for its adjectival feature the attribute that is present in the substantive.[4]

It might be said : in the above two definitions the word *jñāna* is used, and that word is common to both experience (*anubhava*) and recollection (*smṛti*). Hence the above definitions would be applicable to recollection too.

The above contention is answered in the *Muktāvalī*[5] thus : recollection also is admitted to be valid

knowledge. Hence the application of the above definitions would not amount to the fallacy of *ativyāpti*.

It might be said that in that case, the instrument of recollection, namely, *saṃskāra* must be admitted to be a distinct *pramāṇa* which would mean that there will be a fifth *pramāṇa*.

In the *Muktāvalī*, the above contention is answered by saying that *pramāṇa* is that which is an instrument of valid experience. The instrument of recollection is not the instrument of experience as recollection is not experience. Hence the instrument of recollection cannot be considered to be a *pramāṇa*.[6]

The above view seems to be quite sound. The author of the *Nyāyasūtra* while referring to the valid cognition (*pramā*) which is the annihilating factor of erroneous cognition uses the word *jñāna*[7] which is common to both recollection and experience. Thus when he equates *tattvajñāna* with *pramā*, it comes to this that recollection too which is *jñāna* is valid knowledge. It, however, is not an experience. And its instrument therefore, cannot be a *pramāṇa*. Hence the four-fold classification of *pramāṇa-s* into perception, inference, comparison, and verbal testimony in the *Nyāyasūtra* holds good.[8]

Annaṃbhaṭṭa has, however, defined valid knowledge in such a way as to exclude recollection from its purview. Valid knowledge is experience which has for its adjectival feature or predicate a character which the subject or substantive actually possesses.[9]

When there is contact of sense of sight with silver, there arises the knowledge of silver. This knowledge is not recollection; it is experience. It has silverness as its predicate. And, this silverness is actually present in silver which is the substantive. Hence this experience is valid.

The above may look like a correct definition of *pramā*. But when considered in the light of certain group-cognitions (*samūhālambanabhrama*) where in two or more substantive factors are presented as co-ordinate objects associated with certain adjuncts,[10] a serious difficulty arises. It is thus: when tin (*raṅga*) and silver (*rajata*) are present in a particular place, there may arise a group-cognition mistaking tin for silver and silver for tin. This group-cognition takes the form — these are silver and tin (*ime rajataraṅge*). The definition of *pramā* given above would precisely apply to this case of erroneous cognition. It is because even this erroneous cognition has silverness as its predicate and silver wherein silverness actually exists as its substantive. In the same way, it has tin-ness as its predicate and tin wherein tin-ness actually exists as its substantive. In the definition of *pramā* given above there is nothing that would exclude the cases of erroneous cognition referred to above.

To exclude such cases, it is pointed out that the adjunctness (*prakāratā*) of the attribute presented in a valid cognition is correlated with the substantiveness of the thing that actually possesses the attribute. In the

valid knowledge of silver as 'this is silver', adjunctness (*prakāratā*) is present in silverness. It is correlated with substantiveness that is present in silver which actually possesses the silverness. In the case of the erroneous group-cognition referred to above, the substantiveness of tin is not rightly correlated to the adjunctness of tin-ness, but wrongly correlated to the adjunctness of silverness. Similarly, the substantiveness of silver is not rightly correlated to the adjunctness of silverness, but wrongly correlated to the adjunctness of tinness. Hence the emended definition of valid knowledge is not applicable to the group-cognition and so there is no defect of *ativyāpti*.

Although the above amended definition of *pramā* is not applicable to erroneous group-cognition, and thereby does not suffer from the defect of *ativyāpati*, yet it suffers from the defect of *avyāpti* as it is not applicable to the genuine case of *nirvikalpakajñāna*. The latter does not involve any reference to the adjunct or *prakāra* and hence the definition of *pramā* that involves reference to *prakāra* would not be applicable to it. As such there results the defect of *avyāpti*.

To get over the above difficulty, Annaṃbhaṭṭa should define valid knowledge as that which is different from erroneous cognition. And erroneous cognition is defined as the one which has for its predicate a character that is not actually present in the substantive. According to this definition, *nirvikalpakajñāna*, which is different from erroneous cognition, is *pramā* or a valid one.

The author of the *Muktāvalī* must have felt the difficulty pointed out above. And hence he has stated that *nirvikalpakajñāna* is neither valid nor erroneous.[11] Hence the non-applicability of the definition of *pramā* that involves reference to the presence of adjunct to *nirvikalpakajñāna* does not amount to the defect of *avyāpti*.

II

VALIDITY OF KNOWLEDGE

Valid knowledge has been defined as a cognition that has for its predicate a character which its substantive actually possesses. Now the question arises : what is the nature of the factor that apprehends this fact?

The systems of Bhāṭṭamīmāṃsā, Prābhākaramīmāṃsā, the Mīmāṃsā of Murārimiśra and Advaitavedānta maintain that the factor that comprehends a primary cognition comprehends its validity also. Thus these systems uphold the view that validity of knowledge is known intrinsically. The Nyāya system, on the other hand, maintains the view that validity of a cognition is known not by the factor that comprehends the cognition but by a factor that is different from it. According to it the validity of a cognition is known extrinsically.

According to the Bhāṭṭa school, cognition transcends the sense-organs. Hence the cognition of a pot

which arises from the contact of the sense of sight does not become the object of another cognition. The cognition of the pot gives rise to a peculiar quality called 'known-ness' (*jñātatā*) in the object. This quality is immediately apprehended. On the basis of this immediate apprehension of known-ness, the existence of the cognition of pot is inferred. It is this inferential knowledge that cognizes the primary cognition, and also the validity of the primary cognition.

According to the Prābhākara school, owing to the contact of sense organs, there arises in the first instance itself the cognition in the form 'I know the pot'. In this cognition, the three factors of pot, cognition and the soul are manifested. Cognition is self-luminous in the sense that it is the content of itself. Thus cognition which comprehends itself comprehends its validity too.

According to Murārimiśra, first there arises the cognition in the form 'this is a pot'. Subsequently there arises an after-cognition (*anuvyavasāya*) in the form 'I know the pot'. In other words, the after-cognition takes the form 'I have the cognition whose predicate is potness and the substantive is pot. Thus according to Murārimiśra's view, it is the after-cognition that comprehends the primary cognition. And it is the same after-cognition that comprehends the validity of the primary cognition too.

According to Advaita, cognition of the pot is only the mental state in the form of a pot inspired by the

reflection of consciousness in it. It is comprehended by the witness-self which, according to one school of Advaita, is consciousness that transcends the mind. And it is the witness-self which comprehends the cognition of the pot that comprehends its validity too. Thus, according to the four schools mentioned above, the validity of cognition is intrinsically known in the sense that the cognition which comprehends the primary cognition comprehends its validity too.

According to the Bhāṭṭa school, it is the inferential knowledge based upon 'known-ness' that comprehends the primary cognition. And, it is the same inferential knowledge that comprehends the validity of the primary cognition. According to the Prābhākara school, it is cognition in the form, 'I know the pot' that comprehends itself. And it is the same cognition that comprehends its validity too.

The Nyāya school maintains that the cognition 'this is a pot' is definitely comprehended by the after-cognition 'I have the knowledge of the pot'. But this after-cognition which comprehends the primary cognition does not comprehend the validity of the latter. If the validity were also comprehended by the after-cognition, then doubt about the validity of the primary cognition which sometimes occurs could not be explained. Hence the Naiyāyika is of the view that the after-cognition which comprehends the primary cognition does not comprehend the validity of the latter. Its validity, however, is cognized by inferential

cognition that results from the following inference: 'The cognition I have is valid; because it initiates successful activity in me; whatever cognition is not valid fails to cause successful activity, like invalid cognition.' Thus we see that according to the Naiyāyika the primary cognition is comprehended by the after-cognition. And, the validity of the primary cognition is comprehended by something different from the after-cognition, that is inferential cognition.

Now there are two alternatives: the validity of a cognition is comprehended by that which comprehends the cognition; or, it is not so. The former is affirmative, while the latter is negative. Those who uphold the first alternative favour the theory that the validity of a cognition is intrinsically known. Those who favour the second maintain the theory that the validity of a cognition is extrinsically known. As has been said earlier, the schools of Bhāṭṭa, Prābhākara, Murārimiśra and Advaita adopt the former theory, while the Naiyāyika, the latter.

Now the alternative in the affirmative manner is: The validity of a cognition is comprehended by that which comprehends the primary cognition (*jñāna-prāmāṇyaṃ jñānagrāhakasāmagrīgrāhyam*).

We have said that according to the schools other than Nyāya, the validity of a cognition (*jñāna-prāmāṇya*) is comprehended by that factor itself which comprehends the cognition (*jñānagrāhakasāmagrī-grāhya*). This definition of validity of cognition should

not be applicable to the validity of cognition admitted by the Nyāya school. It, however, becomes applicable to it also. It is thus : we have said that according to Nyāya it is only the inferential cognition that comprehends the validity of the primary cognition. Inferential cognition while apprehending the validity of the primary cognition would apprehend the cognition too. It is because one cannot apprehend the validity of a particular cognition without apprehending, at the same time, that cognition itself. Thus the definition of the validity of a cognition admitted by the schools other than Nyāya would be true of even the Nyāya view. Certainly those schools would never accept the Nyāya position that the validity of a cognition is known extrinsically, that is, by an inferential cognition.

To overcome the above difficulty, it is suggested that the definition of validity given by the schools other than that of Nyāya must be amended thus : *jñānaprāmāṇyaṃ yāvajjñānagrāhakasāmagrīgrāhyam.* That is, the word *yāvat* is employed in the definition. Now the definition would come to this : the validity of a cognition is comprehended by every cognition that comprehends the primary cognition. In the case of schools other than Nyāya, there exists no cognition excepting the cognition that comprehends the primary one. But, for the Nyāya school, there exist two cognitions that comprehend the primary cognition. The cognition 'this is pot' is comprehended not only by the after-cognition which takes the form 'I know the pot'

but also by the inferential cognition which is admitted to be comprehending the validity of the primary cognition. As we have already said, the inferential cognition cannot apprehend the validity of a cognition without apprehending the cognition itself.

Now, the schools other than Nyāya could say that the validity of a cognition is comprehended by every cognition that comprehends the primary one. But the Nyāya school could not say so, because, the validity of the primary cognition is not comprehended by every cognition that comprehends the primary one. The primary cognition is comprehended by the after-cognition and also by the inferential cognition. It is only the inferential cognition that is admitted to be comprehending the validity of the primary one and not the after-cognition. Thus since according to the Nyāya school, the validity of a cognition is not comprehended by every cognition that comprehends the primary one, the definition of validity given by the schools other than Nyāya would not be true of the Nyāya view. Now the amended definition stands as follows: *jñāna-prāmāṇyaṃ yāvajjñānagrāhakasāmagrīgrāhyam.*

It is argued that according to this definition intrinsic validity of a cognition lies in being comprehended by the cognition that comprehends the primary cognition. Now the cognition 'this knowledge is not valid', which arises subsequent to the valid cognition, 'this is silver' cognizes the cognition of silver. Further it cognizes not the validity of the

cognition of silver but only its invalidity. Thus the cognition 'this knowledge is not valid', does not apprehend its validity although it comprehends the cognition of silver; on the contrary it apprehends its invalidity. This is against the position held so far that a cognition besides comprehending another cognition cognizes its validity too.

To get over this difficulty it is suggested that the cognition which comprehends another cognition must be such that it does not comprehend the invalidity of the latter. In the present case, the cognition 'this knowledge is not valid' no doubt comprehends the cognition 'this is silver'. But it apprehends only the invalidity of the latter. Hence by the expression 'that which comprehends another cognition' we should not take the cognition 'this knowledge is not valid'.

Now the amended definition takes this form: *jñānaprāmāṇyam aprāmāṇyagrāhakayāvajjñānagrāhakasāmagrīgrāhyam*.

It is argued that even in this changed form the definition would not apply to the following case, where, therefore, validity would not be intrinsically cognized. This we shall explain thus:

1. Shell is mistaken for silver. There is the erroneous cognition 'this is silver'.

2. Then there arises the after-cognition 'this cognition is invalid'. This after-cognition has the cognition of silver as its object.

3. Subsequently there arises another after-

cognition which takes the form, 'the cognition', (the after-cognition) that 'this cognition is invalid' is valid.

Now the second cognition 'this cognition is invalid' is a valid one. According to the definition of intrinsic validity, the second cognition is comprehended by the third cognition. And, it must be said that the third cognition while comprehending the second one comprehends its validity too. But we have just now stated that only that cognition which comprehends the primary cognition and which does not apprehend it to to be invalid, comprehends its validity. When viewed in this light, the third cognition while comprehending the second cognition comprehends the element of invalidity pertaining to the first cognition. As such, the third cognition cannot comprehend the validity of the second cognition.

To get over this difficulty, it is said that the comprehending cognition should not apprehend the invalidity of the cognition which it comprehends. In the present case, the third cognition comprehends only the invalidity of the first cognition presented in the second cognition. It does not comprehend invalidity of the second cognition. Hence the third cognition comprehends the second cognition, and does not apprehend its invalidity, i.e. it does not apprehend invalidity of that cognition, the validity of which is to be apprehended. Thus the final definition of intrinsic validity is : *jñānaprāmāṇyaṃ tadaprāmāṇyagrāhaka-yāvajjñānagrāhakasāmagrīgrāhyam.*[12]

The Nyāya school argues that validity is known extrinsically. If it were held that it is known intrinsically, then the doubt which one has as regards the validity of a cognition would not be intelligible. And so as said earlier, it is the inferential cognition based upon the successful activity on attaining a particular cognition that comprehends not only the cognition but also its validity. Hence validity of knowledge is known extrinsically. This is the Nyāya view.

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Notes

1. *pramāṇāni upalabdhisādhanāni*. (*Nyāyasūtra*, I.1.3).
2. *lokādhīnāvadhāraṇo hi śabdārthasaṃbandhaḥ. lokaśca smṛteḥ anyām upalabdhim arthāvyabhicāriṇīṃ pramām ācaṣṭe.* (*Nyāyavārttika Tātparyaṭīkā*, p. 35).
3. *bhramabhinnaṃ tu jñānam atrocyate pramā*. (*Kārikāvalī*, v. 134.).
4. *nanu yatra śuktirajatayoḥ ime rajate iti jñānaṃ jātaṃ tatra rajatāṃśe'pi pramā na syāt, tajjñānasya bhramabhinnatvābhāvāt.* (*Muktāvalī*, p. 484.). *athavā tatprakāraṃ yajjñānaṃ tadvadviśeṣyakam.* (*Kārikāvali*, v. 135).
5. *Muktāvalī*, p. 484.
6. ibid.
7. *tattvajñānat niḥśreyasādhigamaḥ*. (*Nyāyasūtra*, I.1.1).
8. *pratyakṣānumānopamānaśabdāḥ pramāṇāni*. (ibid, I.1.3).

9. *tadvati tatprakārako'nubhavaḥ yathārthaḥ saiva pramā ity ucyate.* (*Tarkasaṃgraha*, p. 115).
10. *nānāmukhyaviśeṣyakaṃ jñānaṃ samūhālambanam ity ucyate.* (*Bālapriyā,* p. 118).
11. *...na pramā nāpi bhramaḥ syān nirvikalpakaḥ.* (*Kārikāvalī*, v. 135).
12. *Tarkasaṃgrahadīpikā*, p. 268-82.

S. RAMASWAMI

JANAŚRUTI AND RAIKVA

An ancient story speaks of a king approaching a sage seeking the most efficacious means of achieving peace of mind and freedom from a mind-destroying recurrence of restlessness. The sage took pity on the king and bad him seek out a truly happy man and acquire his shirt to wear in place of his royal robes. The king's messengers searched far and wide for a truly happy man, and found at last some-one blissfully devoid of cares and anxieties singing himself away with rapturous abandon. But he had no clothes at all on him, not to speak of a shirt which he could be presuaded to give away to the king. Peace of mind and the happiness that goes with it cannot be secured by any magical or mechanical means but only by strenuous and persistent effort of the entire being. This message is of timeless and placeless validity.

There is, however, a story in the *Chāndogyopaniṣad* of a king who was a generous benefactor of his people, a royal giver of food and a kindly compassionate one. This king was indeed a philosopher and a lover of nature.

Once Janaśruti found himself talked about by a flight of swans flying overhead. One swan scolded another for unwittingly disrespecting Janaśruti's sublime contemplation of the visible miracles of the

heavens above. The other swan retorted. 'Is Janaśruti at all comparable in his spiritual achievement with Raikva, the man behind a mere cart?' Janaśruti was not pained or displeased by the apparently adverse comment on him of one of the swans. He sent his messengers abroad to find out about Raikva. The messengers did find Raikva after a strenous search, seated by the side of a cart. Janaśruti went to Raikva with a gift of fruits, flowers and cows, and a gold necklace. Raikva in a rare show of absolute disdain and contempt for the gifts addressed him a Śūdra and rejected him and his gifts. Janaśruti, stunned by the peremptory rejection of his gifts, went a second time to Raikva with a thousand cows and much else, and taking his daughter also with him. Raikva appeared less brusque and more complaisant on this occasion. He accepted the gifts and agreed to take the daughter to be his wife. He then imparted to Janaśruti the *upāsana vidyā*, a precious store of matchless wisdom which would yield its possessor measureless peace and true joy.

The story, like most stories in the Upaniṣad-s, is of a compelling homeliness, but also of a disconcerting abruptness and brevity. To my mind the lessons of this remarkable episode is both valid and illuminating. The term *śūdra* with which Raikva greets Janaśruti is explained by the great Ādi Śaṃkara Bhagavatpāda as referring to a person who is constantly in a state of inner tumult and disharmony changing vainly and

fruitlessly to worthless objects of transient material happiness. Wisdom consists in transcending this ludicrously low level of being. *Śūdra* thus refers not to a *jāti* or *varṇa* but to distressingly low level of spiritual and moral development. On this basis most humans are *śūdra-s* whatever *varṇa* they may be born into. The contempt of Raikva for less spiritually developed persons may be disconcerting. One expects compassionate concern for the less fortunate from the more fortunate. But let us remember, the contempt is for the things that satisfy the more ordinary type of mind and not for the person involved.

The Upaniṣad-s are a clarion call to abandon attachment to things which afford a dubious, transient, sensuous joy and to lift ourselves to that transcendent height wherein one's being finds a rare and joyous fulfillment and meaning. Life is not for a livelihood. Life is an opportunity for spiritual growth and development. One may encounter disturbing and disconcerting obstacles on the way. These are a test of our earnestness in pressing the goal of *adhyātma-vidyā* of *brahmānubhhava* and *brahamajñāna*.

A Marcus Aurelius may claim that even in a palace, one may lead a worth-while life. But palaces are perilous prisons which keep the *ātman-s* in a vice-like grip of worldliness. The true goal of life may not be easily persued in an environment of glittering pomp and revelry. The sages of India sought the forests and caves, shunning every material comfort as a

disastrous temptation to forgo the spiritual riches we are truly heirs to. A palace may seem quite a forest or a cave to a highly developed being. To most of us palaces are visions of apparent joy and certain ruin of one's essential being.

K. KUNJUNNI RAJA

PURE LITERATURE

Pure literature deals with human emotional relationship which forms the essential nature of life for us. Even when the characters are not human beings as in the case of fables like the *Pañcatantra* it is human emotional relationship that is mainly described. In the case of inanimate objects of nature like rivers and mountains also, it is the human emotions that are invoked. It may be that sometimes natural phenomena like the sunset and the fullmoon rise, the running rivulets and the travelling clouds are described for their own sake ; but even there the objects of nature are described as evoking the emotions in the characters, or as reflecting the emotions of the characters described. That is why Ānandavardhana and his followers declared that there is no literature completely devoid of emotions.

There are three types of introducing emotions in literature : invoking, evoking and provoking. Invoked emotions have their *loci* in the different characters invented by the poet, or the playwright. The locus of evoked emotions is the heart of the *sahṛdaya-s* — the audience and the readers. The readers have empathy with the characters, and may have to participate actively with the situation, almost identifying with the

characters and even having the same feelings as the characters. This is called the *sthāyibhāva*. Tọtal identification is not necessary or desirable. The actor or the reader must feel as one with the character, but he should not forget that he is only imitating the situation. According to the *Kūṭiyāṭṭam* tradition of staging Sanskrit plays in Kerala temple theatres, the actor must always remember that he is identical with the character (*so'smīti manasā smaran*). The ideal reader must forget about his personal problems etc., and try to identify with the situation. But he must not forget that he is not in the real world, but a make-belief world created by the artist. The locus of this kind of emotion is the reader or the audience. What is evoked is called *rasa*. The invoked emotion may be grief, but the evoked *rasa* is a pleasurable experience. The third kind of emotion is that which is provoked in the audience. Propaganda literature inciting people for action, didactic poems and Subhāṣita-s may be included in this type. Even narrative literature like the Itihāsa-s and Purāṇa-s imply didactic instruction. According to the Mīmāṃsā school of hermeneutics every sentence ultimately tries to influence the mind of the listener towards some action ; even in statements as in the case of commands, advice and prayer.

Aesthetic pleasure (*rasāsvāda*) is considered as the most important aim of pure literature. It is this which distinguishes pure literature from other types of literature. If any didactic element is implied in pure litera-

ture, it should be in a concealed and subtle form. Didactic powers of pure literature resolve themselves into a peculiar power of suggesting aesthetic enjoyment. Mammaṭa puts it clearly through the simile of a loving wife influencing her husband (*kāntā-saṃmitatayā upadeśayuje*, I.2). Bhāmaha's reference to *prīti* or pleasure refers to the same aesthetic delight as one of the purposes of poetry, explained by Abhinavagupta as the most important purpose.

धर्मार्थकाममोक्षेषु वैचक्षण्यं कलासु च ।
करोति कीर्तिं प्रीतिं च साधुकाव्यनिषेवणम् ॥

(*Kāvyālaṅkāra,* I.2)

Quoting this passage from Bhāmaha, Abhinavagupta remarks in his *Locana* (*Dhvanyāloka*, I, p. 41) :

तथापि तत्र प्रीतिरेव प्रधानम् । अन्यथा प्रभुसंमितेभ्यो वेदादिभ्यो मित्रसंमितेभ्यश्चेतिहासादिभ्यो व्युत्पत्तिहेतुभ्यः कोऽस्य काव्यरूपस्य व्युंत्पत्तिहेतोः जायासंमितत्वलक्षणो विशेष इति प्राधान्येनानन्द एवोक्तः ।

(Here again bliss is the chief goal. Otherwise what difference would there be between one means of instruction, namely poetry which instructs by influencing like a wife and other means of instruction such as the Veda-s which command like a master or Itihāsa-s which instruct like a friend ? That is why bliss is said to be the chief goal. The essence of *rasa*, the soul of poetry, is this bliss, termed as *prīti* and *ānanda.*

Ānandavardhana himself says that the purpose of writing his book *Dhvanyāloka*, (I.2) is *sahṛdayaprīti*, aesthetic pleasure of the accomplished readers.

Later writers have developed this idea and classified Sanskrit literature into three types: the Veda-s which command like a master, Itihāsa-s and Purāṇa-s which advise like a friend and pure literature which influences in a subtle and pleasing manner like a loving wife. It is also stated that the Veda-s are *śabda-pradhāna*, the Itihāsa-s and Purāṇa-s are *arthapra-dhāna*, and pure literature like poetry and drama should be taken as *ubhayapradhāna* where both *śabda* and *artha* are of equal importance (*Pratāparudrīya*, I).

Abhinavagupta stresses this point in the third Uddyota of *Locana* (*Dhvanyāloka*, pp. 368-9). He says that the best way to instruct princes and other people in important positions is to provide them with ethical and didactic education through good poetry which influences them in a subtle and pleasing manner by entering into their heart and giving them delight.

इह प्रभुसंमितेभ्यः श्रुतिस्मृतिप्रभृतिभ्यः कर्तव्यमिदमित्याज्ञामात्र-परमार्थेभ्यः शास्त्रेभ्यो ये न व्युत्पन्नाः, न चाप्यस्येदं वृत्तममुष्मात् कर्मण इत्येवं युक्तियुक्तकर्मफलसंबन्धप्रकटनकारिभ्यो मित्रसंमितेभ्य इतिहास-शास्त्रेभ्यो लब्धव्युत्पत्तयः, अथ चावश्यव्युत्पाद्यः प्रजार्थसंपादनयोग्य-ताक्रान्ता राजपुत्रप्रायाः तेषां हृदयानुप्रवेशमुखेन चतुर्वर्गोपायव्युत्पत्ति-राधेया। हृदयानुप्रवेशश्च रसास्वादमय एव।

'The princes and other people of that type who are

not educated in Veda-s and Smṛti-s which consist in commands like those of a master as to what should be done and what should not, and who have not received instruction from Itihāsa-s etc., which like a friend explain the connection of cause and effect such as this was the result of this action etc. with a persuasive advice, and who are therefore in great need of instruction, since they are to take charge of the power to accomplish the needs of the subjects — such people can be given instruction in the four goals of man only by entering into their hearts — through the imaginative experience of aesthetic pleasure.'

This *rasa* can be brought about by the delineation of proper *vibhāva-s* etc. Thus enjoyment of *rasa* itself will be the means of instruction; delight is the aid to instruction. The idea that didactic elements should be conveyed in literature only in a subtle and pleasing manner was pointed out by Bhāmaha himself much earlier.

स्वादुकाव्यरसोन्मिश्रं शास्त्रमप्युपयुज्यते ।
प्रथमालीढमधवः पिबन्ति कटु भेषजम् ॥ (१.३)

The criticism on Bhāmaha in the *Daśarūpaka* seems to be very strong and harsh.

आनन्दनिष्यन्दिषु रूपकेषु व्युत्पत्तिमात्रं फलमल्पबुद्धिः ।
योऽपीतिहासादिवदाह साधु तस्मै नमः स्वादुपराङ्मुखाय ॥

Dhanika, on this verse, quotes Bhāmaha's verse

dharmārthakāmamokṣeṣu.. and says (*Daśarūpaka*, I.6):

त्रिवर्गादिव्युत्पत्तिं काव्यफलत्वेनेच्छन्ति केचित् । तन्निरासेन स्वसंवेद्यपरमानन्दरूपो रसास्वादो दशरूपाणां फलं न पुनरितिहासादिवत् त्रिवर्गादिव्युत्पत्तिमात्रमिति दर्शितम् ।

It may be noted that Bhāmaha had given *prīti* (bliss) as the final aim (*prayojana*) and Abhinavagupta had explained it as equivalent to *rasāsvāda*. *Trivargādivyutpatti* is a misquotation or a partial quotation, and the attack is unwarranted.

Bhaṭṭanāyaka is also said to have held a similar view giving importance to *rasa* realization, not direct instruction or command:

काव्ये रसयिता सर्वे न बोद्धा न नियोगभाक् ।

Here there are two points of views to be noted, often confused, and not properly distinguished: 1. Aesthetic enjoyment itself plays the role of didacticism; there is no separate didactic element to be introduced, even in a subtle or pleasing manner. 2. There can be didacticism independent of aestheticism, but that didacticism should be concealed in aestheticism; like bitter medicine covered in honey, or a sugar-coated pill. The former view is that real aesthetic experience, almost akin to self-realization, will have a didactic purifying, cathartic influence on the audience or the reader.

A similar problem comes in philosophy and religion also. Dharma may not have any meaning for a

realized soul (*sthitaprajña*) ; then should he follow ethical rules ? The answer is that such a man is not bound by ethical rules ; however, he cannot but be a morally sound person, because of his early training for being a fit seeker after truth. In literature also a really great poet like Kālidāsa may not be bound by any considerations of moral ethics, but the vision of reality as beauty which prompted him to write his poem will automatically lead him (and his readers) through the proper way.

Veda-s as Pure Literature

Should we include Vedic literature on the one hand and the Itihāsa-s and the Purāṇa-s on the other in pure literature ? The case of the *Ṛgveda* as pure literature has been advocated effectively by the late Professor C. Kunhan Raja. The value and importance of the *Ṛgveda* unsurpassed in world classical literature in aesthetic value, in variety and in volume have been highlighted by him in many of his publications like *The Poet Philosophers of the Ṛgveda*, *Quintessence of the Ṛgveda* and *Asyavāmīya or The Riddle of the Universe*. He says, 'In matter, in form and in variety the *Ṛgvedic* poetry can claim a place among the highest literary output in any language. *Ṛgvedic* poetry has never been surpassed in Sanskrit, and as art there is no literature in any language that can beat it. It is the earliest poetry of humanity and continues to be the finest even after the laps of so many millennia. It is not

the scripture of any religion. There is no dogmas involved in it. It calls for no belief. It reflects a very advanced civilization. It is a source book for the study of man and his life. Its appeal is thus universal.'

The Vedic seers (Ṛṣi-s) were very much concerned with the problem of communication of their aesthetic and mystic vision of reality through the medium of language. Sometimes they wailed over the inadequacy of the ordinary language for communicating ultimate religious and aesthetic experience ; but more often they praised the goddess of speech (*Vāk*) for favour in blessing them with the power of language to overcome the innate inadequacies in proper communication.

They were very much concerned with the craftsmanship of composing poetry. The ordinary words of everyday life were accepted as the raw material. The chaff had to be removed by winnowing ; the instruments (words) had to be sharpened and polished, and used like arrows in battle. They were interested in finding out the deviance from ordinary language, and were experimenting with the proper arrangement of words for the required effect. Importance of metres as wings for the flying birds, was also recognized. The later theory of *sahṛdaya* or an ideal listener who can tune his mental *vīṇā* to the same wavelength as that of the poets, and the multiplicity of meaning for the same poem when looked at from different points of view — all these were known to them. If literary criticism was raised to the level of a science in the classical period,

the roots of that theory can be seen in the Veda-s themselves. Yāska has made it clear that the same passage could be interpreted in different ways depending on contextual factors and that the received text is more important than what the poets thought and some of the readers understood.

The Rāmāyaṇa

Ānandavardhana has advocated the cause of Vālmīki's *Rāmāyaṇa* and Vyāsa's *Mahābhārata* as pure literature. Vālmīki is mentioned as *ādikavi* (the first poet) and his *Rāmāyaṇa* is paised as *ādikāvya* (the first poem). Ānandavardhana says (*Dhavanyāloka*, III.19, p. 402) that *karuṇa* based of *śoka* is the main *rasa* of the *Rāmāyaṇa*. The theory of *aṅgirasa* enunciated by Ānandavardhana is claimed to be based on the works of Vālmīki, Vyāsa and Kālidāsa.

वाल्मीकिव्यासमुख्याश्च ये प्रख्याता कवीश्वराः ।
तदभिप्रायबाह्योऽयं नास्माभिर्दर्शितो नयः ॥

The theory of *aṅgirasa* was propounded by Ānandavardhana on the basis of classical works like the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Mahābhārata*. Even Bharata does not insist on the *aṅgirasa*. Bhāmaha and Dāṇḍin are also silent on *aṅgirasa*.

The Mahābhārata

The *Mahābhārata* is universally accepted as an Encyclopaedia of Indian culture. There is a saying that what is not in the *Bhārata* is not in Bhārata (India) —

yanna bhārate tanna bhārate. Vyāsa says that the first three of the four goals of life for those following the active life in the world (*pravṛtti-mārga*) and the fourth for those following the *nivṛtti-mārga* of renunciation are in his work. Even among the first three the first *dharma* is considered as the most important (*trivarga-sāra*) ; even Kālidāsa makes this claim in *Kumāra-saṃbhava* (V.38, p.58) '*trivargasāraḥ*'. Vyāsa proclaims: 'with raised hands I cry aloud; but nobody pays any attention to me; *artha* (wealth) and *kāma* (enjoyment) can be gained by following the path of *dharma* itself; why is it that nobody cares to follow that path of *dharma* ?

ऊर्ध्वबाहुर्विरौम्येष न च कश्चित् शृणोति माम् ।
धर्मादर्थश्च कामश्च स धर्मः किं न सेव्यते ॥

(*Mahābhārata* 18.5.49)

The *Mahābhārata* is also considered as the fifth Veda.

It was Ānandavardhana who first discussed the value of the *Mahābhārata* as pure literature. He says that the text can be considered both as a philosophical text (*śāstra*) and as a *kāvya*. From the former point of view *mokṣa* is the chief *puruṣārtha* depicted in it, and from the latter *śānta* is the main *rasa*. He says that the main emotion is *tṛṣṇākṣayasukha*, 'the happiness of having no desires'. Later writers consider *śama* as the main emotion depicted. *Bhakti* was not considered by Ānandavardhana as a possible claimant for being the

aṅgirasa of the *Mahābhārata*, since nobody had raised the problem of considering *bhakṭi* as a *rasa* then.

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IAN WHICHER

PATAÑJALI'S METAPHYSICAL SCHEMATIC : *PURUṢA* AND *PRAKṚTI* IN THE *YOGASŪTRA*

Introductory Comments

In their metaphysical ideas classical Sāṃkhya and Yoga are closely akin. Dasgupta asserts that it was Patañjali who collected the different forms of Yoga practices, gleaned the diverse ideas which were or could be associated with Yoga, and 'grafted them all on the Sāṃkhya metaphysic.'[1] In the above sense, Sāṃkhya is often characterized as the theoretical aspect of Yoga *praxis*, but this is inaccurate.[2] Nor is Yoga simply a borrowed form of Sāṃkhya. G. Feuerstein[3] has convincingly shown that 'there can be no justification whatever for deriving Classical Yoga from Classical Sāṃkhya.'[4] Despite the seemingly radical nature of Feuerstein's arguments to challenge the idea that Sāṃkhya and Yoga are two sides of the same coin, his overall claim is not as strong as it sounds. When we examine his arguments closely, he is not asserting that the two systems have virtually nothing in common but merely that some scholars have gone too far in their claims that Yoga is a sub-school of Sāṃkhya. In this he is correct and Hindu tradition obviously agrees with him since it classes Sāṃkhya

and Yoga as two philosophical schools (Darśana-s), not one. It was in the earlier epic period (200 BCE-200 CE), notably in the Mokṣadharma section of the *Mahābhārata*, that Yoga and Sāṃkhya assumed separate identities from their more or less common (Upaniṣadic) base. Moreover, the *YS* (ca second-third century CE) is probably older than the *SK* (ca 400-500 CE), and if any borrowing has occurred it is more likely to be on the part of Īśvara Kṛṣṇa.[5]

In spite of the similarity between these schools in their approach to the basic structure of reality, they in fact present different systems of thought, holding divergent views on important areas of doctrinal structure such as theology, ontology, psychology and ethics, as well as differences pertaining to terminology. The numerous philosophical differences between classical Yoga and classical Sāṃkhya derive, however, from the different methodologies adopted by the two schools of thought. Sāṃkhya relies primarily on the exercise of the discernment (*viveka*) of *puruṣa* (spirit, pure consciousness) from *prakṛti* (matter, nature, psycho-physical being and its source) on the basis of prefabricated categories of differentiation, stressing a theoretical/intellectual analysis in order to bring out the nature of final emancipation. This emancipation is often understood as an isolation (*kaivalya*) of *puruṣa* from *prakṛti*, *puruṣa* conceived as the uninvolved (*mādhyasthya*), inactive (*akartṛbhāva*) witness (*sākṣin*) of the evolutions of *prakṛti*.[6] However, Sāṃkhya's

overt conceptual means of discrimination (*vijñāna*) is not sufficient enough for the aspiring yogin. The ontological categorization of what represents the non-self (*prakṛti*) must become the object of direct experience and perception. Without *praxis* and its experiential and perceptual dimension, philosophy would have no meaning in Yoga. Yoga is a practical spiritual discipline for mastering the modifications of the mind (*YS* I.2) and abiding as the changeless identity of the Self (*puruṣa*). In Yoga, immortality is realized through consistent practice and self-discipline, and is not something to be demonstrated through inference, analysis, and reasoning. Classical Yoga emphasizes the necessity of personal experimentation and practical meditational techniques for the cultivation of *samādhi* (*YS* I.17-8) in which insight (*prajñā*), disclosed within the deeper levels of the mind, progressively leads to a clearer understanding and realization of one's intrinsic identity as *puruṣa*.

Even just a cursory look at the *YS* reveals that Patañjali makes no attempt, as does Īśvara Kṛṣṇa, to speculate upon a metaphysical explanation of the nature of reality. In the first chapter of the *YS* (Samādhi-pāda), no formal ontological schematic is given by Patañjali. It is not until the second chapter on the 'means' or 'path' of Yoga (Sādhana-pāda) that a more formalized ontological scheme is explicitly outlined.[7] Assuming the text to be unitary,[8] we can, however, conceive of an implicit metaphysics in the

Samādhi-pāda that can be explained by the fact that Patañjali falls back on a world view which he does not need to make explicit. Patañjali's overriding concern, however, is to show how to bring about the realization, freedom, and glory of an immortal state of consciousness and being as authentic identity or Self (*puruṣa*), a state that can be described in terms of freedom from suffering (*duḥkha*).[9] This 'showing how' culminates in 'clear seeing' which in turn reveals our true identity as *puruṣa*. Patañjali begins the discipline of Yoga by addressing his listeners where they 'are' from a yogic perspective, that is, as human beings desirous of freedom, yet who are subject to a mistaken identity, ensconced within the subject-object duality of empirical existence (*prakṛti*), and who conceive of themselves and the world from the limited perspective of ego-consciousness (*asmitā*).

For Yoga, as well as other soteriological traditions of India, the ultimate concern of a human being is not understood to be separate from humanity itself. That is to say, the highest goal to which a human being can and ought to aspire does not lie in some separate realm or 'outer', extrinsic world, but is, rather, 'within' oneself, as one's core intrinsic being. Yoga tries to express this concern in a truly human way beginning with the psycho-physical nature and experience of our human-ness with its weaknesses, vulnerabilities and virtues, and describes the human condition by incorporating our multi-levelled understandings and

concepts of self-identity (*cittavṛtti*). Through a process of transformation of the mind, or *metanoia*, termed *nirodha* (*YS* I.2),[10] Yoga expands, purifies, and illuminates our understanding of self and world. By grasping the nature of our personal experiences : how we think, feel, act, understand, and why we have assumed ourselves to be finite, temporal beings when, according to Yoga our nature is infinite and unchanging, we can more easily discern how Yoga philosophy applies to our own perception and to our day to day existence.

Classical Yoga informs us of the fundamental defining characteristic of empirical selfhood as essentially being a misidentification with or conformity to (*sārūpya*, *YS* I.4) the mental processes or modifications (*vṛtti-s*) of the mind (*citta*). Yet, the process of identification (and misidentification — which is a form of identification) with thought and personality takes place for the purpose of experience (*bhoga*) and spiritual emancipation (*apavarga*), i.e., for the purpose of *puruṣa* (*YS* II.21).

As a cross reference to assess the aspirant's standard of awareness, and where one can grow and develop, classical Yoga also offers the ideal of the *jīvanmukta*, one established in the true nature of *puruṣa* (*YS* I.3) and who embodies that enlightened perspective. Vyāsa's reference[11] to the enlightened being, the yogin free while yet living, places before us the ultimate 'human' potentiality for the transfor-

mation of consciousness and identity of all aspirants of Patañjali's Yoga.

One of the problems confronting any study of the *YS* is that there is no obvious reference (excluding the *YB*) from which to base an analysis of Patañjali's thought. Some of the fundamental philosophical concepts of the Sāṃkhyan system of Īśvara Kṛṣṇa can provide a useful backdrop or cross-reference point from which to facilitate understanding and a greater appreciation of Patañjali's metaphysical and soteriological perspective. Vyāsa's *Bhāṣya*, which was probably written after the *SK* (and other major Sāṃkhyan works) has unhesitatingly drawn upon Sāṃkhyan doctrine for the purpose of expounding yogic principles taught by Patañjali.

We will now highlight some of the basic similarities and differences[12] between classical Sāṃkhya and the Yoga of Patañjali. It is often said that, like classical Sāṃkhya, Patañjali's Yoga is a dualistic system, understood in terms of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*. Yet, I submit, Yoga scholarship has not clarified what 'dualistic' means or why Yoga had to be 'dualistic'. Even in avowedly non-dualistic systems of thought such as Advaita Vedānta we can find numerous examples of basically dualistic modes of description and explanation.[13] It does not seem inappropriate to suggest the possibility of Patañjali having asserted a provisional, descriptive, and practical metaphysics, i.e., in the *YS* the metaphysical schematic is abstracted

from yogic experience, whereas in classical Sāṃkhya 'experiences' are fitted into a metaphysical structure. This approach would allow the *YS* to be interpreted along more open-ended, epistemologically oriented lines without being held captive by the radical, dualistic metaphysics of Sāṃkhya. Despite intentions to render the experiential dimension of Yoga, purged as far as possible from abstract metaphysical knowledge, many scholars have fallen prey to reading the *YS* from the most abstract level of the dualism of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* down to an understanding of the practices advocated. Then they proceed to impute an experiential foundation to the whole scheme informed not from mystical insight or yogic experience, but from the effort to form a consistent (dualistic) world-view, a view that culminates in a radical dualistic finality[14] or closure due to its hierarchically structured tendency toward abstractive reduction.

It should be noted that the contrast, suggested above, between the philosophical perspectives of Īśvara Kṛṣṇa and Patañjali is of crucial importance. Nevertheless, the theoretical connections and parallels between the *YS* and Sāṃkhya remain significant. Patañjali's philosophy, however, is not based upon mere theoretical or speculative knowledge. It elicits a practical, pragmatic, experiential/perceptual (not merely inferential/theoretical) approach that Patañjali deems essential in order to deal effectively with our total human situation and provide real freedom, not

just a theory of liberation or a metaphysical explanation of life. To this end Patañjali outlined, among other practices, an eight-limbed (*aṣṭāṅga- yoga*) path of Yoga (*YS* II.29) dealing with the physical, moral, psychological, and spiritual dimensions of the yogin. Yoga is not content with knowledge (*jñāna*) perceived as a state that abstracts away from the world removing us from our human embodiment and activity in the world. Rather, Yoga emphasizes knowledge in the integrity of being and action and as serving the integration of the 'person' as a 'whole'. Edgerton concluded in a study dedicated to the meaning of Yoga that : '... Yoga is not a "system" of belief or of metaphysics. It is always a way, a method of getting something, usually salvation... .'[15] But this does not say enough, does not fully take into account what might be called the integrity of Patañjali's Yoga. As a major philosophical Darśana within Hinduism, Yoga derives its real strength and value through an integration of theory and practice, implying a philosophy of 'life' — incorporating both *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* — grounded in the direct experience of 'life'.

Patañjali's Yoga derives its insights from a process of introspection into the nature not unlike that of Sāṃkhya. According to Sāṃkhya and Yoga our 'inner' world of thought, feeling, imagination, etc., parallels the structure of the cosmos itself. It is made up of the same fundamental layers of existence (i.e., *prakṛti*, *traiguṇa*) that compose the hierarchy of the

external world. Therefore the so-called 'maps'[16] utilized by Patañjali and Īśvara Kṛṣṇa are guides to both the 'inner' and the 'outer' dimensions of existence, and also function, certainly in the case of Yoga, as heuristic devices in the form of contemplative directives for facilitating understanding and meditative insight. Their principle purpose thus is to point beyond the levels and limitations of psyche and cosmos reminding us that the true nature and identity of human being — the spiritual component of our person — is an utterly transcendent yet immanent reality, pure consciousness (*puruṣa*), sometimes referred to as the witness (*sākṣin*) behind all content of consciousness.

Patañjali's Yoga philosophy incorporates the Sāṃkhyan idea of a multilayered or hierarchical cosmos where *prakṛti* is seen to encompass : (1) on the one hand, the grosser levels of manifestation and actualization resulting in the material forms of manifest reality (*vyakta*), and (2) on the other hand, the transcendent ground of *prakṛti* herself. Beyond *prakṛti's* realm of existence is the unmodified dimension of pure identity/consciousness, the formless *puruṣa*-principle. As we will soon discover, the ontological categories outlined in the *YS* provide one with a provisional 'map' consisting of contemplative directives that enable the yogin to pass through different levels of experience (*bhoga*) culminating in emancipation (*apavarga*) whereupon one transcends the

binding influence or effects of *prakṛti* altogether.

The psychocosmological 'map' structure put forward by Patañjali is, in the true sense of yogic experimentation that results in first-hand evidence (*pratyakṣa*) or experiential verification, no doubt profoundly informed by the territory he discovered in the course of his own explorations of human consciousness or mind (*citta*) — levels of consciousness, self-understanding, and identity that can be correlated to the dimensions of *prakṛti*. Īśvara Kṛṣṇa's sketched account or 'map' of reality appears to be shaped by more formalistic, rationalistic, and theoretical considerations interwoven no doubt with Sāṃkhya's long history (i.e., several centuries) of metaphysical speculation. I shall be alluding to this and other philosophical differences between the two systems throughout this study (see, for example, n. 17 below). Both 'maps', of course, are intended to guide the practitioner to the realization of *puruṣa* and are thus ultimately derived for soteriological purposes. The above intention notwithstanding, scholars have often questioned the efficacy of the classical Sāṃkhyan 'means' for attaining freedom (*mokṣa*, *kaivalya*) especially in comparison to yogic methods.[17]

Within the context of Yoga, hierarchical 'maps' of reality served very practical, psychological, pedagogical, and soteriological purposes.[18] G. Feuerstein states : 'The ontogenetic models were originally and primarily maps for meditative introspection intended

to guide the yogin in his exploration of the *terra incognita* of the mind ... [and] are records of internal experiences rather than purely theoretical constructions. They are descriptive rather than explanatory.'[19] C. Pensa rightly describes the approach of Yoga as an 'homologisation between cosmological and psychological structures.'[20] To be sure, the categories used in Yoga are both descriptions and contemplplative directives for the ways in which the mind, identity, and world are actually experienced through meditative awareness and insight.

If one is to grasp how Yoga philosophy can be lived on a practical level, one must understand how *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* relate to one in practical, experiential, and personal terms. To this end Patañjali translated a 'universal', macrocosmic perspective into subjective, microcosmic terms. Yoga philosophy, being historically rooted in a pedagogical context,[21] functions in part as a teaching method skillfully aimed at transforming, purifying, and illuminating human consciousness (i.e., the mind or *citta*, which can be described as a grasping, intentional, and volitional consciousness) and thus our perception and experience of reality. The metaphysics is united to the teaching tradition of spiritual preceptor (*guru*) and disciple (*śiṣya*) and is soteriological as well as practical in nature and purpose. The distinction between the two major categories in Yoga : *puruṣa* or *draṣṭṛ* (the seer), and *prakṛti* or *dṛśya* (the seeable), may not have been

intended by Patañjali as a metaphysical theory of truth. Moreover, despite the fact that Patañjali initially adopts a Sāṃkhyan metaphysical orientation, there is no proof in the *YS* that his system stops at dualism (i.e., the dualism may be said to be open to the criterion of falsifiability playing only a provisional role in his system), or merely ends up, as many scholars have concluded, with a radical dualism in which *puruṣa and prakṛti*, absolutely disjoined, are unable to 'cooperate', establish a 'harmony' and achieve a 'balance' together. In this sense the *YS* can be understood not so much as contradicting Sāṃkhya but more so as accommodating and subsuming the philosophical stance in the *SK* by extending the meaning of purification and illumination of human identity to incorporate an enlightened mode of action as well as being.[22] As such, Yoga philosophy helps to resolve some of the tensions inherent in a radically dualistic perspective — as is exemplified in interpretations of classical Sāṃkhya — wherein *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* are utterly separate and incapable of 'uniting' through an integration of being and activity, that is, as an embodied state of freedom, consciousness, and being.

Prakṛti as Viewed in the *Yoga-Sūtra*

In Patañjali's Yoga, as in classical Sāṃkhya, *prakṛti* refers to both the primordial ground (*mūla-prakṛti*) of the innumerable manifest forms and those forms themselves. Also termed *pradhāna* (or a*vyakta*),

which denotes the transcendent matrix of *prakṛti* as apart from the consciousness-principle (*puruṣa*), *prakṛti* is defined by Vācaspati Miśra as that by which the mutiplicity of evolutes (*vikāra*) is brought forth (*pradhīyate*).[23] It is the primordial, undifferentiated continuum that contains in potential the entire cosmos in all its levels and categories of being.

Prakṛti is frequently defined in Sāṃkhya as the state of balance or equilibrium of the three *guṇa-s* (*tri-guṇa-sāmyāvasthā*).[24] When this state of balance is disturbed or disrupted by the presence of pure consciousness (*puruṣa*), the process of the creation of the ordinary world occurs. The theory of homogeneous equilibrium (*sāmyāvasthā*) formulated by later Sāṃkhyan thinkers proceeded more from speculation concerning the drive for liberation; it flowed only indirectly from an analysis of the phenomenon of observation. The perfectly balanced substrata of *prakṛti* (matter) was an unevolved and unmanifest state wherein the three *guṇa-s* — the basic strands or qualities of *prakṛti* (matter, see below) — were thought to revolve in 'palpitating'[25] balanced movement within unmanifest *prakṛti* while yet being completely separated from the light of *puruṣa*. This theory, which does not appear to be upheld in the *YS* or the *YB*, is not without its difficulties. Can the *guṇa-s* in the undifferentiated state of *prakṛti* really be described as 'moving'? Do the *guṇa-s* of unmanifest potentiality possess the reality of the actual, manifest,

observable world of experience which the Sāṃkhyan claims to analyse? If the *guṇa-s* are only unevolved potentiality, then what can claim the attribute of movement or dynamism and manifestation? The above questions hint at only a few of the unresolved issues which arise for those who wish to hypothesize a theoretical state of perfect, unmanifest equilibrium in contrast to the imbalanced and disharmonius state of manifest existence, that is, the world we normally perceive and experience.

An even more serious problem for such speculators would be to explain how such a hypothetical state of equilibrium actually becomes unbalanced.[26] Is imbalance or disequilibrium an intrinsic characteristic of the reality of manifestation, actualization, and the 'evolution' of the universe in all its diversity? Is the suffering (*duḥkha*, *YS* II.16), misidentification, and confusion that should be overcome or discarded in order that authentic identity takes place an intrinsic aspect of any 'movement' within *prakṛti* herself? If suffering is an inherent aspect of manifest existence, would it then necessitate a return to the original unmanifest ground dissolving away or withdrawing from our human, manifest nature and identity? Or, is the state of human conflict and sorrow (*YS* II.15 ; see n. 53 below) that Yoga seeks to remove the result of a malfunctioning factor within *prakṛti* including the phenomena of mind (*citta*) or consciousness through which we perceive and experience reality? If the latter

be the case, it would then follow that the cause of this malfunctioning or distortion operating within *prakṛti* would need to be corrected. Is *prakṛti's* two-tiered existence consisting of: (1) an unmanifest potentiality which is in itself a state of homogeneous equilibrium, and (2) manifest existence implying disharmony and imbalance, meant to be understood as an ontological description of reality? Can the homogeneous equilibrium, referred to as *sāmyāvasthā*, as well as the processes of 'disequilibrium' resulting from its actualization and manifestation be more appropriately rendered with an epistemological emphasis? Much of the remainder of this study will be addressing these as well as other related questions not from a purely Sāṃkhyan orientation but rather from within the context of Patañjali's Yoga philosophy.

Patañjali subscribes to the Sāṃkhyan theory of evolution, called *satkāryavāda*, according to which an effect (*kārya*) is pre-existent (*sat*) in its cause (*kāraṇa*); and also *prakṛti-pariṇāma-vāda* which signifies that the effect is a real transformation (*pariṇāma*) of *prakṛti*, not merely an appearance or illusory change as is thought in the idealist schools of Vedānta[27] and Mahāyāna Buddhism. The *satkārya* doctrine maintains that whatever comes into manifestation is not a completely new reality or production[28] thereby rejecting the notion of creation *ex nihilo*. Yoga holds that what is non-existent can never be produced; what is existent can never perish.[29] The

causes must be of the same fundamental substance as the effects.[30] The effects are thus already latent in the material causes and manifest as transformations resulting from, as Patañjali states, the outflow or implementation of their material causes (*prakṛtyā-pūra*).[31] The disappearance of a previous transformation and the rise of a subsequent one takes place as a result of the integrating pervasion of the constituent parts of the material cause.[32]

In Yoga, differentiation and actualization (or what may be referred to as creation) is always only the manifestation (*āvirbhāva*) of latent possibilities. The ultimate material cause is thought to be *prakṛti*. All unmanifest and manifest forms are simply developments, transformations or actualizations (*pariṇāma*, *vikāra*, *vikṛti*) of that primal 'substance' or *prakṛti*. Moreover, the disappearance of an existing object does not mean its total annihilation, but merely its becoming latent again (*tirobhāva*). 'Destruction' is nothing but 'dissolution' into the unmanifest, a withdrawal from manifestness or return to the 'origin.' This theory may well have been derived from the kind of metaphysical speculation found, for example, in the *Bhagavadgītā* where Kṛṣṇa instructs Arjuna as follows :

> Of the nonexistent there is no coming to be. Of the existent there is no ceasing to be. Also, the final truth of these is known by the seers of Truth. Yet, know as indestructible that by which

> all this is pervaded. Nothing is able to accomplish the destruction of that which is imperishable.[33]

Like *puruṣa*, the transcendent core of *prakṛti* — *pradhāna*, *avyakta* or what Patañjali calls *aliṅga*[34] — is also indestructible. Yet it has the capacity to undergo modification and it does so in the process of actualization or manifestation during which it gives birth to the multidimensional universe.

In Sāṃkhya (*SK* 20-1) the ubiquitous presence of *puruṣa* as unchanging, contentless, and pure (unaffected by the changes within *prakṛti*) consciousness, 'solicits' this process. According to Patañjali[35] the transformation and development (*pariṇāma*) of *prakṛti*, denoting serial change, is of three basic types: (1) *dharma-pariṇāma*, the change or development in the form of a substance; (2) *lakṣaṇa-pariṇāma*, or the change of characteristic implicit in the fact that time (*kāla*) consists of past, present, and future; (3) *avasthā-pariṇāma*, the state or stage of development or the qualitative change or condition due to the effects of time (i.e., aging), as when an earthen vessel breaks and turns to dust. Patañjali seeks to apply these insights to the mind (*citta*) — the locus of empirical consciousness and personality — and its transmutation through the practice of Yoga. The above three types of change are universally applicable to the phenomena of consciousness as well as to material objects, the elements, and the senses. While recognizing the changelessness of pure spirit or awareness (*puruṣa*),

Yoga (unlike Sāṃkhya) explicitly allows for fluctuation between potentiality or pure power (*śakti*) and actuality (*abhivyakti*) within the mind, such modification or transition within the phenomena or content of consciousness referring to the transformation from an unconscious nonviewed (*aparidṛṣṭa*) state to a conscious viewed (*paridṛṣṭa*) one.[36]

In *YS* III.13 Patañjali employs the term dharma in the technical sense of 'form', which is of changing nature. This he contrasts (*YS* III.14) with the concept of *dharma*-holder (*dharmin*), the underlying essential nature or unchanging 'substance' (as opposed to the changeable form).[37] *Prakṛti* is the permanent substance (*dharmin*) and its series of manifestations are the forms (*dharma*). Applying the *satkāryavāda* doctrine, which states that change affects only the form of an object, not its underlying substance, Patañjali distinguishes between three forms or states of an object: its subsided (*śānta*) or past aspect, its arisen (*udita*) or present aspect, and its undetermined (*avyapadeśya*) or future aspect.[38] All three are related to the same 'substance' or '*dharma*-holder', which is permanently present in, yet cannot be contained by (and therefore is different from) its forms or modifications, that is, it assumes many changes but is not wholly defined or consumed by these changes. Vyāsa explicitly contrasts this view with the Buddhist doctrine of *anātman*, no-self or inessentiality, according to which there is a multiplicity of changing forms but no underlying

being or substance.[39] In contrast to the Yogācāra school of Buddhism, for example, classical Yoga does not attempt to reduce 'being' to 'being experienced'. Yet classical Yoga 'tends to ascribe a more constitutive role to awareness or experience than the Sāṃkhya and to interpret it as an efficient factor of manifestation and actualization.'[40] The above three kinds of transformation can be understood as different ways of looking at the change affecting a single substance.

To illustrate the concept of *pariṇāma* (as used in *YS* III.13) Vyāsa describes the three modalities (*dharma, lakṣaṇa, avasthā*) in the following manner: a lump of clay is made into a water jar, thus undergoing a change in external property or form (*dharma*); in its present condition as water jar it is thus able to hold water (*lakṣaṇa*); finally, the jar gradually becomes 'old', thus undergoing stages of development (*avasthā*).[41] Vyāsa, furthermore, associates the notions of actuality and potentiality, manifest (*vyakta*) and subtle (*sūkṣma*) with time and temporality: Present phenomena are manifest or actual; past and future phenomena are considered subtle or in potential form.[42] Thus, there is an attempt in Yoga to clarify the nature of time in the light of the concepts of actuality and potentiality and as it applies to the structure and functioning of the mind. The reality of time and its three paths (*adhvan*) — past, present and future — is the reality of the ever-changing nature and forms arising from the unmanifest ground of *prakṛti*.[43]

Patañjali's philosophy of the change and development of *prakṛti* as applied to empirical consciousness (*citta*) disallows intrinsic stability or permanency to the phenomena of the mind and the empirical sense of self. Only *puruṣa* is able to enjoy the status of immutability (*apariṇāmitva*),[44] meaning that its authentic, immortal identity is never really lost throughout all the changes and identifications which take place in the mind and the perceived world. Yoga reminds us that even though our psycho-physical being is an apparent composite of the forces of *prakṛti* and is merely a temporary modification, it is also associated with an eternal, transcendent yet immanent and essentially unaffected aspect, the *puruṣa* or spiritual Self.

Patañjali makes use of the *guṇa* theory, one of the most original contributions of the Sāṃkhya tradition. The three *guṇa-s* — the basic constituents of *prakṛti* — compose all cosmological as well as physical and psychological principles. Without the manifestation of the *guṇa-s* there would be nothing to be experienced. The most common denotation for the tripartite process (*traiguṇya*) of *prakṛti* given in the *YS* is the term *dṛśya*, the seeable (*YS* II.17, 18, 21 and IV.23), which includes the unmanifest, non-differentiated potentiality as well as the manifest, differentiated universe or diverse aspects of *prakṛti*. This concept has a strong epistemological resonance to it and signifies anything that is capable of becoming an

object of the *puruṣa*, meaning here anything that pertains to *prakṛti* in any of its modes including the causal source (*pradhāna, aliṅga*) itself. Descriptions of the *guṇa-s* (cf Sāṃkhya) point to an interpretation which would stress their psychological and even moral components both indispensible for the definition and existence of individual entities or persons within the world. The *guṇa-s* encompass the entire personality structure including the affective and cognitive dimensions involving various qualities and states such as pleasure, pain, intelligence, passion, dullness, etc.[45] The guṇa-s also function like cosmological proto-elements (cf *MBh* XII.187[46] and sk 15-6), as generative/creative factors involved in and responsible for the evolution of life-forms. Patañjali employs the term *dṛśya* in the above possible ways where he delineates its main characteristics in *YS* II.18.[47] Here, he mentions the three characters or dispositions of the seeable in a clear reference to the interdependent nature of the three *guṇa-s* : *prakāśa* or luminosity/brilliance (pertaining to *sattva*), *kriyā* or activity (belonging to *rajas*), and *sthiti* or fixity/inertia (connected with *tamas*). The 'seeable' has the nature of the elements (*bhūta*) and the senses (*indriya*) and serves the dual purpose of experience (*bhoga*) and emancipation (*apavarga*).[48]

Patañjali appears to conceive of the *guṇa-s* as three types of psycho-physical force, 'matter' or energy whose existence can be deduced from the

'behaviour' patterns of *prakṛti*. Vyāsa provides us with a lucid commentary on the tripartite process where he describes the *guṇa-s* in the following manner :

> *Sattva* tends towards luminosity ; *rajas* towards action ; *tamas* towards fixity. Though distinct, these *guṇa-s* mutually affect each other. They change, they have the properties of conjunction and disjunction, they assume forms created by their mutual co-operation. Distinct from each other, they are identifiable even when their powers are conjoined. They deploy their respective powers, whether of similar or dissimilar kind. When one is predominant, the presence (of the others) is inferred as existing within the predominant one from the very fact of its operation as a *guṇa*. They are effective as engaged in carrying out the purpose of the *puruṣa*.[49]

G. Koelman notes, 'The *guṇa*'s nature is throughout expressed in terms of functional qualities, kinetic dispositions and causal urges.'[50] To summarize the above, we can say that the *guṇa-s* underlie all physical, material, cosmological, psychological, and moral realities.[51] From the *YB* (II.18 above) we are informed that: (1) although the *guṇa-s* are to be distinguished according to their qualities, (2) they are nevertheless interdependent and (3) in combination generate cosmic existence/the phenomenal universe, whereupon (4) everything must be regarded as a 'synergization'[52] of these three factors. Constituting the

realm of the seeable (*dṛśya*), the *guṇa-s* exist for the purpose of *puruṣa* (i.e., for experience [*bhoga*] and emancipation [*apavarga*]) which suggests that from a yogic perspective the guṇic processes do not ultimately result in delusive forms of self-identity, worldly identification, conflict, destruction, and dissatisfaction (*duḥkha*). Rather, they can function as a vehicle for liberating self-identity from the bondage of worldly existence.

In *YS* II.15 Patañjali portrays these three types of fundamental prakṛtic forces as being in continual conflict with each other: 'Because of the dissatisfaction and sufferings due to change and anxieties and the latent impressions, and from the conflict of the modifications of the *guṇa-s*, for the discerning one, all is sorrow alone.'[53] As a result of this inherent tension between them, and due to their dynamic, energetic nature associated with transformation (*pariṇāma*), they are said to form the different ontological levels (*parvan*) of prakṛtic reality.[54] From the perspective of the discerning yogin (*vivekin*) human identity contained within the phenomenal world of the three *guṇa-s* amounts to nothing more than sorrow and dissatisfaction (*duḥkha*).[55] The declared goal of classical Yoga is to overcome all suffering (*duḥkha*, *YS* II.16) by bringing about an inverse movement or counter-flow (*pratiprasava*)[56] understood as a return to the origin[57] or process-of-involution[58] of the *guṇa-s*, a kind of reabsorption into the transcendent purity of

being itself. What does this process-of-involution — variously referred to as return to the origin, dissolution into the source [59] or withdrawal from manifestation — actually mean? Is it a definitive ending to the perceived world of the yogin comprised of change and transformation, forms and phenomena? Ontologically conceived, *prasava* signifies the 'flowing forth' of the primary constituents or qualities of *prakṛti* into the multiple forms of the universe in all its dimensions, that is, all the evolutionary process or creation (*śarga*, *prasarga*). *Pratiprasava* on the other hand denotes the process of dissolution into the source or withdrawal from manifestation of those forms relative to the personal, microcosmic level of the yogin who is about to attain freedom (*apavarga*).

Does a 'return to the origin' culminate in a state of freedom in which one is stripped of all human identity and void of any association with the world including one's practical livelihood? The ontological emphasis usually given to the meaning of *pratiprasava* — implying for the yogin a literal dissolution of *prakṛti*'s manifestation — would seem to support a view, one which is prominent in Yoga scholarship, of spiritual liberation denoting an existence wholly transcendent (and therefore stripped or deprived) of all manifestation including the human relational sphere. Is this the kind of spiritually emancipated state which Patañjali had in mind? As I have argued against this isolationistic view of Yoga elsewhere[60] it suffices to

say that in *YS* II.3.17—which set the stage for the remainder of the chapter on yogic practice (*sādhana*) —Patañjali describes *prakṛti*, the 'seeable' (including our personhood), in the context of the various afflictions (*kleśa-s*) that give rise to an afflicted and mistaken identity of self. Afflicted identity is constructed out of and held captive by the root affliction of ignorance (*avidyā*) and its various forms of karmic bondage. Yet, despite the clear association of *prakṛti* with the bondage of ignorance (*avidyā*), there are no real grounds for purporting that *prakṛti* herself is to be equated with or subsumed under the realm of affliction. To equate *prakṛti* with affliction itself implies that as a product of spiritual ignorance, *prakṛti*, along with the afflictions, is conceived as a reality which the yogin should ultimately avoid or discard completely.

Patañjali leaves much room for understanding dissolution or return to the source with an epistemological emphasis thereby allowing the whole system of Yoga Darśana to be interpreted along more open-ended lines. In other words, what actually 'dissolves' or is ended in Yoga is the yogin's misidentification with *prakṛti*, a mistaken identity of self that—contrary to our true identity as *puruṣa*—can be nothing more than a product of the three *guṇa-s* under the influence of spiritual ignorance. Understood as such, *pratiprasava* need not denote the definitive ontological dissolution of manifest *prakṛti* for the

yogin, but rather means the eradication of misidentification: the incorrect world-view born of *avidyā* or incapacity to 'see' from the yogic perspective of the seer (*draṣṭṛ*) — our spiritually authentic identity as *puruṣa*. However, in order to appreciate this line of argument which gives an epistemological emphasis to the meaning of key yogic terms,[61] it is necessary to outline in greater detail Patañjali's metaphysical schematic.

Within *prakṛti*'s domain, Patañjali recognizes four hierarchic yet interrelated levels of existence whose characteristics and qualities are determined by the relative pre-dominence of any of the three *guṇa-s*. The levels are, according to *YS* II.19 :[62]

1. The Unmanifest (*aliṅga*)
2. The Designator (*liṅga-mātra*)
3. The Unparticularized (*aviśeṣa*)
4. The Particularized (*viśeṣa*)

The following excerpt from the *YB* (II.19) shows Vyāsa's correlations of Patañjali's four-level model with the more familiar (Sāṃkhyan) series of principles of existence (*tattva-s*) :

> Of these [four divisions], space, air, fire, water and earth are the gross elements which are the particularizations of the unparticularized subtle elements (*tanmātra-s*) : sound, touch form-precept, taste and smell. Ears, skin, eyes, tongue and nose are the sense-organs, and mouth, hands, feet, organs of evacuation and generation are the

> five action organs. The eleventh organ, the mind-organ (*manas*), is multi-objective. These are the particularizations of the unparticularized I-am-ness. This is the sixteen-fold transformation of the *guṇa-s* into particulars (*viśeṣa*). The unparticularized (*aviśeṣa*) are six. They are the subtle elements of hearing, touching, seeing, tasting and smelling, distinguished (respectively) by one, two, three, four and all five, beginning with hearing. The sixth unparticularized is mere I-am-ness (*asmitā-mātra*). These are the six unparticularized transformations of the great principle (*mahat-tattva*), whose nature is mere being (*sattā-mātra*) which is bare form (*liṅga-mātra*). Beyond the unparticularized is that great (self) which is mere being; supported in it these fulfil their development to the limit. And in the reverse process they are supported in that great (self) which is mere being and go back to that *pradhāna*, the formless (*aliṅga*) which is neither being-non-being, nor yet existent-non-existent.[63]

In classical Yoga, *aliṅga* (the signless, formless) is the most subtle level — because of its utter unmanifest nature — of the hierarchical levels of *prakṛti*. It is the state of undifferentiated existence and corresponds with the Sāṃkhya concept of *avyakta* or the unmanifest (also termed *mūlaprakṛti*). Vācaspati Miśra defines it (*aliṅga*) as the equilibrium (*sāmyāvasthā*) of the three primary constituents (*guṇa-s*) of *prakṛti*.[64]

Being the transcendent core of *prakṛti*, which is pure potentiality, it is without any 'mark' or 'sign'. Only a small part of *prakṛti* is at any time undergoing manifestation and actualization. The rest remains in unmanifest existence.

From out of the 'unmanifest' emerges the (mere) designator, or *liṅga-mātra*, as the first cosmic principle or level of manifest existence. This is the level of cosmic manifestation prior to the mergence of specific objects. Vyāsa identifies it as the great principle (*mahat-tattva*) whose nature is mere being (*sattā-mātra*).[65] Vācaspati Miśra also refers to *liṅga-mātra* as the great principle (*mahat-tattva*).[66] *Mahat* is the most sattvic, finest, and purest production of *prakṛti*. On the one hand it is that first manifestation of *guṇa-s* in which no other form or shape yet emerges. As the designator *mahat* is also the *buddhi*, the faculty of discernment that serves as a vehicle of *puruṣa*'s (reflected) consciousness.[67] Because it is the most subtle and sattvic modification, it is fit to serve as a medium between *puruṣa* and the phenomenon of *prakṛti*. In Sāṃkhya (*SK* 22-3) a 'spark' of the universal *mahat* is also the individual or personal aspect of *buddhi*, the faculty of intelligence and discernment in a sentient entity, and the highest power in the process of sensation.

Following from *liṅga-mātra* is the unparticularized (*aviśeṣa*) composed of six categories, namely the five subtle elements or potentials (*tanmātra-s*, lit. that

only) and the principle of individuation (*asmitā-mātra*) or mere I-am-ness.[68] The last level of guṇic manifestation is the 'particularized' which, according to Vyāsa, is composed of the five elements (*bhūta-s*), the ten senses (*indriya-s*) and the mind-organ (*manas*), and is a product of the unparticularized I-am-ness.[69]

Whereas, in a cosmological context, *liṅga-mātra* is a category of which nothing can be predicated except that it exists — the first sign that *prakṛti* gives of her presence — *asmitā-mātra*, in the words of G. Koelman, 'differentiates and pluralizes the indetermined and universal principle of being (*sattā-mātra*) into so many different centres of reference, so many sources of initiative.'[70] Koelman continues : 'These centres of reference constitute, so to say, distinct nucleations within the one *prakṛti*, in such a way that there arise different suppositions or subjectivations or numerically distinct units of centralisation adapted to the needs of each particularised Self. This supposition is sufficiently stable to be called a substantial entity, a *tattva* or a *dravya*.'[71] *Asmitā-mātra* is that principle and agency that splits the primary substratum into subjects vis-à-vis objects in the form of a bifurcate line of development and transformation. It corresponds with Īśvara Kṛṣṇa's notion of *ahaṃkāra* (I-maker or egoity ; see below). The author of the *Yuktidīpikā* (on *SK* 4) wrongly maintains that Patañjali does not know *ahaṃkāra* as a separate principle but includes it in *mahat*.[72] As is the case with *ahaṃkāra*, *asmitā-mātra*

brings forth the subjective sensorial world and the objective sensed world. It is the generic pool of all individualized empirical selves which according to the Sāṃkhyan system is the cosmic differentiator of subject and object; *ahaṃkāra* is a self-awareness (*abhimāna*) giving rise to the human sense 'I am'. [73]

We must guard against generalized statements such as that made by S. Radhakrishnan who asserts that Yoga does not recognize *ahaṃkāra* and *manas* as separate from *buddhi*. [74] Prior to his commentary on *YS* II.19 (see above), Vyāsa already refers to the sixth unparticularized principle as *ahaṃkāra*, which strongly suggests that *ahaṃkāra* is the equivalent of *asmitā-mātra*: Subtler than these [the *tanmātra-s*] is the *ahaṃkāra*, and subtler than that is the great principle (*liṅga-mātra*). [75]

Patañjali's vocabulary, while not being a mere replica of Sāṃkhyan terminology, can be seen as accommodating the Sāṃkhyan metaphysical schematic. Much of this hinges on how we understand Patañjali's important concept of *asmitā* (I-am-ness) which, being one of the five afflictions (*kleśa-s*) in Yoga, is defined in *YS* II.6 as follows: I-am-ness is when the two powers of seer and view [i.e., what is viewed] as if (appear) as one self. [76] Vyāsa's commentary states:

> *Puruṣa* is the power of the seer; mind (*buddhi*) [77] is [understood here to be] the power of seeing. The taking on of a single nature, as it were, by these two, is called the affliction of I-am-ness.

> When there comes about a failure, as it were, to distinguish between the experiencer and what is experienced, which are utterly distinct and have nothing to do with each other, that is the condition for experience. But when the true nature of the two is recognized, that is aloneness. Then how could there be experience? So it has been said : 'Not seeing *puruṣa* beyond the mind and distinct from it in such things as form, disposition and knowledge, one will make there a mental self out of delusion.' [78]

In *YS* III.35 Patañjali defines experience (*bhoga*) as 'an idea (i.e., intention or cognition) that does not distinguish between *sattva* and *puruṣa*, though they are absolutely unmixed.' [79] Vyāsa has clearly understood *asmitā* as taking place or finding its primal locus of identification in the *buddhi* (i.e., *liṅga-mātra*), which in Sāṃkhya is also called *mahat*. To facilitate an understanding of the practical understanding leading to meditational *praxis*, Patañjali employs terminology a little differently from that of Sāṃkhya. For example, the *SK* discusses *mahat* but not *asmitā*. In the *YS* it is in *asmitā* that the impression of a union (*saṃyoga*, *YS* II.17) between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, between consciousness and insentience, first occurs. *Asmitā* is that process in which *mahat* or *buddhi*, being the purest and most sattvic evolute of *prakṛti*, becomes a recipient of a 'reflection' of pure consciousness. This reflected state of consciousness [80]

masquerading in the garb of *asmitā*, assumes itself to be Self/*puruṣa*. It is, by analogy, like the union of a crystal mirror with a reflection of the sun. *Puruṣa*, like the distant sun in the sky, remains unaffected by the union of its 'reflection' in the mirror, but at the interface between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* all the processes of the composite personality begin. Consciousness and life flow through this *asmitā*, which lends to the ego-principle (*asmitā-mātra, ahaṃkāra*) and to the mind (*citta*) a semblance of awareness. This reflected awareness generates a deluded sense of selfhood and must be understood as arising from a mistaken identity, that is, the misidentification of *prakṛti* with *puruṣa* (authentic identity), beginning with *mahat*.

The *puruṣa*-principle in Sāṃkhya and Yoga is not a supreme creator and does not reappear in the cosmos as a personal world-soul. Our empirical sense of self misidentifies with the prakṛtic, 'created' world thereby veiling *puruṣa*, resulting in a failure 'to distinguish between the experiencer and what is experienced' (*YB* II.6 ; see n. 78 above). Thus, what is seen as real cosmogony in the Upaniṣad-s (for example, *Kaṭha Up* (III.2), is described in the *YS* (II.3-5) as a process taking place under the influence of spiritual ignorance (*avidyā*). This does not mean to imply that the cosmogony of Yoga is itself an illusory process. *Prakṛti* does, in full reality, transform itself into the created essences, headed by *mahat*/*buddhi*. The seeming aspect of this 'flowing forth' (*prasava*)

or creation (*sarga*) is *puruṣa's* seeming bondage within *prakṛti*. The cosmos itself is experienced as if pervaded by consciousness. Patañjali describes *prakṛti* in terms of how it is experienced by one who is ensconced in the condition of ignorance. When one falsely identifies or misidentifies with the principles of matter or any of *prakṛti*'s modifications, those *tattva-s* and mental processes (*vṛtti-s*) are experienced as pervaded by an I-am consciousness (i.e., I am *buddhi*, I am *ahaṃkāra*) that is wholly identified within *prakṛti* thereby masking or excluding *puruṣa*. *Puruṣa* does not do anything in this process. *Asmitā* thus is an afflicted state of consciousness and identity that permeates and sustains our notions or sense of authentic identity as a bound 'entity' under the sway of *prakṛtic* existence.

Asmitā-mātra, the sixth category of the level of the unparticularized (*aviśeṣa*), is a product of the designator (*liṅga-mātra*) and can have no direct contact (as does *mahat* or *buddhi*) with *puruṣa*'s reflection of consciousness that produces the I-am-ness located in *buddhi* (*YB* II.6). H. Āraṇya correctly addresses the meaning of *asmitā-mātra* as used in Vyāsa's commentary (II.19) as follows : Here it means ego [*ahaṃkāra*]. It has been said before (*YS* II.6) that identity of the instrument of reception with ... consciousness is *asmitā*. From that point of view *buddhi* is pure *asmitā* or final form of egoism. In every case, however, *asmitā-mātra* is not *mahat* [*buddhi*] .... [81]

Patañjali uses the term *asmitā-mātra* once (in *YS* IV.4) where it is described as that principle from which the multiple individualized or fabricated minds (*nirmāṇa-citta-s*[82]) are projected. Patañjali merely asserts that the individualized minds arise from the unparticularized I-am-ness.[83] *Asmitā-mātra* is an ontological concept, is ontologically real. In contrast *asmitā* is an afflicted state of self-identity — of our having mistaken *prakṛti* (or prakṛtic identity) for *puruṣa* — and is a psychological concept (as given in *YS* II.3 and 6 and III.47) whose meaning can be rendered with an epistemological emphasis.

In disagreement with S. Dasgupta,[84] our study maintains that *mahat* or *buddhi* is a synonym of *sattā-mātra* (*YB* II.19), not *asmitā-mātra*. Both Koelman[85] and Feuerstein[86] understand I-am-ness (*asmitā*) as a psychological experience of 'I-am' rooted in *asmitā-mātra*. However, in doing so it appears that both of the above scholars have restricted the meaning of *asmitā* to the notion of an individualized subject with a particular *buddhi*.[87] Our study understands *asmitā* as taking root in *mahat*, the cosmic, pre-individual (or, from another perspective, trans-individual) aspect of *buddhi*. As in Sāṃkhya, the intellect (*buddhi*) has a dual role to play, individual and pre-individual or cosmic (which can also be designated as trans-individual). While *asmitā-mātra* is the cosmic (ontological) principle of individuation that produces both the psychomental and physical realities of the individual

self, *asmitā* (egoity, I-am-ness) — as an afflicted psychological functioning of the mind (*citta*) — is also responsible for the root or pre-individual identification of self-identity with *mahat* (cosmic knowing). When *puruṣa* seemingly 'comes into' relationship with insentient *prakṛti* in the form of *prakṛti*'s first created essence, *buddhi* (*mahat*), that essence becomes as it were (*iva*, *YS* II.6), conscious as cosmic I-am-ness.[88] The 'insentient' cosmic knowing (transcending individual cognition) — a reflected consciousness or semblance of *puruṣa's* awareness — is experienced as the location of self: I am *mahat/buddhi*. This misidentification transforms (*pariṇāma*) cosmic knowing into personal volitional knowing; it makes cosmic *buddhi* (*mahat*) into 'my intellect' (which is the usual definition of the term). Cosmic knowing is experienced as my intellect when I identify with it as myself.

From *asmitā-mātra* (individuation), which follows from *mahat*, issues forth the subjective and objective world (cf *SK* 24). *Asmitā-mātra* is that which differentiates unified cosmic knowing (*mahat* or *buddhi* where the affliction of *asmitā* originates) into ascertaining subject and the ascertained object. *Mahat* is the cosmic principle of unification of pure cosmic being (*sattā-mātra*). S. Chennakesavan observes: 'The *mahat* [great one or *buddhi*] is the last limit, in an ascending order, up to which the subjective and objective are differentiated. Or, in other words, at this

stage of evolution [creation] the subject and object aspects of experience had not yet emerged.'[89] However, by misidentifying with *asmitā-mātra* we wrongly consider the subjective to be *puruṣa* or true identity itself: 'I am this "myself" of which I am aware.' 'This myself is me.' Mistaken identity of *puruṣa* transforms cosmic subjectivity/objectivity into individual self-awareness. *Asmitā-mātra* (*ahaṃkāra*) is experienced as my ego, personal individualized fabricated consciousness (*nirmāṇa-citta*), when I am identified with it as myself. This modified yet contracted and egoistic sense of self can be dissolved or purified through Yoga into its cosmic source, *mahat*, whereby one's understanding of selfhood is transformed and expanded into cosmic 'I-am-ness'[90] which is still first personal but not egoistic as is *ahaṃkāra*. Based on our analysis above it would appear that Feuerstein's assertion[91] — that the Sāṃkhyan term *ahaṃkāra* is probably replaced in the *YS* by *asmitā* — is inaccurate. We must bear in mind that *asmitā* is an affliction (*kleśa*) that arises out of spiritual ignorance and permeates the entire realm of our seeing or prakṛtic consciousness, individual and cosmic. As such, it along with its root cause (ignorance) must be discarded for the *puruṣa* or pure seer to shine in its true light.

The notion of mistaken identity or misidentification with *buddhi* and *ahaṃkāra* makes it easy to understand how these *tattva-s* can be depicted as

both cosmic and psychological, for it is the very false identification that turns the cosmic into the psychological. It would be a grave mistake to assert, as does S. Dasgupta,[92] that the cosmic and individual *buddhi* for example, have the same ontological status. *Mahat* or cosmic knowing is the first created essence of *prakṛti*, as real as *prakṛti* herself. *Mahat* brings forth the rest of *prakṛti*'s essences — not personal intellects. Personal intellects are not generated from *prakṛti* in the real causal process but are 'created' when the prakṛtic sense of self 'imagines' or conceives *mahat* to be the locus of authentic identity. The identification with 'I am *mahat*' (uttered by the *sattvic prakṛti*), not the ontological causal process in itself, creates a personal or self-appropriated intellect. Personal intellect, egoity, etc., has no ontological reality, only psychological. Thus the psychological terminology used in Yoga results from an 'as if' identification of *puruṣa* with *buddhi*, *ahaṃkāra*, etc. *Puruṣa* and *prakṛti* seemingly 'come together' in the prakṛtic 'condition' of misconception or ignorance (*avidyā*). Through discerning knowledge (*vivekakhyāti*) Yoga brings about a retrieval of our true identity as *puruṣa*.

Although Vyāsa does not state in *YB* II.19 that the subtle elements arise out of *asmitā-mātra*, it can be inferred from *YB* I.45 that this is the case. Vyāsa states that *ahaṃkāra* is subtler than the *tanmātra-s*, implying that the subtle elements arise out of the I-principle.[93] It seems reasonable to assume then that

asmitā-mātra (as is the case for *ahaṃkāra* in the *SK*) also acts as the source of the *tanmātra-s* (assuming that they are a part of Patañjali's ontology), and the elements (*bhūta-s*) and the senses (*indriya*-s). Koelman, taking his cue from Vācaspati Miśra, asserts that 'Yoga ... maintains that the objective universals [*tanmātra-s*] are derived directly from the "function-of-consciousness" [*buddhi*].'[94] Vācaspati Miśra places *asmitā-mātra* and the *tanmātra-s* on the same ontological level in as much as he regards both as evolutes of *buddhi* (*liṅga-mātra*).[95] However, there is no reason not to follow the basic Sāṃkhyan scheme[96] in this regard. Thus, H. Āraṇya writes :

> The commentator (Vyāsa) says that *mahat* undergoes six undiversified modifications in the shape of Tanmātra and ego. Sāṃkhya says that from *mahat* arises ego and from ego come the Tanmātra-s. Some say that this is a point of difference between Sāṃkhya and Yoga philosophies. There is, however, no real difference....In the commentaries on Sūtra I.45 the author of the Bhāṣya has said that the ego is the cause of the Tanmātra-s, and the cause of the ego is the *mahat* principle.... Therefore it is not quite right to say that the six Aviśeṣa-s have arisen straight out of *mahat*. The commentator also does not mean it. From Mahān Ātmā (the great self) or *mahat* to ego, from ego to the five Tanmātra-s and from Tanmātra-s to the five Bhūta-s, this is the correct order of succession.[97]

It is important to note that, like Sāṃkhya, Yoga distinguishes between the material (*upādāna*) and the efficient or instrumental (*nimitta*) cause. New categories of existence and other species or forms of life must all necessarily be developments, transformations (*pariṇāma*), or differentiations (*vikāra*, *vikṛti*) of the same fundamental substance (*prakṛti*). Moreover, as Vyāsa informs us 'The change of body and senses into another life, when they are transformed into the other life, is implemented by their *prakṛti*-natures. With the disappearance of the earlier transformation, the corresponding rise of the later transformation comes about by an integrating pervasion of the new parts.' [98] The material or substrative cause does not produce its effects without the aid of motivating causes known as efficient causes (*nimitta*).[99] Every effect requires for its actualization an appropriate combination of the material cause along with efficient causes such as place, time, and form (i.e., virtue).[100]

Thus a particular place aids in the production of a particular effect. For instance, Kashmir produces (Kashmiri) saffron, which will not be produced at other places in the world even though other causes of its growth may be present at those other places. Likewise, in certain regions of the world, rain may not fall at appropriate times thereby impeding the growth of certain crops later on. Similarly, an elephant cannot give birth to a human being, as the form of an elephant cannot give birth to a form different from its

own. In the same way, a nonvirtuous person does not experience any kind of pleasure in the absence of the motivating cause of virtue. Owing to the operation of place, time and form and motivating causes, the essential nature of things do not become manifest all at once.[101]

According to the tradition, *YS* IV.2-3 concern the way in which the virtues or merits *(dharma)* of the yogin cause that yogin to enter another body, that is, by rebirth or even yogic powers.[102] In *YS* IV.3 the term *prakṛti* is used in the plural (in its two other occurrences in the *YS* I.19 and IV.2 — its number is unmarked since it is the first member of a compound). This plural use is common in earlier texts such as the *Bhagavadgītā* (VII.4-5) and the *Buddhacarita* (XII.18). The *SK* uses the term *prakṛti* in both the singular and plural, speaking of *mūlaprakṛti* (in the sense of an ultimate first principle) and of the various *prakṛti-s* and *vikṛti-s*, that is, the various primary and secondary evolutes and differentiations of primordial *prakṛti* (*SK* 3). The plural use in the *SK* refers to the first eight 'creative' *tattva-s*, namely: *avyakta*, *buddhi*, *ahaṃkāra*, and the five *tanmātra-s*, while *prakṛti* in the single (*mūlaprakṛti*) refers to the eight collectively.[103] Patañjali seems to apply the use of the term *prakṛti* in a similar two-fold way. According to Vācaspati Miśra[104] the term *prakṛti* as used in *YS* IV.2 refers to the five elements that are the *prakṛti* of the body, and the 'I-am-ness' that is the *prakṛti* of the

senses. These are thought to continue from one embodiment to the next, thus corresponding to what the *SK* calls the *liṅga-śarīra* (*SK* 39). The compound *prakṛtyāpūra* in *YS* IV.2 (see n. 31 above): 'implemented by [the] *prakṛti*[*s*]', refers to the process whereby the *prakṛti-s* of the yogin's previous body 'fill' a new body. Vācaspati explains[105] that the *prakṛti-s* of the first body 'fill' the parts of the new body, while the *prakṛti* of the first set of faculties (*asmitā*) fills the new faculties. The *prakṛti-s* in the form of mental impressions (*saṃskāra-s*) that remain cause future experiences to take place. *Prakṛti* as material cause is not, however, the sole cause; it operates according to certain efficient causes (*nimitta*) such as the yogin's merit (*dharma*). Vācaspati tells us that the process is analogous to the passage of a body through childhood, growth, and old age (where the body follows a predetermined pattern of change, but only at certain times), or the growth of a banyan seed into a banyan tree (which can only happen if it is in the earth and suitably watered), or the way a spark dropped on a heap of grass suddenly rises to the sky.[106] In each case the tendency inherent in the material cause is only manifested when an efficient cause arises.

In *YS* IV.3 Patañjali tells us how the implementation of prakṛti takes place: 'The efficient cause does not actuate the *prakṛti-s,* but removes obstacles from them like a farmer [for irrigation].'[107] The

various pathways of manifestation are determined by impressions (*saṃskāra-s*) already in motion. From the implementation of *prakṛti* comes transformation into other births. According to Yoga, an efficient cause does not set the material cause into action nor, as in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, does it make the effect a different existence from the cause (*anyathākaraṇa*). It is not that the cause produces something new as it is held by the Vaiśeṣika-s.[108] In Sāṃkhya and Yoga the efficient cause removes the barriers or obstacles (*varaṇa*) to the manifestation of the effect latent in its material cause. The analogy of the farmer in *YS* IV.3 refers to the practice of irrigation, as Vyāsa explains :

> The farmer, in order to irrigate a terraced field by flooding it with water from another (higher) field, does not take the water in his hands, but makes a breach in its retaining barrier, after which the water pours into the lower field of itself. Similarly, virtue breaches nonvirtue, the retaining barrier of the *prakṛti-s*. When it is breached the *prakṛti-s* flow out into the respective effects or differentiations.[109]

As an alternative explanation of the analogy one could say that the farmer cannot himself force the nourishment from the water or earth into the roots of his crop, but permits it to penetrate the roots by removing the weeds.[110] Efficient causes can obstruct or aid the manifestations of the material causes.[111] For instance the fact that a potter, the efficient cause, turns

the potter's wheel does not detract from the inherent capacity of the wheel to help shape the pot. In the psychological context of the mind and its functioning, for example,[112] it can be seen that the *prakṛti-s* in the form of *saṃskāra-s* — the deep-rooted impressions which mysteriously shape our lives — are canalized by our good or evil actions.

While admitting the subtlety of both the unmanifest (*aliṅga*) or undifferentiated *prakṛti* and pure consciousness (*puruṣa*), Vyāsa points out the considerable difference between these two in that *puruṣa* is not a subtle cause of the great principle (*mahat*, *liṅga-mātra*) in the same way that *aliṅga* (*pradhāna*) is. Not being the material cause of *liṅga-mātra*, *puruṣa* is however considered to be a final cause of prakṛtic reality.[113] Moreover, in his commentary on *YS* II.19 Vyāsa informs us that 'the unmanifest (*aliṅga*) is not caused by any purposefulness of *puruṣa* ; no purpose of *puruṣa* brings it about, nor is there any purpose of *puruṣa* in it. Hence it is classed as eternal. But purposefulness of *puruṣa* is a cause of the three differentiated states. This purpose being their final and (efficient) cause, they are classed as non-eternal.'[114]

The *guṇa-s* are the material cause of everything prakṛtic and they also act as efficient causes to actualize or manifest their latent determinations. On this issue, Koelman writes : '*Prakṛti* is the universal cause of all genetic realities, a root-cause both substrative in nature and efficient.... All other causes have

only an assisting causality.'[115] The purposefulness of *puruṣa* is evidently a cause. Vācaspati's comments are worth noting here. He argues that:

> ... it cannot be supposed that it is the purpose of *puruṣa* that sets all in motion. It is only the Lord (*īśvara*) who does this with this purpose in view. For the purpose of *puruṣa* is described as setting all in motion in the sense that it is the final end. While this purpose of the *puruṣa* is yet to be realized, it is correct that the unmanifest *prakṛti* should be the cause of stability (of things) .... In the case of the Lord, we must understand that his functional activity is limited to the removal of obstacles with a view to securing a basis for the manifestation of forms.[116]

While virtue is an efficient cause for removing unvirtue (see n. 109 above), it is not, however, the cause which sets the material cause in motion. In the same sense, there is a view in Yoga that the Lord (*īśvara*) favours the yogin through the yogin's special devotion (*YS* I.23). All barriers themselves are causes in the sense that they block the manifestation of another form. Thus place, time, form, and other factors are required for the manifestation of some change of modality.[117]

In the condition of misidentification (*YS* I.4), human identity is ensconced in the ever-changing saṃsāric world of the three *guṇa-s*. Vyāsa tells us that virtue and non-virtue, pleasure and pain, attachment

and aversion are the causes of the six-spoked 'wheel' of *saṃsāra*. Ignorance, the root cause of all affliction, is said to be the driver of this 'wheel.'[118] Everything within the purview of saṃsāric experience is thus reduced to different functional dispositions of the three *guṇa-s*.

According to the commentaries (see, for example, Vācaspati Miśra on *YS* IV.3) the *YS* reconciles the idea of karman[119] (action in a moral context as determiner of future embodiments) with that of a self-operating *prakṛti* (or set of *prakṛti-s*). The topic is discussed in the context of the yogin's power to change or multiply his body, but there is no reason for not assuming that the same principles apply elsewhere, as Vācaspati has shown by the examples of the maturing and aging of the body, etc. The *sūtra-s* (IV.2-3) are not primarily concerned with cosmology; the term *prakṛti* refers here to the makeup of the empirical self rather than to the primary 'stuff' of the cosmos. This is a clear indication of Yoga's practical, psychological, and integrative approach, or what J.W. Hauer appropriately termed 'experienced metaphysics'.[120] This integrative or wholistic approach displayed by Yoga finds congenial expression in Patañjali's conception of mind (*citta*).[121]

The above metaphor of a 'wheel' (used by Vyāsa) seems an apt description of saṃsāric self-identity and existence. The term *duḥkha* (i.e., suffering, dissatisfaction, pain, sorrow) is comprised of the root *duṣ*

meaning: difficult, bad, doing wrong[122] plus *kha* meaning: axle hole, cavity, cave, space[123] and can literally mean 'having a bad axle-hole'. Such a wheel is unable to function properly or smoothly leading to an unsteady ride or journey in life perhaps even disabling completely the vehicle (the body-mind) it is helping to propel. With spiritual ignorance (*avidyā*) 'driving' the wheel of self-identity consisting of the mind and its perceptions, concepts, memories, etc., human consciousness (the mind) is moulded into, shaped by a mistaken identity of self that has become this wheel of *saṃsāra* and its future sorrow/ dissatisfaction.

This wheel of saṃsāric life or bad/ afflicted space manifesting as self-identity in the form of the mental makeup of the mind (that is, of impressions [*saṃskāra-s*], habit patterns [*vāsanā-s*], and mental modifications [*vṛtti-s*]) including egoity (*asmitā*) with its self-appropriated virtues and non-virtues, attachments and aversions, pleasures and pain, is the product of a malfunctioning of consciousness in the mind. Can this malfunctioning of the 'wheel' of the mind and its mental processes be corrected? Or is it necessary for this wheel of life — in the form of the mind, personal identity, morality, likes and dislikes — to be utterly removed, dissolved, negated or snuffed out of the yogin's life? Is our embodied, sensorial, thinking apparatus and empirical existence as well as relationships and participation in society an inherently or ultimately dissatisfying, sorrowful state of affairs?

Are the guṇa-s, by definition, a reality of disease, disharmony? Is the 'wheel of *saṃsāra*' a limitation, distortion, or contracted form of human life in the world?

The discerning yogin sees (*YS* II.15) that this world or cycle of saṃsāric identity is itself dissatisfaction (*duḥkha*). But we must ask, what exactly is the problem being addressed in Yoga? What is at issue in Yoga philosophy? Is our ontological status as a human being involved in day-to-day existence forever in doubt, in fact in need of being negated, dissolved in order for authentic identity (*puruṣa*), an immortal consciousness, finally to dawn? Having overcome all ignorance (*avidyā*, the 'driver' of the wheel and cause of all afflicted identity), is it possible for a human being to live in the world and no longer be in conflict with oneself and the world? Can the *guṇa-s* cease to function in a state of ignorance and conflict in the mind? Must the guṇic constitution of the human mind and the whole of prakṛtic existence disappear, dissolve for the yogin? Can the ways of spiritual ignorance be replaced by an aware, conscious, nonafflicted identity and activity that transcends the conflict and confusion of ordinary, saṃsāric life? Can we live, according to Patañjali's Yoga, an embodied state of freedom?[124]

The following chart (see below) constitutes a summary of the different ontological levels comprising *prakṛti*. On the left hand side is the general scheme

outlined in the system of classical Sāṃkhya (i.e., the *SK*), and on the right hand side are the alternative explanatory titles given in the *YS* (II.19) and as explained by Vyāsa (*YB* II.19) :

	Classical Sāṃkhya	**Classical Yoga**
1	*prakṛti* (*avyakta*)	*aliṅga*, the unmanifest
	mahat (*buddhi*)	*liṅga-mātra*, the designator : *sattā-mātra* or *mahat/buddhi*
3-8	*ahaṃkāra* (I-maker) five *tanmātra-s* (subtle senses)	six *aviśeṣa-s*, the unparticularized : *asmitā-mātra* and five *tanmātra-s*
9-24	*manas* and : five cognitive senses, five conative senses (=ten *indriya-s*), five *bhūta-s* (gross elements)	*viśeṣas*, the particularized : the final sixteen products as in Sāṃkhya

We note that in classical Yoga *asmitā-mātra* can be understood as fulfilling a similar function as *ahaṃkāra* in classical Sāṃkhya, that is, its sattvic illuminative nature giving rise to *manas* (the mind organ), the five cognitive senses (*buddhīndriya-s*) and the five senses of action (*karmendriya-s*) ; and its tamasic 'inert' nature as generating the five subtle elements (*tanmātra-s*) and the five gross elements (*bhūta-s*).[125]

The twenty-three evolutes or manifestations of

which the cosmos is constituted and which also form our psycho-physical being/personality are all *prakṛti*, matter-energy or non-self (i.e., extrinsic identity or *anātman*), as is *aliṅga*, the unmanifest. The whole of the guṇic realm (including all the evolutes) does not constitute intrinsic identity (*puruṣa*) and is therefore classified as non-self. In order of subtlety, intelligence or the faculty of discernment (*buddhi*), sense of self (*ahaṃkāra*) and the mind-organ (*manas*), including all the things or content of the mind such as cognitions, volitions, inclinations, emotions and so forth, all the senses (*indriya-s*) as well as their objects, the components as well as the states of the physical body — they are all nonself (i.e., are not to be mistaken for authentic identity or *puruṣa*). This realization or discriminative discernment is the key to the eradication of ignorance, misidentification, and dissatisfaction and it ushers one into a state of freedom termed *kaivalya* : the 'aloneness of seeing'[126] or *puruṣa* established in its true nature or form (*svarūpa*).

Puruṣa in the Yoga-Sūtra

As in classical Sāṃkhya, Patañjali's Yoga regards *puruṣa* as the witness (*sākṣin*) of *prakṛti*, that is, the three *guṇa-s*. More specifically, *puruṣa* is affirmed as being the seer (*draṣṭṛ*) of all mental content or psychomental experiences[127] and the knower of all the mental processes or modifications (*vṛtti*) of the mind (*citta*).[128] The most common term used by Patañjali to

designate *puruṣa* — authentic Selfhood — is the seer as can be observed in *YS* I.3 and II.17 as well as II.20 and IV.23. In the *YS* the gender of *puruṣa* must be seen merely as a linguistic or grammatical convenience. This masculine word meaning the seer or Self (i.e., pure consciousness) is used interchangeably with the feminine words: *śakti*[129] (power, energy, force), *citi*[130] (consciousness), *citiśakti*[131] (power of consciousness) and *dṛśi*[132] (sight, seeing). Also termed the power of seer (*dṛś-śakti*[133]), *puruṣa* is described as being absolutely unmixed[134] with or distinct from[135] even the finest, most subtle aspect of *prakṛti* — the *sattva* of consciousness or mind — which can still allow the yogin to misidentify with prakṛtic existence, the seeable (*dṛśya*). The seeable is, in itself, insentient and lacks all consciousness or self-luminosity.[136]

Yet what we call worldly existence including our ordinary human identity is due to the conjunction (*saṃyoga*) between the seer (*puruṣa*) and the seeable (*dṛśya, prakṛti*).[137] That conjunction, which is the cause of suffering and dissatisfaction (*YS* II.16-17), is to be undermined through yogic *praxis* until the *puruṣa* shines forth in its original and untainted glory. It is the *puruṣa* which the yogin seeks to realize and thereby liberate identity from any entanglement or concealment within matter. *Puruṣa* is often described as being totally opposite to manifest or unmanifest *prakṛti* (*vyaktāvyakta*) and as such is unaffected by *prakṛti*'s intricate web or network of traces or strands

of materiality. Due to its 'otherness', *puruṣa* — the principle of consciousness — is not to be confused with the transactions of human awareness (intellect, memory, etc.) as it transcends all object (worldly) — orientation ; and unlike *prakṛti*, *puruṣa* is said to be uncharacterizable, conscious and non-productive.[138] As witness, and possessing freedom and the quality of clear vision or 'seeing', *puruṣa* can be conceived (i.e., from *prakṛti*'s perspective) as being indifferent and inactive[139] thus laying emphasis on an existence whose nature appears wholly transcendent, uninvolved and invariably aloof from *prakṛti's* realm. Whereas change characterizes all matter including our psycho-physical being, changelessness is the very essence of *puruṣa*. Dasgupta writes :

> *Puruṣa* is the constant seer of the mind when it has an object, as in ordinary forms of phenomenal knowledge, or when it has no object as in the state of *nirodha* or cessation. *Puruṣa* is unchanging. It is the light which remains unchanged amidst all the changing modifications of the mind.... Its knowing is manifested in our consciousness as the ever-persistent notion of the self, which is always a constant factor in all the phenomena of consciousness. Thus *puruṣa* always appears in our consciousness as the knowing agent.[140]

Since such a *puruṣa*, as contentless consciousness, could not be fully at home within the world of

evolved matter, its ideal state is conceived of as being separate and apart from its apparent entanglement by the bonds of *prakṛti*.

In the Sāṃkhyan ontological duality of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, which Patañjali — at least on a provisional basis — utilizes, it appears to be the case that the former category comprises countless *puruṣa-s* (cf *SK* 18) that are omnipotent, omniscient and passive spectators of the cosmos. The *MBh* (XII.338.2)[141] states that both Yoga and Sāṃkhya proclaim the existence of multiple *puruṣa-s* in the world but that these many *puruṣa-s* all have their origin in the one Self (*ātman*), which is eternal, immutable and incommensurable. That Self is described in the same section as being both the seer (*draṣṭṛ*) and the seeable (*draṣṭavya*). While this view is generally characteristic of the schools of preclassical forms of Yoga it is not on the whole the acknowledged scholarly understanding of classical Yoga. According to Vyāsa, Yoga does admit many liberated beings (*kevalin-s*)[142] although it is not stated in the *YB* whether a plurality of *puruṣa-s* is ontologically intended or is not derived from a single *ātman* or the *puruṣa*-principle as spiritual essence.

What is the metaphysical status of *puruṣa*? Being eternal and omnipresent (*YS* III.54) a *puruṣa* has no particular locus but is ubiquitous, pervading everywhere. However, that a *puruṣa* is all-pervading leads to problems for both Sāṃkhya and Yoga (unlike, for

example, Advaita Vedānta) since there is supposedly an infinity (or atleast a very large number) of completely distinct, unrelated *purusa-s*. How can they all occupy the same infinite space without affecting each other in some way? Transcending all objectification, how can *puruṣa* be conceived as an entitative being? Given that, as pure consciousness, they are all devoid of any attributes, how are they to be distinguished from each other? Furthermore, each liberated *puruṣa*, being ubiquitous, must co-exist with all of *prakṛti* yet be completely unaffected by it. Vācaspati Miśra (*TV* I.41) emphasizes that there is no distinction between these many Selves.[143] But is the doctrine of a plurality of *purusa-s* really a part of Patañjali's system of thought?

Following the cues provided in Vyāsa's *Yoga-bhāṣya* and especially Vācaspati Miśra's *Tattva-Vaiśāradī*, S. Dasgupta[144] argued on the basis of *YS* II.22 that Patañjali recognized a plurality of *puruṣa-s*. The text of *YS* II.22 runs as follows : *kṛtārthaṃ prati naṣṭam apy anaṣṭaṃ tadanyasādhāraṇatvāt*, 'For one whose purpose is accomplished, it [the nature of the seeable/extrinsic identity] has ceased, but not for others [i.e., the deluded, empirical selves], due to it being common.'[145] In agreement with Feuerstein[146] I submit that it cannot be conclusively demonstrated based on the above *sūtra* that Patañjali subscribed to the doctrine of plurality as, for example, is more explicitly set out in classical Sāṃkhya (*SK* 18). In

fact, I cannot locate any clear reference to the effect that there is a multiplicity of *puruṣa-s*. There is no reason why *YS* II.22 could not be read in the same light of the pre-classical tradition where the term *kṛtārtha* also signifies the enlightened person who has attained *puruṣa*-realization thereby recovering authentic identity of Self beyond all plurality.[147]

The Sanskrit commentaries on the *YS* do imply that *puruṣa-s* are somehow countable entities and, if such is the case, then it must be admitted that the ancient Yoga masters or *guru-s* allowed themselves to fall into ineluctable difficulty. According to G. Larson's reading of classical Sāṃkhya there may be as many disclosures of pure consciousness (*puruṣa*) as there are intellects (*buddhi*) capable of reflective discernment (*adhyavasāya*), i.e. the intellects are following various life 'paths' and are functioning at various times and under varying circumstances in accordance with the various manifestations of the *guṇa-s*.[148] In classical Sāṃkhya pure contentless consciousness in its immanence accompanies every intellect (unlike the cosmic *ātman* of the Upaniṣad-s) and thus it is stressed that :

> ... the awareness of consciousness is an achievement of the intellect and is a negative discernment of what the intellect is not. The Sāṃkhya arguments for a plurality of pure consciousness ... appear to be directed at epistemological concerns rather than ontological

> matters. Because contentless consciousness can never be a content and cannot be characterized as are materiality or the tripartite process, it is hardly likely that the Sāṃkhya teachers were thinking of the plurality of consciousness as a set of knowable entities to be counted. They were thinking, rather, of the plurality of intellects through which the disclosure of contentless consciousness occurs.[149]

The only Sāṃkhya textual support for the above view is given by Vijñāna Bhikṣu in his commentary (entitled the *Sāṃkhya-pravacana-bhāṣya*) on *Sāṃkhya-sūtra* I.154. Vijñāna Bhikṣu raises a similar issue in his *Yoga-vārttika* (II.22) which seems to suggest that for him the intention in Yoga with its so-called plurality of *puruṣa-s* is also largely epistemological. Bhikṣu understands the meaning of the expression *kṛtārtha* in *YS* II.22 as referring to 'one whose object or purpose is supplied by the intellect'[150] and which can imply a plurality of intellects leading to the existential sense of there being multiple individualized selves or persons (because each individual self has a particular mind) through which pure consciousness discloses itself. Bhikṣu suggests that the Sāṃkhya notion of a plurality of *puruṣa-s* does not contradict the evidence of the Veda that there is only one Self (*paramātman*) or essential identity. Bhikṣu makes the arguable claim that in the Veda oneness or uniformity refers to the essential nature (*svarūpa*) of selfhood in

terms of genus (*jāti*) and therefore Vedic references to oneness or selfhood need not be construed as implying singularity.[151] Bhikṣu further maintains that many passages in the Veda (Śruti) show that selfhood presents itself under limiting adjuncts (*upādhi*) and as such there is no contradiction between Vedic testimony and the Sāṃkhyan notion of the plurality of *puruṣa-s*.[152]

One way therefore to approach the notion of the plurality of *puruṣa-s* is to adopt a somewhat suspicious attitude toward Yoga interpreters (in both the extant native textual tradition and in modern scholarship) and approach the issue (as mentioned above by Larson) by laying emphasis on the epistemology of the intellect (*buddhi*) or mind (*citta*) rather than the ontology of the *puruṣa-s*. *Puruṣa*, by definition being ever-free, ever-wise, unchanging, etc., could never be in actual bondage, and its intrinsic nature is therefore quite unaffected by any apparent loss of true identity or by any form of limitation. Vyāsa (*YB* II.18) reveals that 'These two, experience and emancipation, are created by mind (i.e. *buddhi*) and function only in mind. ... In the mind alone are bondage, which is the failure to fulfil the purpose of *puruṣa*, and emancipation, which is completion of that purpose.'[153] Metaphysically speaking, the universe has meaning only insofar as it serves the purpose of *puruṣa*, i.e. for experience and liberation.[154] According to Vyāsa's statement (n 153 above), it would make more sense to

understand spiritual emancipation as referring to a liberated state of mind (i.e., the mind — including the individual consciousness and personality — is liberated from its former condition of spiritual ignorance) and not literally as referring to a *puruṣa* which is by definition already free and therefore has no intrinsic need to be liberated from the fetters of worldly existence. One of the implications of multiple *puruṣa-s* for Patañjali would be to underscore the uniqueness of each individual's perspective and/or consciousness. Whether or not Patañjali actually adhered to the notion of a plurality of *puruṣa-s* appears to be an open question.

Any consideration of Patañjali's 'metaphysics' would be incomplete without reference to the third major 'principle' of his ontology, the concept of *īśvara* or 'Lord' (God). The term *īśvara* is found as early as the *BĀ Up* (e.g. I.4.8).[155] In some Vedānta-inspired schools of Yoga, *īśvara* refers to the Supreme Being as it rules over the cosmos and individuated beings. This is idea is illustrated in the *Bhagavadgītā* (XVIII.61): The Lord abides in the heart of all beings, Arjuna, by his power (*māyā*) causing all beings to revolve [as if they were] mounted on a wheel. [156]

In the *hiraṇyagarbha* 'school' of Yoga outlined in XII.296 of the *Mahābhārata* epic,[157] the noteworthy distinction is made between the Self which is recovering its innate enlightenment, that is, the

buddhimāna, and the ever-enlightened *buddha* (awakened one) or *prabuddha*.[158] The later principle, *buddha*, is considered the twenty-sixth principle (*tattva*) and is also known as the Lord, *īśvara*.[159] The *buddhyamāna* is the twenty-fifth principle (*tattva*) — the principle of conscious existence. When it fully 'awakens' and realizes its true nature as *buddha*[160] it becomes the absolute *īśvara*, the Lord or God, and as the twenty-sixth principle forever remains transcendent. Feuerstein, commenting on *īśvara*, writes: 'He never becomes involved with any of the lower *tattva-s*. Thus emancipation can be said to be a condition of the *buddhyamāna qua* the *buddhyamāna* in the company (*samiti*) of the lord.'[161]

As we have just seen, the epic yogins allowed twenty-six fundamental categories (*tattva-s*) of existence, *prakṛti* and its modes comprising the first twenty-four principles. Many passages in the *mokṣa-dharma* section of the *MBh* that assert a twenty-sixth principle do not necessarily imply the classical Yoga notion of a Lord (*īśvara*). Such passages could simply refer to the *puruṣa* or *kṣetrajña*[162] in its unenlightened state. However, it is obvious from examining sections of the *MBh*, especially the twelfth Parvan, that the conceptualization of *īśvara* in Patañjali's Yoga has its epic antecedents. In his pioneering study, P.M. Modi rightly points out, 'The idea of God in the Yoga system was not arrived at by superimposing it on an atheistic Sāṃkhya system with twenty-five principles

but by distinguishing the *jīva* [individuated self] from God on practical grounds.'[163]

While classical Sāṃkhya is said to be *nir-īśvara* or non-theistic, classical Yoga appears to incorporate a *sa-īśvara* or theistic stance. However, it is simply not appropriate to label the *SK* as being 'non-theistic'. Īśvara Kṛṣṇa, rather like the Buddha, chooses not to mention or make any statement about God at all. According to the *SK*, if there be a God (there being no positive denial of God's existence in the *SK*), then such a Being has little or nothing to do with the actual path of salvation as propounded by Īśvara Kṛṣṇa.[164]

According to several scholars, the theistic stance of Yoga is clearly acknowledged by Patañjali.[165] The Lord (*īśvara*) is not a creator (i.e. an anthropomorphic deity) like the Judeo-Christian God. Neither Patañjali nor Vyāsa mention *īśvara's* role (as a material cause) in the creation, preservation, and destruction of the world, implying thus an absence of a creator God in Yoga. *Īśvara* is also not the kind of universal Absolute taught in the Upaniṣad-s and envisaged by many thinkers within the tradition of Vedānta. Nor is *īśvara* intended as a type of enlightened super-being such as the transcendent *bodhisattva-s* of Mahāyāna Buddhism. *Īśvara* is defined by Patañjali as a Self (*puruṣa*) *sui generis* and whose distinctiveness from the 'ordinary' *puruṣa* is explained largely in negative terms. *YS* I.24 states: '*Īśvara* is a distinct Self

(*puruṣa*) untouched by the afflictions, actions or their fruition or their latent residue [in the mind].' [166] The distinctness or specialness of *īśvara* consists in that at no time can *īśvara* become embroiled in the domain of *prakṛti*, whereas all other *puruṣa-s* at one time will either have been entrenched in the illusion of being a misidentified entity within *prakṛti* and thus enslaved to prakṛtic existence. *Īśvara* does not abandon 'His' perfect condition of transcendence as pure consciousness and infinite existence. The Lord's freedom is eternal.[167] This view has led to theological difficulties since Patañjali also regards *īśvara* as being of positive relevance for humankind in that *īśvara* is : (1) that Being in whom 'the seed of omniscience is unsurpassed' ;[168] (2) the first teacher (*guru*) of all former yogins because not limited by time ;[169] (3) whose expression is *praṇava* [*Om*] ;[170] and (4) following from the recitation of *praṇava* and realization of its meaning,[171] one realizes the inner consciousness (*pratyakcetanā*) and obstacles no longer arise.[172] The above statements (*YS* I.25-9) are meant to be understood in conjunction with the concept of *īśvara-praṇidhāna* or devotion/dedication to *īśvara*.[173]

One might ask : How is it possible that a wholly transcendent *puruṣa* can intervene in the spatial, temporal world? In his commentary (*YB* I.24) Vyāsa elaborates on this issue explaining *īśvara*'s teaching role in terms of the Lord's appropriation of a perfect medium, which Vyāsa terms *sattva* (beingness).[174]

Vācaspati Miśra reasons that out of compassion for the individuated selves the Lord, as it were, reaches 'down' and 'touches' the pure *sattva* of *prakṛti*, the power of *sattva* excelling beyond the reach of *rajas* and *tamas*. *Īśvara* 'touches' this *sattva* as it prevails in the mind (*citta*) thus asserting a definite proprietorship (i.e., lordship : from the root *īś* : to own, be master of' and *vara* : 'choicest') over this aspect of *prakṛti*.[175] But unlike the empirical selves, *īśvara* does not become subject to spiritual ignorance (*avidyā*) and bondage. This is comparable to the role played by an actor/actress who, while identifying with the part nevertheless remains aware that he or she is not identical with the character of his or her role. The Lord, unlike the indivduated selves, does not identify with *avidyā* on the 'stage' of a *sattva*-dominated mind.[176] This is made possible because the Lord's unblemished *sattva* is devoid of any contamination of *rajas* and *tamas*.[177] All *puruṣa-s* (assuming there are many *puruṣa-s*) are of course intrinsically free but only the 'Lord' has been forever aware of this truth.

According to Vacaspati Miśra (*TV* I.24) *īśvara*'s power of knowledge and 'action'[178] continues to bestow favour to the mind of the devoted yogin all for the purpose of liberation. *Īśvara* therefore 'acts' non-saṃsārically, in the spirit of what the *Bhagavad-gītā* calls ego-transcending or transaction (*naiṣkarmya*) action — acting without attachment to the fruits of action — whereby no binding karmic fruition (*vipāka*)

could ever accrue, nor could any afflictions ever arise. Vyāsa declares that *īśvara* appropriated such an untainted vehicle of *sattva* in order to confer favour to living beings,[179] and also insists that the proof for this conviction is located in the sacred scriptures, which are manifestations of *īśvara*'s perfect *sattva*.[180]

Īśvara was undoubtedly more than a mere concept to Patañjali and the yogins of his time. It makes sense to assume that *īśvara* corresponded to an 'experience' they shared. Considering the distinctly pragmatic orientation of his Yoga it is doubtful that Patañjali would adopt the concept *īśvara* for merely historical reasons or simply in order to make his philosophy acceptable to orthodox Hinduism. The idea of 'grace' or divine recompense (*anugraha*, *prasāda*)[181] has been an integral element of Yoga since the rise of the theistic traditions as seen in the *Pāñcarātra* tradition as epitomized in the *Bhagavadgītā*.

If one were to classify Yoga as being a radical dualistic perspective thereby focusing on the purely transcendent nature of *īśvara* (i.e., *īśvara*'s role as a teacher being viewed as entirely passive and disengaged from any relation to the mechanism of *prakṛti*), it is possible to see *īśvara's* role as *guru* in purely metaphorical terms. The practical significance of the Lord, which the classical exegetes see in terms of *īśvara*'s related existence to empirical selves entangled in the prakṛtic realm, can also be understood passively, namely, as the utter formless transcendent

teacher, the archetypal yogin who 'guides' by 'His' mere presence or sheer being.[182] Mircea Eliade speaks of this as a 'metaphysical sympathy'[183] between *īśvara* and the aspiring yogin made possible by the ontological co-essentiality of *īśvara* and the spiritual essence of a human being (*puruṣa*). To view *īśvara* as something not absolutely identical with *puruṣa* is of intrinsic value. Not only does it enable yogins of a more devotional disposition to advance along the 'path' by way of *praṇidhāna* or devotion, but also warns those with a more intellectual outlook not to think of themselves in terms too autonomous, thus falling prey to dangerous pride (*abhimāna*), a quality of the ego-consciousness. It should not be overlooked that *īśvara* might have met primarily psychological and pedagogical needs rather than providing a purely ontological category. In otherwords, the term *īśvara* was used by Patañjali largely to account for certain yogic experiences (e.g. *YS* II.44 acknowledges the possibility of making contact with one's chosen deity (*iṣṭa-devatā*) as a result of personal [scriptual] study, namely *svādhyāya*).

If there are many transcendent *puruṣa*-s, then how exactly are they related to one another and to *īśvara*, singly and collectively? For the purpose of this study it suffices to say that the status and relationship of *īśvara* to the *puruṣa-s* and the *puruṣa-s* to one another is an open question. Empirically, however, the relation of *īśvara* to the yogin can be described as a one-way

affair in which the believing yogin emulates *īśvara's* condition, which is co-essential with the condition of his inmost Self.[184] However, there can be no question of the intrinsic nature of the transcendent Self—whether *īśvara* or not—ever being affected in the literal sense by the afflictions (*avidyā*, *asmitā*, etc.) or any other saṃsāric phenomena. Notwithstanding some of the problems inherent in Patañjali's concept of *īśvara*, this term is of considerable importance for Patañjali's Yoga. Indeed, original Yoga within Hinduism always was *sa-īśvara* or 'with God' (cf *MBh* XII.300.3). However narrow and even unacceptable to some the conception of God in classical Yoga may appear, the devotional element in it cannot be ignored or denied.

Even though Patañjali's *YS* appears to designate 'devotion to the Lord' as an alternative 'path', or only one of several ways that combine together to achieve a liberating transformation of consciousness, there can be no question of *īśvara*'s integral role in Patañjali's system. It is of interest to note that neither Vyāsa nor Vācaspati tackle the issue of whether *īśvara* is an additional principle (implying a twenty-sixth *tattva*) of Patañjali's Yoga. It is entirely possible that being a particular kind of *puruṣa*, *īśvara* is not intended to be an additional principle. If this be the case, it can further be speculated that even though *īśvara* and the so-called innumerable *puruṣa-s* (or *puruṣa*) are/is formally differentiated as a numerical multiplicity, one

can assume that at the absolute level of existence *īśvara* coincides with the *puruṣa*(*s*). It might then be possible that at the transcendent level *īśvara* and the 'liberated' *puruṣa*(*s*) (the twenty-fifth principle) merge ontologically as one Being, that is, are qualitatively one in eternity; or even can be said to 'intersect' as separate Self-monads whereupon they enter into a state of pure intersubjectivity. But speculation at this highly abstract level, however difficult it may be, does not seem to represent the spirit of the Yoga school which is much more practical and experiential in character. The nature of *īśvara* as experienced in the liberated state of aloneness (*kaivalya*) is not a topic in the *YS*. What seems crucially important, however, is for the yogin to know that the existence of *īśvara* is clearly admitted. Unlike any other conscious 'being' or 'principle', *īśvara* can function as a transformative catalyst or guide for aiding the yogin on the 'path' to spiritual emancipation. Thus, whether one asserts that Patañjali's descriptions of *īśvara* constitute a theistic stance or not, the concept of *īśvara* must be taken seriously as an authentic and dynamic aspect of Patañjali's philosophical platform.[185]

Paradoxically it appears that *puruṣa* is both aware of its transcendent nature as the 'seer' (*YS* I.3) and yet is seemingly and mysteriously 'entrapped' in *prakṛti* whereby human identity experiences itself to be a finite entity through a process of 'conformity' (*sārūpya*, *YS* I.4) to the nature of the modifications

(*vṛtti*) of the mind (*citta*). What we normally call the mind or ordinary consciousness is due to the conjunction (*saṃyoga*[186]) between the 'seer' and the 'seeable' — that is, between pure consciousness and the complex of the body and personality. *Puruṣa* is, however, distinct from phenomenal consciousness (*citta*) and therefore is not to be confused with empirical selfhood and its turbulence or whirls of thoughts and emotions,[187] these all being a form and product of the three *guṇa-s*. The *puruṣa*'s proximity to the highly evolved human organism 'solicits' the phenomenon of consciousness.[188] The connection between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* is made possible because at the finest, most subtle level of *prakṛti* is found a predominance of the *sattva* component (*guṇa*) wherein *prakṛti*, in the form of the mind (*citta*), is transparent enough to 'reflect' the 'light' of consciousness (of *puruṣa*) and create the appearance of sentience as well as an autonomous sense of intelligence in its evolutes or manifestations.

Patañjali effectively draws on the key yogic concept of mind (*citta*) in order to articulate the human predicament of mistaken identity. A study of the central term *citta* would necessarily lead into an exploration of how Patañjali and his main commentator, Vyāsa, make use of the Sāṃkhyan *triguṇa* doctrine and present a study of the mind — its nature, structure, and functioning (*vṛtti*) — that is integrally linked to Yoga epistemology.[189]

Abbreviations

BĀ Up	Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad
BG	Bhagavad Gītā
Chānd Up	Chāndogya Upaniṣad
RM	Rāja Mārtaṇḍa of Bhoja Rāja (ca eleventh century CE)
SK	Sāṃkhya Kārikā of Īśvara Kṛṣṇa (ca fourth-fifth century CE)
SPB	Sāṃkhya Pravacana Bhāṣya of Vijñāna Bhikṣu
STK	Sāṃkhya Tattva Kaumudī of Vācaspati Miśra
Śvet Up	Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad
TV	Tattva Vaiśāradī of Vācaspati Miśra (ca ninth century CE)
YB	Yoga Bhāṣya of Vyāsa (ca fifth-sixth century CE)
YS	Yoga Sūtra of Patañjali (ca second-third century CE)
YV	Yoga Vārttika of Vijñāna Bhikṣu (sixteenth century CE)

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Notes

1. Dasgupta (1930) p. 15.
2. According to H.T. Colebrooke (1873), Vol.1, p. 265, the only significant difference between Yoga and Sāṃkhya is the affirmation of the doctrine of *īśvara* by the former and its denial by the latter. A host of other scholars do not fully acknowledge Yoga and Sāṃkhya as being distinct philosophical schools. See, for example, M.N. Dvivedī (1934 : xviii), R. Garbe (1917 : 148), S. Radhakrishnan (1951, II : 342), M. Eliade (1969 : 7) and N. Smart (1968 : 26). S. Dasgupta (1930 : 2) observes, however, that although the two schools are fundamentally the same in their general metaphysical positions, they hold quite different views on many points of philosophical, ethical and practical interest. Recent scholarship has tended to support Dasgupta's claim. See, for example, F. Catalina (1968 : 19), K.B.R. Rao (1966 : 9) and G. Koelman (1970 : 57-66, 104, 237). See also notes 3, 4, and 5 below and accompanying text..
3. Feuerstein (1980) pp. 109-18.
4. ibid., p. 111.
5. G. Larson (1987 : 13) would obviously disagree with this dating. He suggests that the *SK* pre-dates the *YS*. He lists Īśvara Kṛṣṇa's *SK* as (ca) 350-450 CE and Patañjali's *YS* as (ca) 400-500 CE. Moreover, Larson feels that the *YS* philosophy is a school of Sāṃkhya. He writes (ibid., p. 19) : '... there is a basic and normative Sāṃkhya philosophy, concisely yet completely set forth in Īśvara Kṛṣṇa's *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* and appropriated with a somewhat different inflection in Patañjali's *Yoga-sūtra* for the sake of yogic praxis. The former can be called simply the tradition of Kārikā-Sāṃkhya and the latter, Pātañjala-sāṃkhya.' While admitting (ibid., p. 22) that the *YS* is 'obviously a compilation of older *sūtra* collections' he further advances (ibid.) that, 'Keith may well have been correct in suggesting that the appearance of the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* may have been the occasion for an attempt by the followers of Yoga to systematize their own older traditions.' See Keith (1949 : 70).
6. *SK* 19.
7. *YS* II.17-20. See the discussion later in this essay on *prakṛti* and

puruṣa. One could, however, look upon the *vṛtti-s* (*YS* I.6-11) as providing something of a proto-ontology equivalent in the first chapter.

8. For more on the issue of the unitary nature of the *YS* see Chapter 2 in Whicher (1998).
9. *YS* II.16 (p. 78) : *heyaṃ duḥkham anāgatam*. 'The suffering yet to come is to be overcome.' It must be emphasized as well that the question of 'how' also presupposes the question of 'why,' why one would desire liberation from the saṃsāric realm. This question of 'why' is answered, as we will see, in *YS* II.15 where we are told that from the perspective of the discerning yogin, all identity contained within the saṃsāric world is inherently dissatisfying. The Sanskrit text of the *YS*, the *YB* of Vyāsa, the *Tattva-vaiśāradī* of Vācaspati Miśra and the *Rāja-mārtaṇḍa* of Bhoja Rāja is from *The Yoga-sūtras of Patañjali* (1904), K.S. Āgāśe Ed. Poona : Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Ser. no. 47.
10. For an indepth study of *cittavṛttinirodha* see Whicher (1998).
11. *YB* IV.30 (p. 203).
12. See also Whicher (1999).
13. See, for example, Śaṅkara's (ca eighth-ninth century CE) use of *vyāvahārika* (the conventional empirical perspective) in contrast to *paramārthika* (the ultimate or absolute standpoint).
14. See in particular : Feuerstein (1980 : 14, 56, 108) ; Eliade (1969 : 94-5, 99-100) ; Koelman (1970 : 224, 251) ; and G. Larson (1987 : 13) who classifies Patañjali's Yoga as a form of Sāṃkhya.
15. F. Edgerton (1924), '*The Meaning of Sāṃkhya and Yoga*' in *AJP* 45, pp. 1-46.
16. I am adopting the term 'maps' from G. Feuerstein; see n. 19 below and also Feuerstein (1989) pp. 176-8.
17. One might query, for example, whether the central expedient of *vijñāna* (*SK* 2), recommended by Īśvara Kṛṣṇa, to terminate suffering (*duḥkha*) is, in the last analysis, adequate for realizing the postulated goal of identity as Self. *Tattva-abhyāsa* or applied *vijñāna* is, however, equated by R. Parrot [see (1985), 'The Experience called Reason in Sāṃkhya,' *JIP* 13, pp. 235-64] with wisdom as opposed to rational knowledge. Larson (1987 : 27) states that the ethical goal of Sāṃkhya is to discriminate the presence of a transcendent consciousness (*puruṣa*) distinct from

prakṛti and its tripartite process, and thereby to attain radical isolation (*kaivalya*) or liberation from ordinary human experience. But can *vijñāna* be synonomous with *prajñā* or yogic insight acquired in *samādhi* as described in the *YS* (I.17-18)? How, in Sāṃkhya, is the *bhāva* of (*SK* 23) *jñāna* actually brought about? K.B.R. Rao (1966 : 432) speculated that it is the accentuated rationalism of classical Sāṃkhya that must be held responsible for the fact that this school of thought never actually acquired the same recognition and prestige as the other Hindu Darśana-s. Feuerstein (1980 : 115-6) seriously doubts the efficacy of the classical Sāṃkhyan approach for arriving at genuine liberation, rendering *vijñāna* as 'an intellectual act'. He argues that *vijñāna*, as a sufficient means for attaining liberation, 'is tacitly denied, by the adherents of Yoga.' Koelman (1970 : 237) also supports the claim that the method of *vijñāna* in the *SK* (2) is inferior to yogic *praxis*. He writes : It is not by dint of thinking that one can empty the intellect ; only another faculty, the will, can inhibit the working of the intellect. In this, Yoga has seen more clearly than Sāṃkhya, which considers liberation as a purely intellectual process.

18. cf *Kaṭha Up* VI. 7-8.
19. Feuerstein (1980) p. 117.
20. Foreword to Feuerstein (1980) p. viii.
21. See Chapter 1 in Whicher (1998).
22. See Whicher (1999).
23. *TV* II.23 (p. 93): *pradhīyate janyate vikārajātamaneneti pradhānaṃ.* Translators have struggled to express the meaning of *mūlaprakṛti* with words such as 'nature', 'primordial nature', 'primordial materiality', and 'prime matter'; though these translations have generally been accepted, they are not precisely accurate and may even be misleading. The Sāṃkhyan dualism is quite distinct from the Cartesian dualism which bifurcates reality into mental and material aspects. The dualistic perspective of Sāṃkhya is made up of *puruṣa* as pure consciousness, and *prakṛti* as everything else, including the mental and the material. Psyche and the external world are not ultimately different. Both are forms of insentient (nonconscious, *acetana*) *prakṛti*. With the above explanation held in mind we shall adopt the simple term 'matter' for *prakṛti*.

24. See S. Dasgupta (1922) pp. 246-7, and Vācaspati Miśra on *SK* 3 ; see also *Sāṃkhya-sūtra* I.61 : *sattvarajastamasāṃ sāmyāvasthā prakṛti,* in R. Garbe, Ed. (1943), The *Sāṃkhya-pravacana-bhāṣya* (Harvard Oriental Series, Vol. 2, p. 29) of Vijñāna Bhikṣu as well as Vijñāna Bhikṣu's commentary (*SPB*) on Sāṃkhya-sūtra I.61 ; see also *SPB* VI.39 and *passim.*
25. See Anima Sen Gupta (1969), *Classical Sāṃkhya* : A *Critical Study* (Patna : The University Press) pp. 5-72.
26. See K.B.R. Rao (1966) pp. 55-6.
27. In Advaita Vedānta, the effect — that which is observed in our world — is often understood to be an unreal appearance or manifestation of *brahman* which alone is the ultimate reality. Therefore *brahman* is the real cause of all appearances which only possess limited, empirical levels of reality. This approach to causality is termed *brahma-vivarta-vāda* ; though the principle of *satkārya-vāda* is accepted, each effect is understood as an unreal appearance of *brahman.* This is in marked contrast to Sāṃkhya and Yoga which maintain that both the effect and the cause are on equal planes of reality. The above example is true of post-Śaṃkara Advaitins only. Śaṃkara did not hold *vivarta* but ascribed a lower level of reality, *vyāvahārikaṃ satyaṃ*, to the phenomenal world. In the school of Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta, Rāmānuja conceived of souls and the material world as attributes or the body of the absolute cause, though real like the cause ; and in Dvaita Vedānta, Madhva considered souls as finite, dependent beings while the Supreme cause is independent being.
28. *YB* IV.11 (p. 185) : *na hy apūrvopajanaḥ.*
29. *YB* IV.12 (p. 186) : *nāsty asataḥ saṃbhavaḥ, na cāsti sato vināśa ...*
30. *TV* I.18 (p. 22) : *kāryasarūpaṃ kāraṇaṃ yujyate na virūpam.*
31. *YS* IV.2 (p. 177) : *jātyantarapariṇāmaḥ prakṛtyāpūrāt.* 'The transformation into another life (i.e. birth) is implemented by [the] *prakṛti*[s].'
32. *YB* IV.2 (p. 177) : *pūrvapariṇāmāpāya uttarapariṇāmopajanas teṣāṃ pūrvāvayavānupraveśād bhavati.*
33. See Radhakrishnan (1948) pp. 105-6 :
nāsato vidyate bhāvo nābhāvo vidyate sataḥ,
ubhayor api dṛṣṭo'ntas tv anayos tattvadarśibhiḥ.

avināśi tu tad viddhi yena sarvam idaṃ tatam,
vināśam avyayasyāsya na kaścit kartum arhati. (cf *Chand Up* VI.1-4).

34. *YS* II.19 (p. 84).

35. *YS* III.13 (p. 124) : *etena bhūtendriyeṣu dharmalakṣaṇāvasthā-pariṇāmā vyākhyātāḥ.*

36. *YB* III.15 (p. 136) : *cittasya dvaye dharmāḥ paridṛṣṭāś cāpari-dṛṣṭāś ca.* In *YB* III.52 (pp. 170) Vyāsa rejects the notion that 'time' as normally conceived ('day', 'night', 'hour', etc.) is a real entity. The ultimate unit of time is the 'moment' (*kṣaṇa*). Vyāsa tells us that a 'moment' is the time taken to pass from one point of change in a substance to the next. A succession or sequence (*krama*) consists of a continuity of the unbroken flow of the moments in it. Yet there is no aggregation of 'moments' and their 'succession', i.e. hours, days and nights are basically mental constructs empty of reality yet appear real to those people who have a conceptual or reified view of the world. It is only the *kṣaṇa* or 'moment' which has reality and is the support or foundation of any succession of change over time. 'Succession' is a continuity of 'moments'. At each moment in time a subtle change takes place (perceptible to the yogin) and it is the accumulated effect of these subtle changes of which we become aware. See also *YS* III.9, 15, 52, and IV.33 and Vyāsa's commentary on these *sūtra-s*. In classical Yoga the idea of the 'moment' attains significance in spite of the general rejection of Buddhist 'impermanence' by 'orthodox' Hindu schools in general.

37. *YS* III.14 (p. 132) : *śāntoditāvyapadeśyadharmānupātī dharmī.* The *dharma*-holder corresponds to the subsided, arisen or indetermined form.

38. *YS* III.14 ; see n. 37 above.

39. See *YB* III.14 (p. 134).

40. Wilhelm Halbfass (1992), *On Being and What There Is*, (Albany : State University of New York Press) p. 61.

41. *YB* III.13 (p. 131) : *tatredam udāharaṇaṃ mṛddharmī piṇḍākārād dharmādharmnāntaram upasaṃpadyamāno dharmataḥ pariṇāmate ghaṭākāra iti. ghaṭākāro'nāgataṃ lakṣaṇaṃ hitvā vartamānalakṣa-ṇaṃ pratipadyata iti lakṣaṇataḥ pariṇāmate. ghato navapurāṇa-taṃ pratikṣaṇam anubhavannavasthāpariṇāmaṃ pratipadyata iti.*

42. *YB* IV.13 (p. 187): ... *vartamānā vyaktātmano'tītānāgataḥ sūkṣmātmānaḥ* ...
43. *YS* IV.12 (p. 186): *atītānāgatam svarūpato'asty adhvabhedād dharmāṇām*. Past and future exist in their own form due to differences between paths of the forms (*dharma-s*) [generated by *prakṛti*].
44. *YS* IV.18 (p. 193).
45. For more discussion on the nature of *guṇa-s* including their manifestation as characteristics of personhood and human identity see Chapter 3 in Whicher (1998).
46. See van Buitenen, (1956, 1957), 'Studies in Sāṃkhya (I-III)' in *JAOS* 76, 77.
47. *YS* II.18 (p. 81): *prakāśakriyāsthitiśīlaṃ bhūtendriyātmakaṃ bhogāpavargārthaṃ dṛśyam*. The seeable [*prakṛti*] whose qualities are of luminosity, activity and inertia, has the nature of the elements and the senses and is for the purpose of experience and emancipation.
48. See n. 47 above.
49. *YB* II.18 (pp. 81-2): *prakāśaśīlaṃ sattvam. kriyāśīlaṃ rajaḥ. sthitiśīlaṃ tama iti. ete guṇāḥ parasparoparaktapravibhāgāḥ pariṇāminaḥ saṃyogaviyogadharmāṇa itaretaropāśrayeṇopārjitamūrtayaḥ parasparāṅgitve'py asaṃbhinnaśaktipravibhāgās tulyajātīyā tulyajātīyaśaktibhedānupātinaḥ pradhānavelāyām upadarśitasaṃnidhānā, guṇatve'pi ca vyāpāramātreṇa pradhānāntarṇītānumitāstitāḥ. puruṣārthakartavyatayā prayuktasāmarthyāḥ.*
50. G. Koelman (1970) p. 77.
51. ibid.
52. G. Koelman's (ibid, p. 78) coinage. Cf. G. Feuerstein (1980) p. 36.
53. *YS* II.15 (p. 74): *pariṇāmatāpasaṃskāraduḥkhair guṇavṛttivirodhāc ca duḥkham eva sarvaṃ vivekinaḥ*.
54. See *YS* II.19. In otherwords, the predominant interpretation among scholars is that phenomenal existence is an inherently problematic, even constantly turbulent state of affairs. The danger in the above interpretation is that *prakṛti* all too easily becomes equated with or reduced to affliction (*kleśa*) itself.
55. See n. 53 above and text.
56. Patañjali uses the term *pratiprasava twice*, in *YS* II.10 and IV.34.

57. See Chapple and Kelly (1990) p. 60.
58. Feuerstein (1979a) p. 65.
59. cf. T. Leggett (1990) p. 195 and U. Arya (1986) pp. 146, 471.
60. See Whicher (1998).
61. As my longer study (1998) argues.
62. *YS* II.19 (p. 84) : *viśeṣāviśeṣaliṅgamātrāliṅgāni guṇaparvāṇi*. 'The levels of the *guṇa-s* are the particularized, the unparticularized, the designator, and the unmanifest.'
63. *YB* II.19 (pp. 84-5) : *tatrākāśavāyvagnyudakabhūmayo bhūtāni śabdasparśarūparasagandhatanmātrāṇām aviśeṣāṇāṃ viśeṣāḥ. tathā śrotratvakcakṣujihvāghrāṇāni buddhīndriyāṇi, vākpāṇipādapāyūpasthāḥ karmendriyāṇi, ekādaśaṃ manaḥ sarvārtham, ity etāny asmitālakṣaṇasyāviśeṣasya viśeṣāḥ. guṇānām eṣa ṣoḍaśako viśeṣapariṇāmaḥ. ṣaḍaviśeṣāḥ. tadyathā śabdatanmātraṃ sparśatanmātraṃ rūpatanmātraṃ rasatanmātraṃ gandhatanmātraṃ ceti ekadvitricatuḥ pañcalakṣaṇāḥ śabdādayaḥ pañcāviśeṣāḥ, ṣaṣṭhaś cāviśeṣo'smitāmātra iti. ete sattāmātrātmano mahataḥ ṣaḍaviśeṣapariṇāmāḥ. yattatparamaviśeṣebhyo liṅgamātraṃ mahattattvaṃ tasminn ete sattāmātre mahatyātmanyavasthāya vivṛddhikāṣṭhām anubhavanti. pratisaṃsṛjyamānāś ca tasminn eva sattāmātre mahatyātmanyavasthāya yattan niḥsattāsattaṃ niḥsadasan nirasad avyaktam aliṅgaṃ pradhānaṃ tatpratiyanti.*
64. *TV* II.19 (p. 85) : *sattvarajastamasāṃ sāmyāvasthā*. See also *TV* II.17 (p. 79) : *pradhānasāmyam upagato'pi.* The state of equilibrium, balance or equipoise is known as *sāmyāvasthā* or *pralaya* and is where the unmanifest *guṇa-s* 'neutralize' or balance one another's energy prior to all their manifestations.
65. See n. 63 above.
66. *TV* I.45 (p. 50).
67. *TV* II.19 (p. 85) : *yāvatī kācit puruṣārthakriyā śabdādibhogalakṣaṇā, sattvapuruṣānyatākhyātilakṣaṇā vāsti sa sarvā mahati buddhau samāpyata ity arthaḥ.*
68. See n. 63 above and text.
69. See n. 63 above and text.
70. G. Koelman (1970) p. 107.
71. ibid.
72. On this see P. Chakravarti (1951) p. 134 who has made a strong

case against the identification of the Patañjali referred to in the *Yuktidīpikā* with the author of the *YS*.

73. *SK* 24. Often in Hindu literature the term *ahaṃkāra* denotes the illusory sense of self confined to the nature of *prakṛti* as a body-mind and having various properties such as 'my thoughts', 'my feelings', 'my actions', etc.
74. S. Radhakrishnan (1951), Indian Philosophy, Vol II (London : George Allen and Unwin) p. 434.
75. *YB* I.45 (p. 50) : *teṣāhaṃkāraḥ. asyāpi liṅgamātraṃ sūkṣmo viṣayaḥ* ; *teṣa* (these) refers to the subtle elements (*tanmātra-s*).
76. *YS* II.6 (p. 64) : *dṛgdarśanaśaktyor ekātmatevāsmitā.*
77. Vyāsa often uses the terms *buddhi* and *citta* synonomously, although it is also correct to understand the former to be included in the latter ; see Chapter 3 in Whicher (1998).
78. *YB* II.6 (p. 64) : *puruṣo dṛkśaktir buddhir darśanaśaktir ity etayor ekasvarūpāpattir ivāsmitā kleśa ucyate. bhoktṛbhogyaśaktyor atyantavibhaktayor atyantāsaṃkīrṇayor avibhagaprāptāv iva satyāṃ bhogaḥ kalpate. svarūpapratilambhe tu tayoḥ kaivalyam eva bhavati kuto bhoga iti. tathā coktam — buddhitaḥ paraṃ puruṣam ākaraśīlavidyādibhir vibhaktam apaśyan kuryāt tatrātmabuddhiṃ mohena.* Vācaspati Miśra (*TV* II.6, p.64) tells us that the above quotation used by Vyāsa is by the Sāṃkhya teacher, Pañcaśikha.
79. *YS* III.35 (p. 154) : *sattvapuruṣayor atyantāsaṃkīrṇayoḥ pratyayaviśeṣo bhogaḥ* ...
80. See Chapter 3 in Whicher (1998).
81. Āraṇya (1963), *Yoga Philosophy of Patañjali*, Trans. P.N. Mukerji, p. 195. When quoting Āraṇya, I will be using the translations by Mukerji.
82. *YS* IV.4 (p. 178) : *nirmāṇacittāny asmitāmātrāt.*
83. *YS* IV.4 is explained further in Chapter 3 of Whicher (1998).
84. S. Dasgupta (1920), *A Study of Patañjali*, (Calcutta : Calcutta University Press) p. 51.
85. Koelman (1970) p. 108.
86. Feuerstein (1980) p. 46.
87. For example, Koelman (1970: 108) writes : Only when plurified or suppositated by the ego-function [*ahaṃkāra*] can the great substance (*mahattattvam*) ... be strictly called *buddhi*. Koelman sees

buddhi in an individuated sense only. Feuerstein (1980: 44) understands *buddhi*, in Patañjali's philosophy, as standing 'for "cognition" only and not for any ontological entity.'

88. This 'cosmic being', it could be argued, has been mythologized as '*hiraṇyagarbha*', who came to designate the 'first-born' entity in the evolutionary series, as taught in Vedānta. According to the *MBh* (XII.291.17), '*hiraṇyagarbha*' is none other than the higher mind or *buddhi*.
89. S. Chennakesavan (1980), *Concept of Mind in Indian Philosophy*, p. 134.
90. This experience is referred to in *YS* I.17 as *asmitā-samādhi*. For a study of the various forms of *samādhi* see Whicher (1996/1997).
91. G. Feuerstein (1980) p. 41.
92. S. Dasgupta (1922).
93. See n. 75 above.
94. G. Koelman (1970) p. 115.
95. *TV* II.19 (p. 84) : *pañca tanmātrāṇi buddhikāraṇakānyaviśeṣatvād asmitāvad iti*. The five subtle elements have *buddhi* as their cause because they are unparticularized, like I-am-ness.
96. As outlined in the *SK* (24).
97. Āraṇya (1963) pp. 196-7.
98. *YB* IV.2 (p. 177) : *tatra kāyendriyāṇām anyajatīyapariṇatānām ... pūrvapariṇāmāpāya uttarapariṇāmopajanas teṣām apūrvāvayavānupraveśād bhavati*.
99. *YB* IV.2 (p. 177) : *kāyendriyaprakṛtayaś ca svaṃ svaṃ vikāram anugṛhṇantyāpūreṇa dharmādi nimittam apekṣamāṇā iti*.
100. *YB* III.14 (p. 134) : *deśakālākāranimittāpabandhān na khalu samānakālam ātmanām abhivyaktir iti*. Under the constraints of place, time, form, and cause, the essences do not manifest simultaneously.
101. As Vācaspati clarifies (*TV* III.14) p. 134.
102. Vijñāna Bhikṣu (*YV* IV.2) mentions such powers as the yogin's ability to multiply his body, implying a change of shape without intervening death and birth. See T. S. Rukmani (1989) pp. 3-4.
103. See Johnston (1937) p. 26, and Larson (1969) p. 174.
104. *TV* IV.2 (p. 177) : *manuṣyajātipariṇatānāṃ kāyendriyāṇāṃ yo devatiryagjātipariṇāmaḥ sa khalu prakṛtyāpūrāt. kāyasya hi*

prakṛtiḥ pṛthivyādīni bhūtāni. indriyāṇāṃ ca prakṛtir asmitā. tadavayavānupraveśa āpūras tasmād bhavati.

105. See n. 104 above.
106. See *TV* IV.2 (p. 177).
107. *YS* IV.3 (p. 177) : *nimittam aprayojakaṃ prakṛtīnāṃ varaṇa-bhedas tu tataḥ kṣetrikavat.* It is understood here that the farmer does not initiate the flow of water but directs the flow by way of barriers. See n. 109 below.
108. Some aphorisms of Kaṇāda (*Vaiśeṣika-sūtras* IX.1.1 to 10) are specifically directed to refute the Sāṃkhya and Yoga doctrine of *satkāryavāda*. In Vaiśeṣika, the product does not pre-exist in its material cause. It is actually brought into existence in the process of causation.
109. *YB* IV.3 (pp. 177-8) : *yathā kṣetrikaḥ kedārāntaraṃ piplāvayiṣuḥ samaṃ nimnaṃ nimnataraṃ vā nāpaḥ pāṇināpakarṣati āvaraṇaṃ tv āsāṃ bhinatti tasmin bhinne svayam evāpaḥ kedārāntaram āplāvayanti, tathā dharmaḥ prakṛtīnām āvaraṇam adharmaṃ bhinatti, tasmin bhinne svayam eva prakṛtayaḥ svaṃ svaṃ vikāram āplāvayanti.*
110. See *YB* IV.3 (p. 178).
111. *YB* IV.12 (p. 186) : *sataś ca phalasya nimittaṃ vartamānīkaraṇe samarthaṃ nāpūrvopajanane. siddhaṃ. nimittaṃ naimittikasya vieṣānugrahaṇaṃ kurute na pūrvam utpādayatīti.* An efficient cause can bring to actuality a result already existent, but not produce what had not previously existed. A recognizable cause gives a particular aid towards what is effected ; it produces something not indeed non-existent before.
112. See Chapter 3 in Whicher (1998).
113. *YB* I.45 (p. 50) : *nanv asti puruṣaḥ sūkṣma iti. satyam. yathā liṅgāt paramaliṅgasya saukṣmyaṃ na caivaṃ puruṣasya. kiṃ tu, liṅgasyānvayikāraṇaṃ puruṣo na bhavati hetus tu bhavati.*
114. *YB* II.19 (p. 86) : *aliṅgāvasthāyāṃ na puruṣārthā hetur nāliṅgā-vasthā yāmādau puruṣārthatā kāraṇaṃ bhavatīti. na tasyāḥ puru-ṣārthatā kāraṇaṃ bhavatīti. nāsau puruṣārthakṛteti nityākhyāyate. trayāṇāṃ tv avasthāviśeṣāṇāmādau puruṣārthatā kāraṇaṃ bhavati sa cārthā hetur nimittaṃ kāraṇaṃ bhavatīty anityākhyāyate.*
115. Koelman (1970 : 76).
116. *TV* IV.3 (p. 178) : *na ca puruṣārtho'pi pravartakaḥ. kiṃ tu*

taduddeśeneśvaraḥ. uddeśyatāmātreṇa puruṣārthaḥ pravartaka ity ucyate. utpitsos tv asya puruṣārthasyāvyaktasya sthitikāraṇatvaṃ yuktam ... īśvarasyāpi dhurmādhiṣṭhānārthaṃ pratibandhāpanaya eva vyāpāro veditavyaḥ.

117. *YB* III.14 ; see n. 100 above.
118. *YB* IV.11 (P. 195) : *hetur dharmāt sukham adharmād duḥkhaṃ sukhād rāgo duḥkhād dveṣas, tataś ca prayatnaḥ, tena manasā vācā kāyena vā parispandamānaḥ param anugṛhṇāty upahanti vā, tataḥ punar dharmādharmau sukhaduḥkhe rāgadveṣāv iti pravṛttam idaṃ ṣaḍaraṃ saṃsāracakram. asya ca pratikṣaṇam āvartamānasyāvidyā netri mūlaṃ sarva kleśaśānam ity eṣa hetuḥ.*
119. For a detailed explanation of the term *karman* see Chapter 3 in Whicher (1998).
120. As quoted in Feuerstein (1980) p. 118.
121. See Chapter 3 in Whicher (1998).
122. See Monier-Williams (1899), *A Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, p. 487.
123. ibid., p. 334.
124. This is exactly the major issue I take up in Chapter 6 of *The Integrity of the Yoga Darśana* (1998).
125. See Larson (1969).
126. For a study of the term *kaivalya* see Chapter 6 in Whicher (1998).
127. *YS* II.20 (p. 87) : *draṣṭā dṛśimātraḥ śuddho'pi pratyayānupaśyaḥ.* 'The seer is seeing alone ; although pure, it appears as/is taken as mental content/intentions/apprehensions.' After stating in *YS* I.3 that our true nature and identity is the seer, *YS* I.4 informs us that unless we are aware of the seer, we yet conform in our identity to the changing nature of *vṛtti* or the modifications of the mind.
128. *YS* IV.18 (p. 193) : *sadā jñātāś cittavṛttayas tatprabhoḥ puruṣasyāpariṇāmitvāt.* 'The modifications of the mind are always known due to the immutability of their master.' In Yoga as portrayed in the epic literature of the *MBh*, the term *puruṣa* is widely referred to as the 'knower' (*jña*) or the 'field-knower' (*kṣetra-jña*), the 'field' being *prakṛti*. See, for example, *BG* XIII.34. In *YB* II.17 Vyāsa uses the term *kṣetrajña* for *puruṣa*. See *SK* 17 for the various proofs establishing the existence of *puruṣa* in the system of classical Sāṃkhya.
129. *YS* II.23.

130. *YS* IV.22.
131. *YS* IV.34.
132. *YS* II.20.
133. *YS* II.6.
134. *YS* III.35 (p. 154) : *sattvapuruṣayor atyantāsaṃkīrṇayoḥ* ...
135. *YS* III.49 (p. 167) : *sattvapuruṣānyatā* ...
136. *YS* IV.19 (p. 194) : *na tat svābhāsaṃ dṛśyatvāt*. That [*cittavṛtti*, i.e. mind, extrinsic identity] has no self-luminosity, because of the nature of the seeable [i.e. it is itself something known, perceived]. cf. *SK* 20.
137. *YS* II.17 (p. 79) : *draṣṭṛdṛśyayoḥ saṃyogo heyahetuḥ*. The conjunction between the seer and the seeable is the cause of what is to be overcome [i.e., suffering, dissatisfaction (*duḥkha*)].
138. *SK* 11 ; see Larson (1969) pp. 263-4.
139. *SK* 19 : *sākṣitvam* ... *kaivalyaṃ mādhyasthyaṃ draṣṭṛtvam akartṛbhāva* ...; see Larson (1969) p. 265.
140. S. Dasgupta (1924), *Yoga as Philosophy and Religion* (London : Trubner and Co.), p. 19.
141. See Edgerton (1965) p. 332.
142. *YB* I.24 (p. 26) : *kaivalyaṃ prāptās tarhi santi ca bahavaḥ kevalinaḥ*. There are many *kevalin-s* who have attained liberation. cf. *YB* II.22 p. 90 and IV.33 (p. 205). It is of interest to note that *kevalin* is a Jaina term. Those who attain *kaivalya* according to Yoga are called *kaivalin* and not *kevalin*. On this matter U. Arya (1986 : 289) writes : 'It appears that Vyāsa is challenging the view of the Jains, who do not believe in a ... God but do believe that those who reach the highest perfection through yoga and are called *kevalin-s* become īśhvaras after death. In Vyāsa's view, Patañjali's definition of īśhvara does not apply to them.'
143. See *TV* I.41 (p. 44).
144. S. Dasgupta (1930), *Yoga Philosophy in Relation to Other Systems of Indian Thought* (Calcutta : University of Calcutta Press), p. 167.
145. *YS* II.22 (p. 90).
146. See G. Feuerstein (1980) p. 23.
147. See, for example, *Muṇḍaka Up* I.2.9 and *Śvet Up* II.14.
148. See *SK* 18.

149. Larson (1987) p. 80.
150. Text from the *YV* (II.22) T. S. Rukmani, Trans. (1983), *Yogavārttika of Vijñāna Bhikṣu*, Vol. 2: Sādhanapāda, p. 149: *buddhyā kṛtaḥ samāpito' rtho yasyeti.*
151. See *SPB* in R. Garbe, Ed. (1943), *Harvard Oriental Series*, Vol. 2, pp. 69-70.
152. ibid., pp. 70-1.
153. *YB* II.18 (pp. 83-4): *tāvetau bhogāpavargau buddhikṛtau buddhāv eva vartamānau ... buddher eva puruṣārthāparisamāptir bandhas tadarthāvasāyo mokṣa iti.*
154. *YS* II.18, 21.
155. See Radhakrishnan (1953) p. 167.
156. See Radhakrishnan (1948) p. 374.
157. See K.B.R. Rao (1966) p. 278; see P.M. Modi (1932) p. 81ff and G. Feuerstein (1980) pp. 5-7 for studies on the twenty-six principles outlined in *MBh* XII.296.
158. *MBh* XII.296.7; see Edgerton (1965) p. 317.
159. *MBh* XII.296, 20; see Edgerton, ibid., p. 319.
160. *MBh* XII.296.11; see Edgerton, ibid., p. 318.
161. Feuerstein (1980) p. 6; see *MBh* XII.296.27.
162. See, for example, XII.296.11 and XII.306.53-4.
163. P.M. Modi (1932), *Akṣara: A Forgotten Chapter in the History of Indian Philosophy*, Baroda: Baroda State Press p. 81.
164. For instance, Feuerstein (1980) p. 116 conjectures that Īśvara Kṛṣṇa assumed a typical agnostic stance. What distinguishes epic Sāṃkhya and Yoga from their classical formulations is, above all, their theistic (panentheistic) orientation. It does not appear to be the case that *īśvara* is a necessary principle for all yogins, that is devotion to *īśvara* can be an optional approach to liberation in the first chapter of the *YS* (implied by the word *vā*, meaning 'or' in *YS* (I.23). Thus, the 'non-theism' of classical Sāṃkhya, and 'optional' theism of classical Yoga can be understood as deviations from a firmly established theistic base, reflected in the Upaniṣad-s. Feuerstein suggests (1989: 164), 'The reason for this shift away from the original panentheism of [Sāṃkhya] and Yoga was a felt need to respond to the challenge of such vigorously analytical traditions as Buddhism by systematizing both

[Sāṃkhya] and Yoga along more rationalistic philosophical lines.' However, we must keep an open mind regarding this, especially in relation to Yoga where rational knowledge is clearly subservient to direct perception.

165. See *YS* I.23-9 below and *YS* II.45. Eliade and Feuerstein clearly endorse the theistic orientation of these *sūtra-s*. Chapple and Kelly (1990: 3) do not impute that Patañjali's descriptions of *īśvara* constitute a theistic stance. However, they do not in turn underestimate the potential importance of the concept of *īśvara* in Patañjali's Yoga.
166. *YS* I.24 (p. 25): *kleśakarmavipākāśayair aparāmṛṣṭaḥ puruṣa-viśeṣa īśvaraḥ.*
167. *YB I.24* (p. 26): *sa tu sadaiva muktaḥ sadaiveśvara iti.*
168. *YS* I.25 (p. 29): *tatra niratiśayaṃ sarvajñabījam.*
169. *YS* I.26 (p. 31): *pūrveṣām api guruḥ kalenānavacchedāt.*
170. *YS* I.27 (p. 32): *tasya vācakaḥ praṇavaḥ.*
171. *YS* I.28 (p. 33): *tajjapas tadārthabhāvanam.*
172. *YS* I.29 (p. 33): *tataḥ pratyakcetanādhigamo'py antarāyābhāvaś ca.*
173. *YS I.23* (p. 25): *īśvarapraṇidhānād vā.* 'Or [*samādhi* is attained] by devotion/dedication to the Lord.'
174. *YB* I.24 (p. 27): *yo'sau prakṛṣṭasattvopādānād īśvarasya śaśvatika utkarṣah.*
175. This suggests one reason why such a being is called *īśvara*. *TV* I.24 (p. 27): *neśvarasya pṛthagjanasyevāvidyānibandhanaś citta-sattvena svasvāmibhāvaḥ ... tāpatrayaparītān pretyabhāvamahā-rṇavāj jantūnaddhariṣyāmi jñānadharmopadeśena.*
176. *TV* I.24 (p. 27): *na punar avidyām avidyā tvena sevamānaḥ ... tadidam āhāryamasya rūpaṃ na tāttivakam.*
177. *TV* I.24 (p. 27) : *na ceyam apahatarajastamomala viśuddha-sattvo-pādānaṃ vinetyālocya sattvaprakarṣam upādat te.*
178. *TV* I.24 (p. 26) : *jñānakriyāśakti saṃpadaiśvaryam.*
179. *YB* I.25 (p. 30): ... *bhūtānugrahaḥ prayojanam.*
180. *YB* I.24 (p. 27): *tasya śastraṃ nimittam. śastraṃ punaḥ kiṃ nimittaṃ, prakṛṣṭasattvanimittam.* Th is perfection — does it have a cause or is it without a cause? The cause is sacred script-ure. Then what is the cause of scripture? The cause is the

perfection (of the divine mind).

181. See *YB* I.23 (p. 25) ; *prasāda* can also mean 'clarity', 'serenity', 'tranquility' — all qualities through which spiritual transformation is enhanced and freedom (*mokṣa*) is allowed to take place.
182. See G. Oberhammer (1964) pp. 197-207.
183. M. Eliade (1969) p. 74.
184. Feuerstein (1980) p. 12.
185. Here we can mention a few scholars who at times underestimate the importance of *īśvara* in Patañjali's system. See, for example : R. Garbe (1917) p. 149 ; S. Radhakrishnan (1951, II) p. 371 ; N. Smart (1968) p. 30 ; and G. Koelman (1970) p. 57.
186. *YS* II.17 ; seen. 11 above.
187. See *YS* II.15.
188. *YS* IV.22 (p. 197) : *citer apratisaṃkramāyās tadākārāpattau svabuddhisaṃvedanam.* When the unmoving higher consciousness assumes the form of that [mind] then there is perception of one's own intellect.
189. On the concept of *citta* as well as a study of yogic discipline as a theory-practice integration and the embodied implications of liberation in classical Yoga see Chapters 3-6 in Whicher (1998).

HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE PUNCH-MARKED COINS

In this paper an attempt is being made to delineate the progress of the historiography of the punch-marked coins. Since nineteenth century, a large number of articles have been written on these coins and also quite a few books, monographs and chapters on numismatic works dealing with them. Several catalogues of the PMC of various hoards and museum collections have also been published. They have been the subject-matter of even some doctoral dissertations. One important article by A.N. Lahiri dealing with their historiography has made 'a selective study of the writings of noted scholars'.[1] Here we propose to treat the subject afresh filling up some lacunae left in that article, and also adding information on the progress of the PMC studies since 1987, the date of the publication of his article.

The term 'punch-marked coin' (PMC) generally refers to the early Indian coins, which are largely in silver, with a few in copper as well.[2] They are found in various shapes, sizes, and weights. They were in vogue when writing was not current in India or was rarely used. The PMC, therefore, are not inscribed, instead they have pre-determined number of symbols punched on them. In fact, symbols are the most conspicuous

feature of these coins, and it is to their study that scholars have devoted their main attention.

Early Western numismatists could not understand their significance. Their view was that Indians could not develop an indigenous coinage ; this vitiated their outlook towards these archaic coins of India. For example, Prinsep, who was one of the pioneers in the field of Indian numismatic studies, believed that the Hindus 'derived their knowledge of coinage from the Greeks of Bactria'. Wilson also held that the Hindus learnt the usefulness of money from the Bactrian Greeks and from their commerce specially with Rome. On the other hand, James Kennedy thought that the PMC were copied from Babylonian originals as a result of the active maritime trade between India and Babylon in the sixth century before Christ. C.W. King also believed that 'inhabitants of the Indian Peninsula derived the use of coined money from the Greek subjugators of Bactria...' However, later on, Prinsep himself came to the right conclusion that these archaic Indian coins were older than the Graeco-Bactrian coinage.

Significant advance in the study of the PMC was made in the last decade of the nineteenth century. With W. Theobald started the era of scientific study of the PMC symbols.[3] He described these symbols minutely, and interpreted them in the light of his findings. He came to the conclusion that some of them are 'definitely Śaivite, others Buddhist, others planatory,

others relating to Aryan mythology and all, or the majority at least, devoted to some esoteric allusion.' He classified them under six heads : (1) human figure, (2) implements, (3) animals, (4) trees, branches or fruits, (5) solar, planetory or Śaivite symbols, and (6) miscellaneous and unknown marks. He believed that five symbols are about the average number on the obverse, and not more than two on the reverse; and the impressions are less distinct on the reverse, and reverse 'punches' or symbols are frequently smaller.

However, it was Sir Alexander Cunningham who first made a systematic study of the PMC. As the first Director-General of the Archaeological Survey of India, he made extensive tours all over the country, and published the results of his explorations in the *Archaeological Survey Reports*. In 1891 his *Coins of Ancient India* was published. He handled some five to six thousand (silver) PMC, mainly of the common square *kārshāpaṇa* types, which are found all over the country from the Himalayan Mountain to Cape Comorin, and from Sistan to the mouth of the Ganges.[4] He believed that these coins were not in any way influenced by foreign issues. 'The Indian monetary system', he asserted 'was essentially original, as it differed from the Greek and from all other systems, in its unit of weight, as well as its scale of multiples. ... Its nomenclature also is quite different and the common form of the money is not round but square. Altogether the differences are so marked that I have no

hesitation in stating my conviction that the Indian monetary system is the original invention of the Hindu mind.' His view on the fabric of the PMC indicating general sequence was very sound. 'The earliest specimens', he opined, 'are generally thin and broad, and of irregular shape. Some are oblong, and some are nearly round; but all are light in weight, and are usually very much worn.'[5] As regards their age, he observed: 'How old these punch-marked coins may be, it is difficult to say. They were certainly current in the time of Buddha, that is, in the sixth century B.C. But I see no difficulty in thinking that they might mount as high as 1000 B.C.'[6]

But the observations of E.J. Rapson on the PMC in his small book *Indian Coins*, published the same year, were not as sound as those of Cunningham. He no doubt supported the indigenous origin of the PMC;[7] but he also asserted that they are little more than weights of metal, on which was stamped from time to time the symbol of the authority responsible for their correctness and purity.[8] Later, in 1916, he made another statement about these symbols, 'The symbols punched on these coins in the *obverse* are supposed to be the private marks of the money changers, while those on the *reverse*, which are almost invariably fewer in number and of a somewhat different character, may possibly denote the locality in which the coins were issued.'[9] As regards the antiquity of these coins he opined that the oldest of them 'are probably as early as

the beginning of the 4th century B.C.'[10]

D.B. Spooner and V.A. Smith

In the early years of the twentieth century D.B. Spooner and V.A. Smith made significant contributions to the studies of the PMC. In his *Annual Report of the Archaeological Survey of India*, 1905-06, Spooner published 61 silver PMC of the Peshwar hoard. On their basis, he observed that so far as the obverse and reverse symbols of the coins are concerned, there was 'an invariable concomitance established between a particular group of symbols on the observe and a particular "mint-mark" on the reverse, which cannot conceivably be lacking in significance and which points decidedly to these coins having been the regular coinage of some accepted central authority, and the symbols of their selection the recognised insignia of the same, not the private marks of individual moneyers impressed haphazard from time to time.'

On the other hand, V.A. Smith, in his *Indian Museum Catalogue*, published in 1906, reiterated the view that 'the punch-marked coinage was a private coinage issued by guilds and silversmiths with the permission of the ruling powers.' 'The numerous obverse punchers', he opined, 'seem to have been impressed by different moneyers through whose hands the pieces passed, and the reverse marks may be regarded the signs of approval by controlling authority.'[11]

However, Smith recognised the numismatic character of three obscure silver bent-bars weighing 169, 165.8 and 174.1 grains as coins of a 100-ratti weight system.

In 1917 the PMC symbols were interpreted as Buddhist symbols by A. Foucher.[12] The elephant and the bull, which appear as symbols on these coins, represent, according to him, the traditional symbols of Buddha's conception and the zodiacal sign of his birth, Taurus. But the suggestion was not accepted by J.N. Banerjea who pointed out that it would be going too far in the present state of our knowledge to attempt to associate the symbols definitely with any one or the other of the various creeds of India.[13]

Durga Prasad, D.R. Bhandarkar and E.H.C. Walsh

In the first half of the twentieth century, apart from Spooner and Smith, researches on the PMC were mainly done by D.R. Bhandarkar, Durga Prasad, E.H.C. Walsh and John Allan. Among the significant writings of Durga Prasad is included a small book entitled *Observations on the Silver Punch-marked Coins of Ancient India and their Age*. It was published in 1931. In it he made a thorough study of the PMC symbols, classified these coins and tried to determine their age. He dated the PMC to the Maurya period on the basis of their symbols. He argued that the coins with the crescenton-hill symbol, when tested chemically, appear to have the same alloy content as the amount suggested in the *Arthaśāstra*. Furthermore, a similar

symbol occurs in the Sohgaura copper plate inscription which is generally accepted as being of the Maurya period. That these symbols were not shroff marks is suggested by the *Arthaśāstra*. A passage in this text reads that coins were minted for the state for two purposes, for hoarding in the treasure and for use in commercial transactions. Thus, they would be punched by the state and there would be no necessity for shroff marks.

Later Durga Prasad wrote two other valuable and exhaustive papers entitled 'Classification and Significance of Symbols on Silver Punch-marked Coins, of Ancient India',[14] and 'Observations on Different types of Silver Punch-marked Coins, their Periods and Local'.[15] In the first paper (1934) he refuted the view that the PMC were private issues, pointed out to the similarity of the PMC symbols with the pictographs of the Indus seals as well as the Tāntrika *mudrā-s* as described in the *Narasiṃhatāpanī Upaniṣad* and the *Kālivilāsa Tantra*, published for the first time all the three known series of 4-symbol *Tripāda-Kārshāpaṇas* and made a detailed study of the coins of the Golakpur hoard earlier published by Walsh and came to the conclusion that they are the earliest known coins of 32 ratti weight with 5 symbols bearing chiefly the figure of the sun and a chakra. In the second paper (1938) he assigned various series of the early PMC to different ancient Janapadas, e.g. Kāśī, Kosala and Magadha.

Another scholar, who made significant contribution

to the PMC studies in the pre-Independence period, was D.R. Bhandarkar. In the *Annual Report of the Archaeological Survey of India* (1913-14) Bhandarkar drew our attention to the oft-quoted passage of Buddhaghoṣa's *Visuddhimagga*, which describes how a lot of *kārshāpaṇas* lying on a wooden slab would strike a boy, a villager or a shroff. The shroff after examining the coins in various ways would decide which of them were struck at which village, mufassil town, capital city, mountain and river-bank, and also by what mint-master. On the basis of this passage, Bhandarkar suggested that the different places had their constant and regular groups of symbols or mint-marks peculiar to them. This interpretation of the symbols on the PMC in the light of Buddhaghoṣa's testimony was indeed quite illuminating. Later on, in his *Carmichael Lectures on Ancient Indian Numismatics* (1921) Bhandarkar discussed in detail the nature and antiquity of the 32-ratti silver *kārshāpaṇas*, which are clearly identifiable with the *dharaṇa* or *purāṇa* of Manu.

Meanwhile E.H.C. Walsh, who worked on the PMC for over three decades, was carrying on his researches on these coins. He, on the one hand, studied the PMC of the British Museum[16] and on the other, examined and published those of some famous hoards, including those found at Golakpur, Paila, Goroghat, Patraha, Bairat, Ramna and Machhuatoli.[17] His study, classification and publication of the *tripāda-kārshā-paṇas* of the famous Paila hoard is notable while his

re-study of the saucer-like *adhyardha-kārshāpaṇas* puts these coins in a new light.

John Allan

John Allan studied the PMC collection of the British Museum, and published them in the *Catalogue of the Indian Coins in the British Museum, Ancient India* (*BMC, AI*), 1936. The introduction portion of his *BMC, AI* (pp. i-lxxix), which discusses various aspects of the PMC, is remarkable. He believed that 'the idea of a coinage came to India in the late fifth or early fourth century B.C. from Achaemenid territory, being suggested by the sigloi, although its character is entirely Indian.' (p. lxxi). This led him to believe that the so-called bent-bar or wheel marked coins, 'were struck on a Persian standard and represented double sigloi or staters...' According to him, there is no evidence that coinage in India is older than the Nanda period, and the earliest finds from Paila, Set Mahet and Golakpur may indicate the region in which punch-marked coins originated. He conjectured that the tradition about the wealth of the Nandas may have arisen because they were the first dynasty to have issued coins on a large scale.

Allan, like other numismatics, was most concerned with the symbols of the PMC. He was convinced that the PMC were issued by a government, because they appear to have been minted in a regular series. For instance the sun and the six-armed symbol are quite

regular and may have been the symbols of a king and a high official. The variation of the symbol on the reverse is explained by its being the symbol of a district or local ruler. He made the ingenious suggestion that the five symbols on the obverse represent five controlling organizations, possibly similar the committees and mentioned by Megasthenes. On the question of some coins bearing counter marks of what have been called shroff marks, he suggests that these may have been older coins which were reissued. He also notes in this connection the testimony of the above-noticed *visuddhimagga* passage, 'which only tells us that the symbols had very definite meaning to the expert, who knew at once exactly where the coins were issued.'

Other PMC Studies of Pre-Independence Period

Among the significant contributions made to the study of the PMC in the pre-1947 period, mention may also be made of a paper of T.G. Arvamuthan in which he published unique series of 4-symbol *ardha-kārshā-paṇas* (?) known from the 1934 Sungavaram (Krishna district) hoard.[18.] These thin silver coins of various shapes bear four rather unusual symbols, one of which is generally repeated twice on each specimen. These were apparently local issues of the ancient Andhra country.[19] He also brought to light another unique series of 5 symbol silver PMC of the 1940 homogeneous Bodinayakkanur (Madurai district) hoard.[20] These coins

which bear five constant symbols on the obv. and an invariable mark on the rev., seem to be local *ardha-kārshāpaṇas* of the Pandyan country.[21] In the same year appeared G.M. Young's paper on bent bar or wheel-marked coins.[22] This archaeologically oriented paper puts these remarkable north-western punch-marked issues in a proper historical perspectives.[23] A few years later, a unique series of 4 symbol tiny silver punch-marked coins of squarish shape coming from Sonepur (Orissa) was published by B.V. Nath.[24] The coins weighing between 19.2 and 21 grains appear to be 1½ *pādas* of a *kārshāpaṇas* current in ancient Kalinga country.

Post-1947 Period : D.D. Kosambi

Among the scholars of the post-1947 period, who made original contributions to the study of the PMC, the name of D.D. Kosambi is very prominent.[25] Kosambi was basically a scientist. He added a new dimension to the study of numismatics by applying statistical analysis to the mute PMC to determine their chronology and identification.[26] This method is based on the idea that handling a coin causes an erosion of the metal which results in a loss of weight. If, therefore, the amount of weight lost in circulation can be measured, it may be possible to calculate the date of the coin. But this method may be regarded as valid only if the original weight of the coin is known. In the case of the PMC there is no certainty as to their

original weight. Further, since the hoarding of coins was a common practice in those times, calculation of the date of a coin on the basis of erosion of its metal may not always be reliable. Although this method may roughly indicates the number of years during which a coin was in circulation, the date of the coin would still have to be determined by the consideration of other factors. Hence, the use of this method did not result in any significant addition to our historical knowledge and it has not been applied to other coin series by other numismatists.

Kosambi's suggestion that the Mohenjodaro weights were carried through Maurya period by the silver PMC, also needs more investigation. He has also not said anything about the cast silver PMC, of which a large numbers are met with in many hoards and museum collections. Nor has he said anything about the copper PMC. Kosambi did not make use of any data from archaeological stratification in his dating of the PMC. It is true that no such data apart from those revealed by the easily datable coins in some hoards were available when he began his numismatic researches, but even in his later articles there is no mention of dating suggested by stratigraphy. He also did not make use of the evidence provided by geographical distribution of different groups which could be done by preparing geographical charts or maps showing the find-spots and the total number of the concerned coins/groups of coins.

On the interpretation of the symbols found on the PMC, Kosambi has suggested that the sun symbol is the symbol of sovereignty ; so also is the *ṣaḍaracakra*. The crescent-on-hill is a Maurya symbol and is often associated with the *ṣaḍaracakra*. According to him, each symbol is associated with a dynasty. The fourth mark in the cluster of symbols is the personal signet of the king, because there are about nine such variations. The fifth mark is that of the issuing minister. The symbols with human figures and without the *cakra* indicates the coins of tribal republics. Kosambi does not accept any of the marks as the symbol of a mint.

A.H. Dani

Further research on the PMC were carried out by A.H. Dani who refuted many of Marshall's suggestions on the hoard found at Taxila.[27] The presence of Hellenistic objects at what Dani calls 'Phase B' at Bhir Mound, suggests that the hoard is not pre-Maurya in date ; in fact it may be of a much later date. Dani feels that the local currency in Taxila consisted of bar coins which occur in what he terms 'Phase A' at Bhir Mound. This suggests that the PMC were first minted by the Mauryas. Possible bar coins were in circulation before the Maurya period.

Several scholars of this period also drew attention to a striking similarity between the symbols found on the Harappan seals and the PMC.[28] C.L. Fabri held that the devices on the PMC are a survival of the Harappan

civilization.[29] Some symbols, identical with the Harappan script, have been found on a copper hand discovered at Patna.[30] A few others have been found on Kumrahar columns and on the Rampurva copper bolt. A few have been discovered on copper plates, such as that of Sohgaura. Many of these symbols are still current in India as auspicious marks decorating the floors and the walls of the houses. However, A.H. Dani[31] does not agree with this view. He has argued that the Indus script represents a system of writing. If a few symbols are taken out of this system and shown to occur at random on coins and other later objects, they do not prove the continuity of the script. Nor do they betoken a survival of the Indus civilization. Dani may be right in his assertion that these symbols do not by themselves represent the continuity of the Indus script, but to say that they are not even a survival of the Indus civilization is perhaps tantamount to blinking at the reality of a traditional heritage of symbols that did not die with time. They may serve as links, however tenuous, between the Harappan and Brāhmī scripts, in a field of study where nothing is definite and a lot that has been said is only tentative and by no means certain.

Dani says that he has not been able to find more than fifteen symbols on the PMC bearing close resemblance to the signs of the Indus script. He, however, admits that a few more may be discovered in future. He is disposed to take them as pure symbols, the

meaning of which has to be understood in their respective contexts. He also rejects the view that the Tāntrika formulae of the medieval period are a survival of the Harappan script.

Romila Thapar, A.D.H. Bivar and A.N. Lahiri

In 1961 Romila Thapar published her famous treatise *Aśoka and the Decline of the Mauryas* in which she made some cogent observations on the PMC. She believes that probably the earlier coins were the bent-bar variety, the PMC coming into use later under the Mauryas. She thus agrees with Allan's view that the bent-bar silver coins preceded the PMC.[32] The PMC being easier to handle, probably replaced the bent-bar coins early in the Maurya period.

Thapar opines that the PMC were issued by a central authority and probably the imperial mints were situated in the five major cities of the empire. She does not accept the idea that these coins were trader's tokens which gradually acquired the status of a national coinage. 'The symbols possibly had some connection with local commerce, or local administration, but there again the symbol was probably passed on to the mint and became incorporated with other marks of royal authority. It is possible that, since commerce was at a comparatively nascent stage, local traders preferred a local symbol amongst others in order that they could differentiate between money minted in their own area and that of other areas. Thus though the issuing

authority would be solely the royal mint, the symbols on the coins would represent, apart from the royal and dynastic symbols, various institutes such as the guilds, or administrative units such as the provinces,'[33] ... 'The peacock on arches seems most certainly to be a symbol of the Maurya dynasty.' 'The connection has already been made in the past between the symbol of the crescent on arches and the name Candragupta, 'protected by the moon'. This is depicted by representing the moon against a background of hills.[34] The Aśoka symbol seems most obviously the tree-in-railing, representing the Aśoka tree.

In 1954 A.D.H. Bivar tried to revive the theory of the Achaemenian influence on the PMC. He argued that the PMC were modelled on, or were influenced by, the later Achaemenid issues on the basis of some thirty re-issued and counter-stamped primitive Greek coins of various weight-standards known from the Chaman Huzuri hoard.[35] This view was contested by A.N. Lahiri who has since then emerged as one of the leading numismatist of the country. He rightly argued that common silver PMC evoked from India's more primitive issues.[36] In his article, 'Archain Coins of Northern India'[37] he has dealt with various categories and series of the PMC both of silver and copper. His third notable paper, entitled 'complexities of Silver Punch-marked coins',[38] attempts to delineate the complexities of these coins. It discusses almost all the aspects of the PMC e.g. their metrology, modes of

manufacture, series-wise characteristics, known denominations, shapes, sizes, fabrics, designs and group combinations of symbols.

A.N. Lahiri is of the view that more archaic and rare 'local' issues were earlier in date than the comparatively sophisticated and more plentiful 'universal' coins. It also discusses the problem of the symbols as well as the origin and evolution of the 'primary' and 'secondary' symbols. His articles entitled 'The saucer-like coins and the Trend of Evolution of early Silver Punch-marked coins'[39] shows how the saucer-like coins of the ancient Kasi region ultimately led to the evolution and introduction of a full *kārshāpaṇa*a of 32 rattis in the kingdom of Magadha. Then, as noted above, he has also contributed a paper discussing the gradual progress of the PMC studies in India.[40]

Seminar on the PMC Chronology

The seminar on the Chronology of the Punch-marked coins held at Varanasi in 1965, under the auspices of the Department of Ancient Indian History, Culture and Archaeology, Banaras Hindu University, was a landmark in the history of the PMC studies. Among those who participated in it were included such luminaries as A. Ghosh, V.V. Mirashi, Jagannath Agrawal, D.C. Sircar, T.V. Mahalingam, Motichandra, P.L. Gupta, K.D. Bajpai, D.D. Kosambi. A.M. Shastri, A.K. Narain, L. Gopal and a host of others. They tried

to solve the problems relating to the chronology of the PMC by examining all the available evidence — internal as well as external, literary as well as archaeological, also taking into consideration the bearing of the composition of hoards and trade and commerce and such other factors which may throw light, direct and indirect, on this problem.[41]

M. Mitchiner, C. Valdettaro and A.M. Shastri

Michael Mitchiner's *The Origin of Indian Coinage* (1975) is a significant work on the PMC, though his attribution of these coins to various ancient kingdoms has not found favour with scholars.[42]

C. Valdettaro, another numismatist of note, published a hitherto unrecorded series of 4-symbol *ardha-kārshāpaṇa*.[43] The coins come from the Tripura region (not from Manipur as wrongly stated). These coins have no similarity whatsoever with the one-symbol *ardha-kārshāpaṇa-s* of the Lotapur hoard as noticed by Durga Prasad.[44] The interesting feature of the Tripura issues is the occurrence on them of the two constant marks, namely, the sun and six-armed symbols, which full *kārshāpaṇas* almost invariably bear.[45] Valdettaro has also published over thirty specimens of the cup-shaped or saucer-like coins, five of which were first brought to light by Shri Nath Shah in 1941.[46] Valdettaro's study of these 4 symbol 48-ratti *adhya-rdha-kārshāpaṇas*, though brief, is highly scientific.[47]

Recently, A.M. Shastri, one of our most brilliant

numismatists, has thrown light on the counterfeit PMC. In his Presidential Address, to the .3rd International Colloquium on Coinage, Trade and Economy held in 1991 under the auspices of the Indian Institute of Research in Numismatic Studies, he has discussed the problems related to the forgeries and imitations of ancient Indian coins including the PMC. In it he has discussed the forger's equipment's (including a broken bronze die used for the purpose of stamping pieces of copper to be afterwards plated in imitation of true silver PMC), and moulds meant for casting silver PMC as well as forged coins. In another article also he has discussed the problem of counterfeit coins.[48]

P.L. Gupta

At present the most dominant figure in the field of the PMC studies is P.L. Gupta. In the last four decades he has written many papers on the PMC, and that too from different angles. In 1955 he published from Bombay his *Bibliography of the Hoards of the Punch-marked Coins in Ancient India* and in 1960 his *Punch-marked Coins in the Andhra Pradesh Government Museum* from Hyderabad. His elaborate catalogue entitled *The Amaravati Hoard of Silver Punch-marked Coins*, 1963, is also a highly informative work which makes a detailed study of nearly three hundred symbols seen on the Amaravati coins. His classification of coins is based on scientific method, and furnishes necessary cross-references with regard to similar specimens

known from other areas or hoards, In his handbook, *Coins*, P.L. Gupta has briefly dealt with almost all the known series of silver PMC which he has tried to attribute to various ancient janapadas of India.

More recently, with T.R. Hardaker, P.L. Gupta has brought out *Ancient Indian Silver Punch-marked Coins of the Magadha-Maurya kārshāpaṇa Series* (Nasik, 1985). As the PMC are still on the frontier of numismatic research, no catalogue of them may be taken as complete as new varieties appear almost constantly. But the work of P.L. Gupta and T.R. Hardaker claims to adopt a method of cataloguing which allows new varieties to take their place without upsetting the general classification. The basis of this work is the unpublished Ph.D. thesis of P.L. Gupta (1959), which for the first time listed all the then known varieties of these coins. The catalogue under discussion is an updated version of this work. Previous attempts to explain the meaning of the punch-marks found on these coins, Gupta and Hardarkar believe, were hampered by a very incomplete knowledge of the marks themselves : their correct form, position in the five mark sequence, and their recurrence and duration. Now, that a more definitive catalogue is available, a fresh approach to this subject is possible.

S.R. Goyal

The latest treatment of the PMC is found in the *Indigenous Coins of Early India* of S.R. Goyal

published from Jodhpur in 1994. The book contains a chapter of about thirty pages on the PMC along with seven plates of these coins. It discusses scientifically, systematically and in detail general features, main categories, metrology, denominations, fabric, chronology, mode of manufacture and problems of the identity of their issuers, classification, significance of symbols and other related issues. It takes into consideration the latest PMC finds and hoards and researches done in recent years.

Notes

1. Lahiri, A.N., *JNSI*, XLIX, 1987, pp. 55-62.
2. According to A.L. Basham (*The Wonder that was India*, London, 1967, p. 507), only one gold PMC known. However, see Goyal, S.R., *Indigenous Coins of Early India,* Jodhpur, 1994, pp. 36, 64.
3. *JASB*, 1890, p. 195.
4. *CAI*, p. 19.
5. *CAI*, p. 43.
6. ibid.
7. *Indian Coins*, 1891, p. 4.
8. ibid. pp. 2-3.
9. Rapson, E.J. *Ancient India*, 1916, p. 151.
10. *Indian Coins*, p. 4.
11. *IMC*, p. 131 f.
12. Foucher, A. *The Beginning of Buddhist Art*, Paris, 1917, pp. 20 ff.
13. J.N. Banerjea in *CHI.* II, K.A.N. Sastri (Ed.), Bombay, 1957, p. 778.
14. *NS*, XLV, 1934, pp. N5 to N59 Pl. 1-32.
15. *NS*, XLVII, 1938, pp. N51 to N92.
16. *JBORS*, 1937-8, 1941.
17. ibid., 1919, 1939-1940. He published Taxila hoards of 1912 and

1924 in *MASI*, no. 59. (1939). He also made critical comments on them in John Marshall's *Taxila*, vol. II. ch. 40, pp. 123 ff. Incidentally, Marshall was in general agreement with Durga Prasad and Walsh that the PMC symbols may be connected with the Indus seals.

18. *Transactions of the International Numismatic Congress*, 1936.
19. Lahiri, op. cit., p. 160.
20. *JNSI*. VIII. 1946, pp.1-9.
21. According to D.D. Kosambi, they are the issues of some late Maurya prince (*JBORS*, XXVI, 1950-1. pp. 214 ff.).
22. *Ancient India*, No. 1, 1946, pp. 27-32.
23. Lahiri, *JNSI*, XLIX, p. 161.
24. ibid., XV, 1953, pp. 54 ff.
25. Kosambi, D.D. *JBBRAS*, XXIV-XXV, 1948. .
26. cf. Lallanji Gopal in his Presidential Address, 'Numismatics : Its Historical and Scientific context', *JNSI* LIII, Pts. i and ii 1991, p. 5. cf. also Jha, D.N., 'D.D. Kosambi', in *Historians and Historiography in Modern India*, S.P. Sen (Ed.), Calcutta, 1973, p. 124.
27. Dani, A.H., *JNSI*, XVII, ii, 1955. pp. 27 ff.
28. Bhattacharya, P.N. 'A Hoard of Silver Punch-marked Coins from Purnea', *MASI*, No. 62, pp. 5 ff. ; Suryavamshi, Bhagwan Singh, 'Interpretation of Some Symbols of the Punch-marked Coins', *Journal of the Oriental Institute of Baroda*, XII, No. 2 Dec. 1962, pp. 152 ff.
29. Fabri, C.L., 'The Punch-marked Coins : A survival of the Indus Civilization', *JRAS*, 1935, pp. 307 ff.
30. For the description of these symbols, see Altekar, A.S., 'Symbols on the copper Band in the Patna Museum', *JNSI*, IX. ii, pp. 88-92.
31. Dani, A.H., *Indian Palaeography*, Oxford, 1963. p. 21.
32. Thapar, Romila, *Aśoka and the Decline of the Mauryas*, p. 247.
33. Thapar, R. op. cit., p. 248
34. ibid.
35. *NC*. 1954.
36. *JNSI*, XXX, 1968, pp. 1-9.
37. ibid., XXXV, 1973, pp. 1-38.
38. ibid., XXXVIII, ii, pp. 1-34.
39. *Chhavi*, 2, 1981, pp. 130-4.

40. *JNSI*, XLIX. 1987, pp. 155-72.
41. *Seminar Papers on the Chronology of the Punch-marked Coins*, A.K. Narain (Ed.), Lallanji Gopal , Varanasi, 1966.
42. cf. Lahiri, *JNSI*, XLIX, 1987, pp. 161-2.
43. *JNSI*, XL, 1878, pp. 82-5.
44. *NS*, *XLV*.
45. Lahiri, loc. cit.
46. *JNSI*, III. 1947, pp. 51 ff.
47. *JNSI*, XXIX, 1977, pp. 8-17 ; also see Lahiri, op. cit., p. 161.
48. Shastri, A.M., 'Counterfeit Coins in Ancient India : Literary and Epigraphic Evidence', in *Numismatic Studies*, 3, D. Handa (Ed.), New Delhi, 1993. pp. 11-8.

ANDRE COUTURE

KṚṢṆA'S STRANGE NAME OF DĀMODARA

Dāmodara is a very famous name for Kṛṣṇa, often encountered in the *Mahābhārata* (*MBh*) as well as in the *Harivaṃśa* (*HV*) and in the Purāṇa-s. Its literal translation is quite straightforward. It must be analysed as a possessive compound word meaning, 'one with a roped belly' and refers to Kṛṣṇa who had been tied with a rope by his mother Yaśodā during his childhood. After explaining the episode referred to by this designation, I shall survey the main explanations given by both Indian and Western scholarship, and bring together some of the evidence provided by the *HV* and other Purāṇic texts to suggest a more comprehensive understanding of this name.

1. Kṛṣṇa is tied to a mortar (*HV* 51 ; Vulg. 2.7)

As far I can guess from the comparison of the different versions of this episode, the oldest narration is presented by the *HV*. Kṛṣṇa and his elder brother Saṃkarṣaṇa were playing together in a cowherd settlement located in a forest in the vicinity of the city of Mathurā. Even if there were two of them, they looked as if they were one and the same person, sharing the same games, and having the same brightness just as the moon and the sun in the sky (51.6). The two boys,

who had become a source of joy for their father Nandagopa (*ānandajananaṃ pituḥ*, 51.10), used to play tricks on the cowherds and make fun of them in every way. Nandagopa was aware that these two children were bound to each other (*atiprasaktau*), but could not prevent them from playing together. Yaśodā often lost her temper, and scolded Kṛṣṇa. Once she slipped a rope round his belly, and tied him to a mortar. Daring him to get out of it, she returned to her housework. While Yaśodā was busy, the child crawled out of the courtyard dragging the mortar behind him as if he were playing. The mortar got stuck between two *arjuna* trees. With the quickness (*raṃhasā*) of the wind, Kṛṣṇa uprooted both trees and stood laughing among their broken branches. He wanted to show his divine strength. On account of the power hidden in this child, the rope resisted the impact.

Some women who were going to the Yamunā river saw the child in this precarious position and ran to Yaśodā with shouts of alarm : Hurry up, you foolish woman. The two tall *arjuna* trees have fallen on your son ! Come back and take care of your son who has just escaped death. Yaśodā ran to the fallen trees. She saw her son playing among the trees still fastened with a rope to the mortar. Everybody in the cowherd settlement flocked to witness the wonder. The herdsmen, full of age and experience, discussed the matter again and again. They wondered at such an accident since there were no wind, no monsoon, no

charging elephants. As this deed was the third one to happen in the settlement, they started thinking of moving elsewhere. Nandagopa untied Kṛṣṇa and took him on his lap. He returned to the settlement along with the cow-herds, scolding his wife Yaśodā for having been so careless.

This is the longest version of the episode of the breaking of the twin *arjuna* trees. The *Viṣṇu-purāṇa* (V.6.10-20) and the *Brahma-purāṇa* (I.76) give a shorter version of the same episode providing no new element. The presentation of this episode in the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa* is longer : it covers two chapters (X.9-10). It is very probably based on the *Viṣṇu* and *Brahma-purāṇa* versions, but ends showing how the *arjuna* trees were former gods liberated from an ancient curse when they came into contact with Kṛṣṇa's body. The *Brahmavaivarta-purāṇa* (IV.14) and the *Gargasaṃhitā* versions (I.19) seem to depend on the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa*, with only a few minor changes.

To explain the new turn taken by the version of the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa*, it is necessary to take into account the Jaina version of this episode as reported by Jinasena in his *Harivaṃśa-purāṇa*, dated from A.D. 783-94. According to this Jaina version, in a former life, Kaṃsa who had practised a long period of penance (*tapas*), got a group of seven deities (33, 76) the boon to assist him in his next life. Consequently, two of these deities took the form of two *arjuna* trees in order to smash young Kṛṣṇa to death but were themselves uprooted by the child.

It is probable that, desiring to counter this popular but misleading version of Kṛṣṇa's childish deeds, Brahmanism adopted a moralistic tone and explained that these two trees were actually two sons of god Kubera who were surprised naked in company of an Apsaras-es (divine nymph) by the sage Nārada[1] and condemned to spend years in the form of two trees as a punishment for their immorality. This rapid presentation of the main versions of the myth already shows that the *HV* version is the main one and the most complete. It contains many details which have been forgotten in later texts and which may be useful in understanding the meaning of this episode. But since the name of Dāmodara seems to have been coined after this episode, it appears preferable to begin by a survey of the usual explanations of this name.

2. A Survey of the Main Explanations of the Name Dāmodara

The Indian tradition gives three explanations for the name Dāmodara. They are summed up in Śaṃkarācārya's commentary on the *Viṣṇusahasranāma*, n° 367.

First, when Kṛṣṇa was tied up with a rope by his foster-mother Yaśodā, he was glorified by the herd-women as Dāmodara (51.36). A similar explanation is given in *Viṣṇu-purāṇa* V.6.21, *Brahma-purāṇa* I.76.14, *Padma-purāṇa* VI.272.95-6 (Veṅk. edn. 245, 93-4). It corresponds to the most natural explanation of the word, as *dāman* means rope, and *udara*, belly.

But the *MBh* prefers another interpretation that connects the first part of this compound word with the word *dama* (with a short first vowel, and meaning 'self-command; self-restraint; self-control', Monier-Williams). The *MBh damād dāmodaraṃ viduḥ*, 'on account of his self-control, they know him as Dāmodara' (V.68.8 / Vulg.70.8): and Śaṃkarācārya comments as follows: He who is known through the mind which is purified (*udara*) by means of selfcontrol (*dama*) and other qualities (*damādisādhanena udarā utkṛṣṭā matir yā tayā gamyata iti dāmodaraḥ*, *Viṣṇu-sahasranāma*, n° 367). Further in the Nārāyaṇīya-parvan of the *MBh*, XI.12.328, 39 / Vulg. 341, 44) one reads:

damāt siddhiṃ parīpsanto
māṃ janāḥ kāmayanti hi.
divaṃ corvīṃ ca madhyaṃ ca
tasmād dāmodaro hy aham.

'Since people desiring success through self-control (*dama*) enjoy me, who is the sky, earth and space, I am Dāmodara.' This explanation assumes that Dāmodara contains in himself the three worlds but insists on his amazing self-control.

Śaṃkarācārya knows a third explanation ascribed to Vyāsa and for which the editor of the text is unable to find an exact reference. '*Dāma* means the worlds; and as they are inside his belly, the Lord is named Dāmodara' (*dāmāni lokanāmāni tāni yasyodarāntare. tena dāmodaro devaḥ...*, ibid). The interpretation of the

word *dāma* as a synonym for *loka*, the worlds, obliges one to leave aside linguistic usages, since there is in Sanskrit no such word as *dāma* meaning worlds. But the theologian who invented this explanation (cleverly connecting *dāman* with *dhāman*, dwelling place, abode) surely knew the importance of reminding his listeners that Kṛṣṇa-Dāmodara is a god who had the universe inside his belly. For him a real understanding of this name could not neglect this basic factor.

Western scholarship gave another explanation for the name Dāmodara. The 19th century rediscovered ancient Indian mythology, and did its best to apply methods already tested on Latin and Greek classics on this new material. The episodes of Kṛṣṇa's childhood became the object of the oddest hypotheses. At the end of that century, two main theses inspired by nature mythology were discussed. Some scholars assumed that all great gods had a solar origin : Max Müller (1823-1900) was the main defender of this position. God Viṣṇu was celebrated for his three steps over the earth which makes him similar to the sun.

On the contrary, Sir George Frazer (1854-1941) postulated the universality of a vegetation cult among the primitives, as he said. He pretended to show how the primitive mind had come to revere the spirit of the Oak tree, from which fire was produced, and little by little to worship gods presiding over lightning, thunder, rain and all sources of fecundity. The Indologist A.B. Keith agreed to this thesis and applied it to

solve the question of the origin of Kṛṣṇa cult. He refused Kennedy's contention according to which Kṛṣṇa would be a solar deity exactly as the Vedic Viṣṇu. Keith took it for granted that Kṛṣṇa was an ancient vegetation spirit to which were added solar features borrowed from the Vedic Viṣṇu through syncretistic processes.[2]

One of the arguments used at that time to demonstrate that Kṛṣṇa was related to vegetation spirits is the name Dāmodara itself. This argument has been presented by Nicol Macnicol in an article that large elements of an ancient vegetation cult have gone to the making of the Kṛṣṇa legend and to the moulding of the character of his worship.[3] Macnicol's argument presupposed that Dāmodara was used as a name for Kṛṣṇa as well as for his elder brother Saṃkarṣaṇa or Balarāma who is often represented with a ploughshare in his hand. He said: 'there can be little doubt that Kṛṣṇa's brother Balarāma was a deity intimately associated with the harvest and the fruitfulness of the crops. He is a god of harvest revels and drunkenness, one of whose symbols is the plough, even as one of his brother's is the ox-goad. Both to him and to Kṛṣṇa is given the title Dāmodara "having a cord about the belly", a name that is explained as referring to the wheat-sheaves, bound with wisps of straw.'

But as far as I can see, Kṛṣṇa's elder brother, Saṃkarṣaṇa or Balarāma, was never called Dāmodara. Moreover, the argument assimilating Dāmodara to a

wheat-sheaf smacks more of romantic enthusiasm than genuine scholarship. To tell the truth, Macnicol just repeated what Kennedy had written in 1908 in an article studying the influence between Kṛṣṇa mythology and Christianity.[4] This type of argument does not hold together and is not to be taken seriously. Actually, only the Indian explanations are worth consideration and oblige us to go back to the *HV*, which is our oldest text.

3. Towards a More Comprehensive Explanation

Since the *HV* version of this episode seems the oldest one and the most consistent one as well, it is appropriate to study its composition more accurately. The text, as it has come down to us, can easily be divided into eight sections connected two by two along the following A B C D D' C' B' A' pattern (A in the beginning corresponding to A' at the end, and so on).

A. Young Kṛṣṇa and Saṃkarṣaṇa are always playing together; even if they appear as two distinct characters, they are one and the same person (51.1-11).

B. Nandagopa does not understand their very close relationship and would like to interfere (51.12).

C. Yaśodā gets angry and fastens Kṛṣṇa to the mortar with a rope, but the child drags the mortar and breaks the two *arjuna* trees. [Kṛṣṇa is kept separated from his brother by Yaśodā with the

ensuing consequences] (51.13-9).

D. The *gopī-s* tell Yaśodā : you stupid woman, take care of your son, and she comes back quickly with her son (51.20-6).

D'. The *gopa-s* arrive on the scene and strive in vain to explain the disaster (51.27-33).

C'. Nandagopa unfetters young Kṛṣṇa (51.34).

B'. Nandagopa scolds his wife (acts as if he understands the situation] (51.35ab).

A'. Implicit return to the original situation (51.35cd).

This configuration clearly shows that the problem to be solved through this story is the very special relationship of these children. Nandagopa is puzzled by their games but seems unable to take any decision. Finally he scolds his wife and does as if he was right to delay his intervention. In any case, Yaśodā, who is his feminine counterpart, appears to bear all the responsibility for this disaster. Nandagopa does not understand the situation but remains at the level of knowledge. Yaśodā acts without reflecting at the consequences. She binds Kṛṣṇa, separates him from his elder brother and indirectly causes the big trees to be broken. Nandagopa unfetters the child, scolds his wife, bringing the action back to the starting point. He does just the opposite of what his wife does. The *gopī-s* tell Yaśodā to act, whereas the *gopa-s* strive to understand what exceeds the human understanding. Their respective interventions are just extensions of Nandagopa's and

Yaśodā's positions. Actually the main items of this narration echo and complete each other perfectly and that is what this sketchy presentation reveals. However, when looking still more carefully at this episode, one notices that the narration uses a simple set of oppositions, very common in the Indian context. The three oppositions finally make clear that Kṛṣṇa manifests the spiritual principle or *puruṣa*, a principle closely related with the material principle or *prakṛti*, and as such dominates death, plays with it and laughs at its dangers.

1. *Puruṣa / Prakṛti*. According to the *HV*, Kṛṣṇa is the manifestation of god Viṣṇu, whereas Saṃkarṣaṇa is the incarnation of snake Śeṣa. Kṛṣṇa is the Puruṣottama, the supreme person; Saṃkarṣaṇa symbolizes what remains of the material world after its destruction at the end of a world-aeon (*kalpa*). The famous visions that the wise Akrūra experienced during his ablutions in the Yamunā waters confirm this state of things. Akrūra has been mandated by King Kaṃsa to bring the two boys back to Mathurā. While bathing in the river, he saw Saṃkarṣaṇa as a Snake and Kṛṣṇa as Viṣṇu sitting on its coils (*HV 70*). One finds a similar assertion in *HV* 58. Saṃkarṣaṇa urges his younger brother Kṛṣṇa to kill the wicked Pralamba. He reminds him of his real nature and expresses himself with these curious sentences: You are who I am, and I am, eternally who you are (*ahaṃ yaḥ sa bhavān yas tvaṃ so 'haṃ sanātanaḥ*, 58.48ab). He adds: The universe is

doubly supported only by means of our two bodies (*āvayor dehamātreṇa dvidhedaṃ dhāryate jagat*, 58. 47cd), and also : We are one body divided into two for the sake of the world (*ubhāv ekaśarīrau svo jagadarthe dvidhākṛtau*, 58.46cd). Such phrases clearly point to the conviction that both brothers represent what the Sāṃkhya philosophy calls the *prakṛti* and the *puruṣa* and what appears in the Purāṇic mythology as Viṣṇu, the supreme Person and the snake Śeṣa as his eternal complement.

While narrating how Kṛṣṇa was bound to the mortar, Vaiśaṃpāyana also appears fully aware of the real identity of these children. But he only alludes to their hidden nature by stating the following paradox : For the people they were equal ; they were two human beings capable of divine deeds ; these pastors of the universe had become two young herders (51.5 ; 30. 7). Since, as it appears clearly from the whole *HV*, Saṃkarṣaṇa and Kṛṣṇa are equivalent to Śeṣa and Viṣṇu-Nārāyaṇa respectively, important conclusions must necessarily be drawn concerning their relationships. The association of these two brothers and their separation[5] do not merely depend on the unbridled imagination of a talented fiction writer. It complies with precise mythological data and must be read along these lines. Both situations do point out to a definite state of the world. As in the cosmic drama when the world is successively destroyed and reduced to a rest symbolized by the serpent Śeṣa before this condensed

reality can be unfolded again at the time of creation, the unity of Saṃkarṣaṇa-Śeṣa and Kṛṣṇa-Nārāyaṇa presupposes that everything has been destroyed and reabsorbed into the divinity. The free games of these young herders in Nandagopa's station direct attention to the moment when the *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* stay together in a sort of superior unity during the cosmic night. On the contrary, the separation of both entities refers to the preceeding moment, when Saṃkarṣaṇa becomes terrible and uses a ploughshare as a weapon to destroy the material world, and makes the souls desert these worlds to be swallowed by the supreme Person. Since the situaṭion experienced by these two exceptional young herders concerns the whole world, when Kṛṣṇa is separated from his elder brother by his foster-mother, one must be prepared for a destruction concerning the whole station (symbolizing the world) and forcing the herders to think of moving elsewhere (as in the *pralaya*). This is exactly what happens when the *arjuna* trees are broken.

2. *Ignorance and Knowledge*. The second opposition underlying this episode is the one between ignorance and knowledge. The analysis of the main sequences of this narration makes it clear that Nandagopa passes implicitly from a state of ignorance to a state of understanding through the mediation of Yaśodā's 'mistake or misjudgement'. After the destrution of the trees, the *gopa-s* try to grasp the cause of such a disaster, but remain unable to bring any expla-

nation. At the end of the episode, Nandagopa accepts the situation, at least suspecting its relevance. Once one realizes that the narration starts with the enigmatic presence of these two children always acting together and impossible to separate, then the question of their identity and of their being accepted as such comes to the fore. Even if it stays in the background, the question of knowledge is continually involved in the narration and must be taken into account to make sense of it.

3. *Bondage and Liberation*. Whereas the two first oppositions have to be elicited, the opposition between bondage and freedom is easily perceived. Yaśodā binds Kṛṣṇa. Nanda unbinds him. Yaśodā's, stupid reaction causes a terrible destruction in the station and reveals the actual meaning of Kṛṣṇa's and Saṃkarṣaṇa's association. The opposition between bondage and freedom appears so important that, to make it still more forceful, the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa* is led to modify the course of the narration. In spite of all her efforts, Yaśodā is unable to bind young Kṛṣṇa. The ropes are always too short. Finally, perceiving the state of complete exhaustion of his mother..., Kṛṣṇa allowed himself to be bound by himself out of sheer compassion (*sva-mātuḥ...dṛṣṭvā pariśramaṃ kṛṣṇaḥ kṛpayāsīt sva-bandhane*, X.9.18).

The *Bhāgavata-Purāṇa* concludes that Kṛṣṇa, who is the supreme master of himself and of the universe, also accepts to be under the control of his devotees

(*bhaktavaśyatā*). This is one of the forms of Kṛṣṇa's play that dominates the whole childhood and manifests the complete freedom of a divinity whose action is not oriented towards something other than himself. The Kṛṣṇa who let himself be fastened by his mother is also an unfettered God.[6]

In India, the actions bind the one who acts, and the real sage is the one who acts without being bound. In this connection, the *MBh* (I.167.1-6) knows the story of the sage Brahmin Vasiṣṭha who attempted to commit suicide when he realized that King Viśvāmitra had killed all his sons. 'He saw a river full of new water — for it was the rainy season — that was washing down a great many trees of many kinds that grew on its band. Then once more the thought occurred to him, "I will drown myself in this water", for he was possessed by grief. The great hermit bound (*baddhvā*) his body tight with ropes (*pāśaiḥ*), and in his great distress he threw himself into the stream of the big river. But the river cut his ropes (*chittvā...pāśān*) and washed the unfettered (*vipāśam*) seer to its even bank. The great seer stood up from its waves freed from his fetters (*pāśair vimuktaḥ*), and he gave the river the name Vipāśa.' Vasiṣṭha was rejected by the waters who cut his bonds, he gained such a freedom through his asceticism that nature itself recognized his freedom. The sage, the saint, and the supreme god is also the one who can play with his own bonds.

Henceforth, it appears impossible to read this

episode without taking into account these three oppositions (*prakṛti* / *puruṣa* ; ignorance / knowledge ; bondage / freedom). Moreover it is worth noticing that they are not joined together in this kind of text by mere chance. They are part of the basic structure of the Sāṃkhya philosophy, which pervades the Purāṇa-s and serves to express the relationships between the supreme Person and the world. The creation and resorption of the concrete world is explained through the presence of two principles, the conscience (*puruṣa*) and the primordial and unconscious nature (*prakṛti*), which are always associated and cooperate together like the blind man and the lame man (*Sāṃkhya-kārikā* 21). *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* are at the same time distinct and similar. Appropriate knowledge of both of them, and true discrimination (*viveka*) between them lead one to realize that, inspite of the popular opinions concerning bondage and liberation, the *puruṣa* is never bound to the world nor needs to be released. Only *prakṛti* in its various forms transmigrates, is bound and is released (*Sāṃkhya-kārikā* 6, translation Larson). Nevertheless, a proper understanding of *HV* 51 must go a little further and propose an interpretation of the main items involved in it, that is the mortar (*ulūkhala*), the rope (*dāman*) and the twin *arjuna* trees (*yamalārjunau*).

1. The mortar (*ulūkhala*). The mortar, as a tool used to grind cereal, is naturally related to food. The *Śatapathabrāhmaṇa* (VII.5.1.2) explains that Viṣṇu placed the mortar and pestle on the altar because he

wanted to be an eater of food. The mortar and pestle mean all (kinds of) food ; for by the mortar and pestle food is prepared, and by means of them it is eaten. The mortar refers to the dislectic of food and eater which are basic Indian categories. Precisely in the context, the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa* knows of a mischievous Kṛṣṇa who denies having eaten mud. When his mother Yaśodā asks him to open his mouth, she stares at the whole universe (X.8.32-45). If we accept to replace the fact that Kṛṣṇa is bound to a mortar by his ignorant mother into his cosmic context, the only way I see to make sense of this mortar is to see in it a reference to a world which has to be ground to be swallowed by the supreme God. I have already noticed that the traditional explanations of the name Dāmodara do not hesitate to say that Kṛṣṇa is given this name because he bears the whole world in his belly. The presence of the mortar in this episode seems to point to a similar mythological setting. If the mortar has any meaning at all here, it must refer to Kṛṣṇa as the eternal Eater.[7]

2. The rope (*dāman*). The ropes (*rajju*, *dāman*) are parts of the normal outfit of the herders (*MBh* 1. 186.5 and *HV* 49.23 ; 52.5 ; 55.5 etc.). But the rope used by Yaśodā is very special. In the *HV* 51, the rope has been filled up by Kṛṣṇa's energy (*prabhāva*) and turned out to be unbreakable. In the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa*, the rope has become magical. It is no more a rope ; always too short, it does not bind anything, and Kṛṣṇa has to take charge of it himself.[8] But in India, the problem of

the rope which is not a rope is a very common one. In Vedāntic philosophy, the rope may actually be a serpent. During the churning of the ocean, snake Vāsuki acted as the twirling rope (*MBh* I.16.12 etc.). To deceive Vinatā, Kadru asked her sons, a thousand snakes, to change themselves into hairs black as *Kohl* and insert themselves in the Horse's tail (*MBh* I.18.6-7 and 20.2). During the Bhārata war, the Kaurava-s are said to use snake-bonds (*sarpa-bandha*) as weapons to snatch their enemies (*MBh* V.126.15 ; Vulg. 128. 15). The *HV* (ch. 108-13) knows the story of Bāṇa who has been hit with arrows which changed themselves into binding snakes. According to *Matsyapurāṇa* (II.8), at the time of the cosmic dissolutation, Janārdana appeared before Manu in the form of a fish (*matsya*) and the serpent (Śeṣa) in the shape of a rope (*bhujaṅgo rajjūrupeṇa*). All these examples show how common this theme is. But a question remains : what is the nature of this rope which contains all Supreme God's energy and has a relevancy in the cosmic context alluded to by this episode ? The only answer I can imagine for such a question is that the rope tied up around Kṛṣṇa's belly evokes the serpent Śeṣa which stays along with God Nārāyāṇa during the cosmic night.

3. The twin *arjuna* trees (*yamalārjunau*). From the Jaina *Harivaṃśa* onwards, these trees became an aspect taken on by two deities, and the *Bhagavata-purāṇa* takes advantage of the presence of the two sons of

Kubera in the station to give its readers a lesson of morality. But the question is more difficult if we go back to the Hindu *HV*. These twin trees are said to be the highest ones in the whole station (*ghoṣasyaivāgra-pādapau*, 51.28). They brought welfare to the station (*ghoṣakalyāṇa-kāriṇau*, 646). They were never propitiated in vain (*satyopayācitau*, 51.22). Nevertheless both of them were uprooted by Kṛṣṇa as in a game.

At least as a possible clue, and on account of the context of the final dissolution (*pralaya*) already mentioned, my suggestion is that these twin trees allude to the same duality as the two (twin) big trees (*mahādruma*) presented in the *MBh*. Indeed, Kṛṣṇa himself compares both Kaurava-s and Pāṇḍava-s to big trees. The wrathful (*manyumaya*) Duryodhana is the great tree, Karṇa its crotch, Śakuni the branches, Duḥśāsana the plentiful blossoms and fruits, and the witless King Dhṛtarāṣṭra the root. The law-minded (*dharmamaya*) Yudhiṣṭhira is the great tree, Arjuna its crotch, Bhīmasena the branches, Mādrī's two sons the plentiful blossoms and fruits, and Kṛṣṇa, Brahman and the Brahmins the root (V.29.45-6 ; Vulg. 29.52-3 ; cf. I.1.65-6 ; Vulg.I.110-11 Van Buitenen's translation). Duryodhana is specified by his *manyu*, a wrath or malice typical of the enemies of *dharma*, whereas Yudhiṣṭhira is characterized by the *dharma* itself.[9] When replaced within the epic context, the twin *arjuna* trees can likely be considered as these twin families of opposite beings that cover the universe, those who

indulge in malice and all kinds of adharmic practices and others who are devoted to *dharma.*

Conclusion

From the beginning of this analysis, my hypothesis has been that the episode telling how Kṛṣṇa was tied up to the mortar, and the name of Dāmodara that proceeds from it, is part and parcel of the Purāṇic tradition, and has not to be considered as some foreign myth artificially and awkwardly pasted into Hinduism. The explanations presented by the Hindu tradition for the name Dāmodara insist on the self-control of Kṛṣṇa as a Yogin able to devour the universe and create it anew. If these explanations are to be taken seriously, they also imply a coherent reading of Kṛṣṇa's deed itself.

This paper suggests the following interpretation. Nandagopa and his wife could not make sense of the close relationship between Saṃkarṣaṇa and Kṛṣṇa. But once fastened to the mortar with a rope, Kṛṣṇa happened to recall his own supreme nature. He is the supreme *puruṣa* who has ground the whole world and has devoured it (the mortar) and who says in close relationship with the snake representing the rest of the world (the rope). Symbolizing the dharmic and adharmic forces involved in the universe, the *arjuna* trees must be destroyed by this form of the deity. The young Kṛṣṇa playing and laughing among the broken trees would then be in a position to say what, he tells Arjuna later in the *Bhagavad-gītā* (IX.9). 'These works

(of mine) neither bind nor limit (*nibadhnanti*) Me : as one indifferent (*udāsīnavad*) I sit (*āsīnam*) among these works, detached (*asaktam*).'

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Notes

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1. Or Devala, according to *Brahmavaivarta-purāṇa* IV.14 et *Garga-saṃhitā* I.19.
2. See A.B. Keith, *The Religion and Philosophy of the Veda and Upaniṣad-s*, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1970 (1925), p. 262.
3. 'The Origin of the Kṛṣṇa Cult' in *JRAS* 1913, p. 151.
4. He quotes an article by J. Kennedy 'The Child Kṛṣṇa, Christianity, and the Gujars' (*JRAS* 1907, 951-91) which contains items corroborating Kṛṣṇa's lunar nature. The passage referred to by Macnicol in 1913, as well as Keith in an article on 'The Child Kṛṣṇa' (*JRAS* 1908, p.169-75) runs as follows : 'As a god the dark Kṛṣṇa is associated with his elder brother, the white Balarāma, and his ensigns are the thunderbolt and the goad. Now, Balarāma is clearly a harvest god. He has a voracious appetite, and is full of jollity and drunkenness. He "annihilates the prowess of his enmies by the glances of his eyes that roll with the joys of wine". His weapon is the ploughshare, with which he cuts his wife down to suit his stature ; his standard is the toddy-palm. After the lustrous Balarāma, with his wheat-fields whitening for the harvest, comes his brother Kṛṣṇa, dark as a cloud, and of an ebony hue, a god who follows close on the harvest, and shares with Balarāma the title of Dāmodara, the god "with a cord round his belly," as the whips encircle the wheat-sheafs. A god who is also the hero of many a solar myth, the slayer of the demons, who dives under the sea, and slays Kaṃsa and Keśī and Madhu, this semi-agricultural, semi-solar, or atmospheric god is evidently connected with the dark sun and the storms of the rainy season, and his Shrine is at Dwārakā on the sea-shore, where the sun dips into the boundless Western ocean.' (p. 961-2). In opposition to Kennedy, Macnicol and Keith do not hesitate on Kṛṣṇa's identity as a vegetation spirit.
5. Mentioned implicity here, but explicity in 55.1 ; see also the *MBh*.
6. While studying 'The Significance of Kṛṣṇa's Childhood Sports' (*ABORI* 74, 1993, p. 101-24), Noel Sheth has this luminous paragraph : Kṛṣṇa's play and pranks symbolize the unconditioned, free

nature of the divine play (*līlā*) is a characteristically divine activity in Hinduism. In his pioneering and penetrating study of how the play-element characterizes culture. Huizinga points out that play is essentially indulged in for the fun of it : it is satisfying in itself and has no ulterior motive. It brings joy and expresses freedom. It steps out of ordinary life. It is supra-logical and transcends wisdom and foolishness, truth and falsehood, good and evil. These characteristics apply very well to the Hindu understanding of play (*līlā*) in the realm of the divine, and particularly to the case of the child Kṛṣṇa, for it is the very nature of a child to play. Kṛṣṇa's unstructured, unpredictable, sponta- neous, unconditioned nature of God who delights in himself. As a mischievous and playful child, Kṛṣṇa is able to manifest the unfettered, free nature of God much better than through an adult personification. Further, the playful activities of Kṛṣṇa mirror, on the microcosmic level, the truth of creation on the macrocosmic plane, for creation, in the Hindu understanding, is but the play (*līlā*) of God.' (p. 111).

7. When looking for all the occurrences of the term *ulūkhala* in the *MBh* with the Tokyo Machine-readable Text of both Epics, I noted three occurrences that seem worthy of consideration. Here are the three passages :

(a) *MBh* IX.45.10 (Vulg. 46.10) : *śatolūkhalamekhalā* is the name of one of the Mātṛ (mothers) who serve Skanda. No translation is suggested.

(b) *MBh* VIII.30.46 (Vulg. 44, 44) :

iti tīrthasnānaratāṃ rākṣasī kācid abravīt.

ekarātraśayī gehe maholūkhalamekhalā.

(Nīlakaṇṭha : *ekarātraśayī, ekarātraśāyinaṃ brāhmaṇaṃ dvitīyārthe prathamā*). Dutt translates : Rākṣasī, woman of huge hips, thus spoke to a Brahman, who went to that country for bathing in a sacred water and passed a single night there.

(c) *MBh* III.129.8 (Vulg. idem) :

atrānuvaṃśaṃ paṭhataḥ śṛṇu me kurunandana

ulūkhalair ābharaṇaiḥ piśācī yadabhāṣata.

(Nīlakaṇṭha : *ulūkhalasadṛśāni strīṇāṃ karṇābharaṇāni bhavantīti, svayam ulūkhalair evābharaṇair yuktā satīti śeṣaḥ*). Even if Nīlakaṇṭha glosses *ulūkhala* as a sort of ear-ornament similar to a mortar, Dutt translates : O descendant of Kuru, hear what a Piśāca

woman, adorned with pestles as her ornaments, said as I was reciting the table of genealogy.

In the first case, *ulūkhala* has no translation since it is a proper name. In the second, Nīlakaṇṭha does not comment, but the translator Dutt guesses it is a word for 'hips'. In the third, Nīlakaṇṭha thinks it means a sort of earring, and Dutt shifts from the mortar to the pestle.

In these three cases, the compound word containing the word *ulūkhala* qualifies a woman. The word — *mekhalā*, ifc. means anything girding or surrounding ; in spite of Dutt's translation, it seems strange in the case of hips. These three occurrences deal with powerful and terrible women (Mātṛ, Rākṣasī, Piśācī) surrounded by even hundreds of mortars, and consequently able to grind mountains of food at the same time. The mortar to which young Kṛṣṇa is fastened may similarly refer to the feminine dimension of a god able to grind and swallow the universe and also bear it in his belly.

8. This is an old theme. The rope (*rajju*) used to bind the animal to be sacrificed to the post (*yūpa*) is said to be *ṛtasya pāśa*, and is referred to Varuṇa. When the animal is bound with the noose of sacred order, that rope does not injure it (cf. *ŚBr*. III. 7. 4. 1 s.).

9. According to Charles Malamoud (Cuire le monde, Paris, Éditions la Découverte, 1989), the word *manyù* at first designates a capacity of the mind : "l'élan qui porte un être à réaliser ses désirs, à faire aboutir ses dessins, à traduire en oeuvres ses pensées (p. 189) ; En général, le *manyù* qu'évoquent leshymnes du Ṛg et de l'Atharva n'est pas le *manyù* abstrait et objectivé ; c'est le *manyù* d'êtres nommément désignés, le plus souvent d'êtres hostiles ou mauvais par définition... (p. 185). When applied to Duryodhana in opposition to the dharmic Yudhiṣṭhira, this term clearly refers to a capacity of fallacy typical of the adharmic Kaurava-s.

S. SANKARANARAYANAN

NĀNĀGHĀṬ CAVE INSCRIPTIONS OF NĀGAṂṆIKĀ : A FRESH STUDY

Nānāghāṭ or Nāṇeghāṭ is the name of a pass leading from the Konkan (in the west) to Junnār (in the east) in Poona district of Maharashtra. There are a few caves in this pass. One among them at the top has yielded two inscriptions of the members of the Sātavāhana dynasty. They were discovered as early as A.D.1830. Many eminent scholars have studied, edited, re-edited, corrected again and again the texts of these records. There have been scholarly debates on the nature of their palaeography, and on their probable dates and historical importance.[1] These epigraphs contain certain points throwing light on the history of ancient Indian religion, philosophy and culture. The present paper makes an attempt to study in detail one such important point contained in these epigraphs — a point, untouched so far.

On grounds of palaeography these two inscriptions had been assigned by early epigraphists to the second century B.C., but now they are assigned to the first century B.C. One of the epigraphs contains six labels engraved below six panels bearing sculptures of the members of the Sātavāhana royal house. The other epigraph is fairly a long one but, partly peeled off and damaged. The language of these records is Prākṛt, a

little admixed with Sanskrit. Among the six panels mentioned above the second one from the left contains sculptural representations of a queen and a king. The Prākṛt label below reads :

Line 1. *devi nāyaṃnikāya rañjo*
Line 2. *ca śiri sātakaṇino*

The Sanskrit *chāyā* of it is :

1. *devī-nāgaṃṇikāyāḥ rājñaḥ*
2. *ca śrī sātakarṇeḥ* (*bimbau*)

'These two images are of the queen Nāgaṃṇikā and of the illustrious king Sātakarṇi.'

In the given context one should normally expect the king's name mentioned first and the queen's next. But here queen takes priority over the king. Does it indicate that she was more important than the king ?

The entire available text of the second epigraph has already been well read and interpreted by expert epigraphists. Hence we propose to take up only the Sanskrit *chāyā* of the Prākṛt portions of the record relevant to our present discussion.

The purport of this epigraph is to record how many Vedic sacrifices the queen Nāgaṃṇikā had performed and how much sacrificial fees (*dakṣiṇā-s*) she had offered to the officiating priests in connection with each one of these sacrifices. This inscription has no parallel among the epigraphs, so far discovered. Every line of the record is soaked with Nāgaṃṇikā's fervent devotion to the Vedic religion. The first sentence is in

the form of salutations to the Dharma, to the sacrificial gods, like Agni, Indra etc. The queen had actually named her son, the ruling monarch as Vediśrī (a unique name in Indian history) after the sacrificial altar, the *vedi*. According to the Vedic mythology the sacrificial altar is called *vedi*, because it represents the sacrificial wealth that had been carried away by the demons, but won back by the gods. The Nānāghāṭ record is the only inscription, known to Indian epigraphy, containing a list of fifteen Vedic sacrifices. This inscription informs us about the great Vedic sacrifices performed by a woman, the Sātavāhana queen Nāgaṃṇikā by offering enormous wealth, both in kind and cash, as sacrificial fees (*dakṣiṇā*). This fact gives us an interesting information, useful for the study of the religious and philosophical history of ancient India.

The record is dated in the 19th year of the reign of Nāgaṃṇikā's son Vediśrī. Hence it is certain that on the date of the record Nāgaṃṇikā's husband Sātakarṇi was no more. The epigraph describes Nāgaṃṇikā as the wife of the king Sātakarṇi, a mighty warrier (*mahārathin*), an illustrious member of the Āṅgika family (*āṅgika-kula-vardhana*) and a hero unparalleled in the entire earth (*sāgaragirivalayāyāḥ pṛthivyāḥ prathama-vīra*). No more description of this king is given. The record describes Nāgaṃṇikā's son, the ruling monarch, Vediśrī also briefly : He is the one who gave gifts of things that were pure and best (*pūtada varada*) and we wished for (*kāmada*).

The record describes however the donor Nāga-

mṇikā in great detail : She had given gifts of best elephants ; and had observed successfully the vows of fasting for a month. She was conducting penance in the house itself and was observing strict celibacy. She was an adept in performing Vedic sacrifices with all the connected subsidiary rites like consecration, *upasad*-services, and other religious rites, (*nāgavaradāyinyā, māsopavāsinyā, gṛhatāpasyā, caritabrahmacaryayā, dīkṣā-vrata-yajña-śauṇḍayā*). She had performed, the description continueṣ, some greạt Vedic sacrifices in elaborate scales. The epigraph gives a list of the sacrifices she had performed (*anayā yajñāḥ hutāḥ*). They are : 1. Agnyādheya, 2. Anvārambhaṇīya, 3. Rājasūya, 4. Aśvamedha, 5. Saptadaśātirātra, 6.Bhagāladaśarātra, 7. Gargātirātra, 8. Gavāmayana, 9. Aptoryāma, 10. Śatātirātra, 11 and 12. Two Aṅgirasātirātra-s, 13. Chandhṛpavamānātirātra, 14. Aṅgirasāmayana of six-year-formula, 15. Trayodaśātirātra, 16. Daśarātra.

The queen had performed a few more sacrifices also. But their names are not preserved in the epigraph. The record gives the details of the huge amount of sacrificial fees (cows, horses, carts, elephants, heaps of corns and food grains silver, gold, *kārṣāpaṇa* — some of them in thousands and ten thousands) the queen had offered to the priests while performing each one of these sacrifices.

The learned editors of this interesting epigraph were confronted with a problem. In ancient times a woman in India could not perform *yajña-s* independently ; so was the man too ; for, the eligibility for per-

forming *yajña-s* rests jointly on both the husband and the wife (*yāge dampatyoḥ sahādhikāraḥ*). Yet the present epigraph records the observance of so many *yāga-s* by a woman ! So to avoid the anomaly apparent in the record, the editors suggested that the expression like *anayā yajñāḥ hutāḥ* in the epigraph demands another expression like *bhartrā śrīsātakarṇinā rājñā saha* to make the sense complete. (i.e. *bhartrā śrī sātakarṇinā rājñā saha yajñāḥ anayā hutāḥ*. The *yajña-s* were performed by her jointly with her husband Sātakarṇi, the king. In fact, scholars asserted that the actual performer of the sacrifices, the list of which included one Rājasūya and two Aśvamedha-s, was Sātakarṇi I, the husband of Nāgaṃṇikā. They are fully justified in understanding the passage in this way since the eligibility for performing Vedic sacrifices rests as noted above, jointly on the husband and wife. This was the practice in ancient India. This was also the final conclusion of the Pūrvamīmāṃsādarśana (ch. VI. 1. topics 3-4). In fact, the husband performs the *yajña* while his wife closely associates herself in that performance. Hence, the man could assume the titles like *Somayājī*, *Vājapeyī*, *Aśvamedhayājī* and so on ; and no instance of a woman assuming any such title is known.

However, one may kindly be pardoned in pointing out this. The king Sātakarṇi (whose wife was Nāgaṃṇikā), is described only as a mighty warrior king, (*samrāṭ*) and not as a performer of any *yajña*. Had Sātakarṇi actually performed any *yajña* like Aśvamedha etc., one should normally expect a text like

aśvamedhādyanekakratuyājinaḥ sātakarṇiśriyaḥ bhāryayā nāgamṇikayā. For example, in many of the Ikṣvāku inscriptions from Nāgārjunakoṇḍa we read: *mahārājasya agniṣṭomavājapeyāśvamedhayājinaḥ...... vāsiṣṭhīputrasya ikṣvākoḥ śrī śāntamūlasya sodaryā* (or *snuṣayā*, or *bhāryayā* etc.). Moreover, the addition *bhartrā sātakarṇiśriyā saha* suggested for solving the said problem of anomaly may not serve the purpose; for that would elevate the queen to the status of the chief or main performer of the sacrifices and relegate her husband, the king, to a secondary status. And this would certainly go counter to the ancient Indian spirit and practice. For, it is the husband who is to undertake the vow (*saṃkalpa*) to perform the given sacrifice in company with his wife. It would be something like: *anayā mama dharma-patnyā saha amuka-mahāyajñaṃ kariṣye.*

A solution seems to be suggested by a school of religious thought represented in the history of Mīmāṃsā Darśana: The Nānāghāṭ inscription probably points to a date, a region, and a Mīmāṃsā school that allowed women also the eligibility to perform the Vedic sacrifices independently. That there was such a school of thought is hinted at by Jaimini himself in his Pūrva Mīmāṃsā Darśana. There the sixth chapter is devoted to the question of eligibility for performing *yajña-s*. That chapter contains a separate Adhikaraṇa or topic, entitled Kratuṣu Striyā Apyadhikārādhikaraṇam (ch. VI, quarter 1, topic 3, aphorisms 5-21). It discusses in detail the question of eligibility of woman for

performing *yajña-s*. Here the *Sūtra* of Jaimini and the *Bhāṣya* of Śabarasvāmin present the arguments of two rival schools.

One school represented by Aitiśāyana contends that women do not enjoy eligibility for performing *yajña-s* :

liṅgaviśeṣanirdeśāt puṃyuktam eva ity aitiśāyanaḥ. (*Pūrva Mīmāṃsā Sūtra* VI. 1. 6 — hereafter *PMS*).

The argument of this school may be summarised as follows :

1. The Vedic injunction *svargakāmo yajeta* (he who desires heaven should perform sacrifice), prescribes the rite only for man. This is indicated by the masculine form *svarga-kāmaḥ* 'the male who desires heaven'. For example, the Vedic injunction : *paśum ālabheta* uses the masculine form *paśum* ; hence the sacrificers always offer only a he-goat, and not a she-goat, in the sacrifice.

2. The Vedic *yajña* involves expenditure of wealth both in kind and in cash. But, women have no right to possess any wealth of their own. The reason is : they are purchased by their husbands or gifted away by their fathers. In fact, we find injunction in the Dharmasūtra enjoining that the bridegroom, if he is a prince desiring to marry a girl, should offer to her father one hundred strong soldiers and receive in return, the girl in marriage ; but in the case of the *ārṣa* form of marriage (i.e. of the Brāhmaṇa-s) the bride-groom should give a couple of cows (*śatam atirathān duhitṛmate dadyāt, ārṣe gomithunam*). Women have therefore no right to own wealth needed for performing a sacrifice. No

doubt women are often found earning money by selling food, milk and milk-products; by cutting and selling grass, and by other forms of labour of their own. Yet, the wealth, earned by them is not their property, but the property of their masters. The wife, the slave and the son are the three who are deemed to possess no wealth. What they earn actually belongs to the master only, of whom these three are property —

bhāryā dāsaś ca putraś ca
trayam evādhanāḥ smṛtāḥ.
yat te samadhigacchanti
yasya te tasya tad dhanam. (*Manusmṛti*, VIII. 416)

As against the above school of Aitiśāyana, the school led by Bādarāyaṇa argues and establishes that women do have eligibility for performing sacrifices.

jātiṃ tu bādarāyaṇaḥ aviśeṣāt, tasmāt stryapi pratīyeta, jātyarthasya aviśiṣṭatvāt. (*PMS*, VI. 1. 8)

Bādarāyaṇa's arguments may be summarized as follows:

1. In the injunction *svargakāmo yajeta* the compound word *svargakāma* does not denote 'a species', like the word *paśu*, 'goat' does. It is employed in its etymological sense 'one who desires heaven'. Thus the injunction enjoins the *yajña* on one for realizing one's desire for heaven, and it connects the *yajña*, 'the meaning of the verb *yaj*', directly with the desire for heaven. Hence, the gender, denoted by the case-ending suffix has no part to play in the proper understanding of the present injunction.

On the other hand, in the injunction *paśum*

ālabheta (cited by the first school to substantiate its case), the goat, the direct meaning of the word *paśum* is a species and can have a connection with the sacrifice (the meaning of the verb *ālabh*), only through its objective-ness (*karmatva*), the meaning of the second case-ending suffix of *paśum*. Hence, the other meanings of the same suffix, namely the oneness (*ekatva*) and the male-ness (*puṃstva*) cannot be ignored. Thus the injunctions *svargakāmo yajeta* and *paśum ālabheta* are on altogether different footings. Hence, it is logically improper to cite the latter injunction for substantiating the purport of the former one. On the other hand, in support of the present (i.e. the second) school one may cite the injunctions like *śaraṇāgato rakṣitavyaḥ* 'he who has taken refuge, must be protected', *bhrūṇo na hantavyaḥ* 'the embryo should not be aborted' and so on. There the words *śaraṇā-gataḥ* and *bhrūṇaḥ* are in masculine gender. But this does not mean that a woman who has taken refuge need not be protected or that a female embryo can be aborted.

2. The second point raised by the school of Aiti-śāyana is that women have no wealth or resources, as per the law laid down in the Smṛti ; hence they are ineligible for performing *yajña*. As against this, the school of Bādarāyaṇa argued that in fact women also do have the right to own wealth. They earn by receiving gifts in the form of *strīdhana* or woman's private property. Manu himself recognizes six-fold property of women :

ṣaḍvidhaṃ strīdhanaṃ smṛtam. (*Manusmṛti* IX.194)

No doubt at the time of marriage, the Brahmin bridegroom should give a pair of cows, and the Kṣatriya bridegroom one hundred warriors to the bride's father and receive their respective brides. But this act is to be undertaken only for sanctifying the marriage rite, or as an integral part of that rite, just as certain number of prescribed offerings and oblations pertaining to the same. That is why a bridegroom is not supposed to offer more number of cows, even in the case where the bride happens to be a highly accomplished, charming person. Hence the act of offering two cows, or one hundred soldiers and receiving the bride should not be viewed as a commercial act of sale and purchase ; since in that case the sale value is bound to vary, depending on the nature and quality of the commodity sold. Thus, it is established that women too have the right to own property. Therefore, it is certain that the above cited Smṛti goes counter to the teaching and spirit of Vedic injunction *yajeta svargakāmaḥ*, the superior and ultimate authority. Hence we have to set aside the obvious meaning (prohibiting the woman's property right) of the said Smṛti and interpret it in some secondary or implied sense. That is, if both the husband and wife, earn, own and spend money independently of each other, there is bound to be ego-clash and misunderstanding, this would lead to confusion and chaos in the family and in the society and this most unpleasant result must be avoided for a smooth running of the

family (*saṃvyavahārasiddhyartham*).. Having argued in this way, Bādarāyaṇa concludes : If a woman, having necessary resources, has a strong desire for heaven, she enjoys eligibility and she can perform *yajña*.

While winding up this line of arguments of Bādarāyaṇa the author of the *Bhāṣya*, Śabarasvāmin adds a few sentences of his own on what he observed around him in those days : Many men, who are very much given to sexual pleasure, cause their wives to perform *yajña-s* elaborately ; sex appeal is the powerful weapon in the hands of wives ; cleverly making use of it they successfully appropriate the entire property of the house of their husbands. *jāghanyā hi patnīr yājayanti vistareṇa bhasadvīryā hi patnayaḥ* ; *bhasadā vā etāḥ para*(*ti*)*gṛhāṇām aiśvaryam avarundhate iti* (*Śābara Bhāṣya* VI.1.16.). This treatment of the topic of women's eligibility for performing *yajña-s* presented by Bādarāyaṇa and Śabarasvāmin had much impact on the commentators (like Kullūkabhaṭṭa, Medhātithi etc.) of the *Manusmṛti*. Consequently while commenting on the above cited Smṛti verse on woman's property right, the commentators manipulate by their interpreting skill and manage to establish that with the consent of their husbands, women do enjoy the right to own property.

Thus the Nānāghāṭ inscription provides us with a test case to illustrate the Mīmāṃsaka Bādarāyaṇa's contention on women's eligibility for performing the Vedic sacrifices. The inscription suggests that Nāgaṃṇikā might have performed sacrifices following the school of Bādarāyaṇa. The importance of the queen

over and above the king, indicated by the label inscription studied above, perhaps supports the above suggestion. Or, she might have been caused by her husband Sātakarṇi to perform the sacrifices on a grand scale since that practice was prevalent in her days, as indicated by Śabarasvāmin's observation cited above. It is significant that the dates of Nāgaṃṇikā and Śabarasvāmin were not far removed from each other (i.e. the 2nd-1st century B.C.).[2] However Jaimini's conclusion, as interpreted by Śabarasvāmin is that both husband and wife jointly, not singly, enjoy the eligibility for performing *yajña-s* ; that the husband is the performer of the sacrifice and the wife is his close associate in the entire sacrificial act ; and that both are eligible for enjoying the fruit of the sacrifice.

We saw above that Bādarāyaṇa as a Pūrva Mīmāṃsaka is liberal enough to allow women the eligibility to perform the Vedic sacrifices. This liberal view seems to be reflected also on the *Vedāntasūtra* of Bādarāyana. No doubt as in the Mīmāṃsā Darśana (VI. 1.25-38), so in the Vedānta Darśana too (I.3.34-8) there is Apaśūdrādhikaraṇa — a topic in which the former Darśana disallows a man of the Śūdra caste the right to perform Vedic sacrifices and the latter denies him the right to study Vedānta i.e. Upaniṣad-s.[3] But while *Jaiminisūtra* unequivocally concludes that women have no right to perform *yajña* independently of their husband the *Vedāntasūtra* maintains total silence on the point of women's right to study Vedānta. This silence on the part of Bādarāyaṇa could be

construed as his approval. Indeed, the famous rule often cited in the philosophical treatises (*tantrayukti*) is to this effect: the calculated silence over a given important issue under dispute amounts to the acceptance of the same (*apratiṣiddham anumataṃ bhavati*). Hence the great Mīmāṃsaka-cum-dramatist, Bhavabhūti could unhesitatingly represent in his *Uttararāmacarita* the character Ātreyī as a female ascetic (*tāpasī*) migrating from Vālmīki's hermitage to the Daṇḍakā forest for studying the science of Vedānta (*nigamānta-vidyā*) under great sages like Agastya there.[4]

Early Indian traditions speak of the Andhra Sātavāhana-s as Vṛṣala-s (members of the Śūdra caste or Hinduized foreigners or degraded Āryans; Dasyu-s, and the non-Āryans). On the other hand, some of the Sātavāhana kings assumed the title *ekabrāhmaṇa* 'a unique Brāhmaṇa'. In the Nānāghāṭ inscription itself Sātakarṇi I is described as an illustrious member of the family of worshippers of the sacrificial fire-god Agni (*aṃgiya-kula-vardhana* = *āgnika* or *āgneya kula-vardhana*).[5]

There is also epigraphical evidence to show the Sātavāhana rulers did have marital relationship with foreigners like the Śaka-s and with the tribals, like the Nāga-s. In view of all this, scholars suggest that the Sātavāhana-s were non-Āryans but claimed Brahminhood on account of the admixture of Brahmin blood in their family, yet they were looked down by the Brahmin orthodoxy as *vṛṣala-s*, degraded Brāhmaṇa-s

or Śūdra-s, on account of their marital relationship with the foreigners and non-Brāhmaṇa-s.[6] In spite of all this, modern writers readily believe that Sātakarṇi I of such a family could have performed all the sacrifices in association with Nāgaṃṇikā.[7] Our suggestion is: in that case, we could as well view Nāgaṃṇika herself as a unique women-sacrificer and fully honour the actual meaning of the available text *anayā yajñāḥ hutāḥ* of this ancient Nānāghāṭ epigraph which does not seem to suffer from any other serious textual errors, like omissions and commissions.

A contemporary parallel case may be noted here. Recently in Rabatak (Afghanistan) a unique inscription[8] of the Kuṣāṇa emperor Kaniṣka I (*acc.* A.D. 78) has been discovered. In this record the Kuṣāṇa king Sadaṣkaṇa (also spelt Saddaṣkana), who was a foreigner and was the grandfather of Kaniṣka I is described to have performed the Somayāga, a Vedic sacrifice. This Kuṣāṇa king Sadaṣkaṇa was more or less a contemporary of Nāgaṃṇikā of the Nānāghāṭ inscription.

Here a question arises. The Kuṣāṇa king, a non-Indian, was not a *traivarṇika* i.e., he did not belong to any of the three higher castes of the ancient Indian social system. So how could he perform the Somayāga? Similarly, how could the Sātavāhana, a Vṛṣala (see above) perform Vedic sacrifices? On the top of all this, how could the Brāhmaṇa-s officiate as priests in the *yāga-s* of that Kuṣāṇa. One tentative answer to these questions is this:

In ancient times there seems to have been a unique

(but forgotten subsequently) Mīmāṃsā school headed by the sage Bādari who held that all persons, even the non-*traivarṇika-s,* had the eligibility (*adhikāra*) to perform Vedic sacrifices. Bādari's reasoning is simple: The Vedic sacrifices in general and the Jyotiṣṭoma i.e., Somayāga in particular, are ordained for all those who entertain a desire for heaven (*svarga-kāmo yajeta* and *jyotiṣṭomena svargakāmo yajeta*); and every one does have that desire. Therefore all the prohibitory rules that go counter to this fundamental rule or injunction (*vidhi*), become invalid. In the topic Apaśūdrādhikaraṇa of his Mīmāṃsā Darśana, Jaimini cites the above thesis of Bādari as the first part of his argument (*PMS*, VI.1 27): *nimittārthena bādariḥ tasmāt sarvādhikāraṃ syāt.*

No doubt there were other Mīmāṃsaka-s like Ātreya who opposed to this view of Bādari. Jaimini's conclusion too in the topic disallows non-*traivarṇika* the eligibility for performing *yāga-s*. Yet, it is probable that the Kuṣāṇa Sadaṣkaṇa, a foreigner, the Sātavāhana Sātakarṇi, a Vṛṣala, and the queen Nāgaṃṇikā, a woman, might have taken refuge in the liberal schools of Bādari and Bādarāyaṇa[9] and claimed eligibility to perform *yāga*; and hence they might not have faced any serious problem in getting Brāhmaṇa-s as their priests, particularly when their *dakṣiṇā-s* were invitingly high.[10] Moreover we must not forget one more fact. The Kuṣāṇa king Sadaṣkaṇa's territory lay only outside India and there was no caste to decide one to

outside India and there was no caste to decide one to eligibility for performing *yāga*. It is also highly probable that the Somayāga of this king was a distant remmant of the Haoma (= skt *soma*) cult of the ancient Iranians — a cult that was basically similar to the Somayāga of the Indians of ancient times.[11] Therefore Kuṣāṇa might not have faced any restriction or opposition. Maybe he had his native priests to officiate in his *yāga*.

Further, it is also not improbable that the Apaśūdrādhikaraṇa and the Kratuṣu striyā apy adhikārādhikaraṇa in the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā Darśana, came to be written and their conclusions were crystallized and propagated with a view to arrest such liberal, but 'sinful' practices in India. Thus the contribution of the Nānāghāṭ inscription of Nāgaṃṇikā is very significant for our study of the history of ancient Indian religion, philosophy and culture.

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See *The Classical Age,* p. 301.

These points may not necessarily indicate that Bādarāyaṇa the Mīmāṃsaka, referred to in the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā Darśana was identical with his namesake, the author of the *Vedānta Darśana*

Sūtra. But the points do establish that both these authors, like Bādari, an author referred to in both the Darśana-s belonged to one and the same *gotra* or clan. See below. See also K.A. Nilakanta Sastri: Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa, pp. 166-74 in *Indian Antiquary*, Vol. L (1921`). Of course there are modern thinkers doubting the genuineness of the Apaśūdrādhikaraṇa of the Vedānta Darśana.

4. I.e., because she could not cope up with the speed in which the subject was taught in Vālmīki's hermitage. *Uttararāmacarita*, II.3. etc. Of course we have still earlier examples of women philosophers and students of philosophy, like Gārgī and Maitreyī of the Upaniṣad-s and Devahūti of the Purāṇa-s.
5. In later ages, some of the Rājaputs, who were Hinduized foreigners, are known to have traced their origin from the fire altar of the Vedic sacrifice performed by the sage Vasiṣṭha.
6. *The Age of Imperial Unity*, pp. 196-7.
7. At the same time, it is of interest to note that the modern researchers have gone to the extent of suggesting that the queen's name Nāgaṃnikā itself betrays her Nāga origin (ibid). However, it must be remembered that since very early times many orthodox Brahmin families of South India had the practice of worshipping the serpent god or Nāga (a deity, not unknown to the Vedic pantheon) and were naming their children as Nāgappa, Nāgaṇṇa, Nāgamma and so on, after their contemporary Dravidian model.
8. This epigraph 'The Great Kuṣāṇa Testament' has been edited by Prof. B.N. Mukherjee in *Indian Museum Bulletin* (Calcutta), Vol. XXX (1995). The text is in a mixed dialect, i.e. a mixture of old Iranian dialect with Sanskrit and Prākṛt.
9. It is significant that these two sages belonged to one and the same clan and family.
10. We saw above that Nāgaṃnikā gave away large sums of cash etc., as her sacrificial fees. Again the name Sadaṣkaṇa (or Saddaṣkaṇa) of the early Kuṣāṇa king might be a local Prākṛtic variation of *sudakṣiṇa* indicating 'the one who offers generous sacrificial fees'. The *Mahābhārata* and the Purāṇa-s contain descriptions of a certain king (or Saddaṣiṇa) Sudakṣiaṇa, a Kāmbojarāja, i.e. a king of the ancient Kāmboja country (see S. Sorensen : *Index to the Names in the Mahābhārata* etc., Sv. Sudakṣiaṇa). This Kāmboja

country included a large area of the modern North Western Province and it extended as far as the present Kāfiristān, not far away from the Northern Afghanistan, wherefrom the Kuṣāṇa inscription in question comes.

11. See the *Vedic Age*, pp. 227, 378-9.

T. VENKATACHARYA

THE NUMBER OF HORSES YOKED TO THE CHARIOT OF ARJUNA

Swami Chinmayananda mentions five horses for Arjuna's chariot (in his English translation of the *Bhagavadgītā*, II.10). He does not give any authentic source for this number; but says that this number symbolically represents the five sense organs (*indriyas-s*). Swami Chidbhavananda says in his introduction to the translation of the *Bhagavadgītā* that the horses are four in number and that they symbolically represent the four *yoga-s*, namely *karma-yoga*, *rāja-yoga*, *bhakti-yoga*, and *jñāna-yoga* (pp. 33-4). Here also no authority is mentioned.

In many of the pictures associated with the episode of *Gītopadeśa* we notice Arjuna's chariot being drawn by four horses. In one picture of this episode, in the house of my friend Mr. Rajagopal Pavan, of Mysore, I saw that the artist had provided seven horses to draw Arjuna's chariot. The picture has *kapi* on the flag. But, only Sun is known as *sapta-sapti*. There is one more thing in this picture which is uncommon. Arjuna is shown here with arrow fixed to the bow, and ready to shoot at (not *visṛjya saśaraṃ cāpam* — I. 47). This may probably be explained as referring to the situation after he had declared his compliance as *kariṣye*

vacanaṃ tava (XVIII.73). Anyway the artist seems to have confused ideas. In the *Bhagavadgītā* Arjuna's chariot and the horses yoked to it are mentioned vaguely in the plural :

tataḥ śvetair hayair yukte
mahati syandane sthithau.
mādhavaḥ pāṇḍavaś caiva
divyau śaṅkhau pradadhmatuḥ, (I.14)

Hayaiḥ in the plural shows that the number of horses is not less than three ; the chariot belonged to Arjuna ; Kṛṣṇa was only the charioteer.

In the Khāṇḍava-vana-dāha episode Arjuna wants unique weapons, and a chariot with suitable horses :

aśvāṃś ca divyān iccheyaṃ
pāṇḍurān vātaraṃhasaḥ. (Ādi : 224, v. 18. p. 640)

The divine horses Arjuna got were more than two in number. The exact number is not given.

The *Kaṭhopaniṣad* contains a reference to the *indriya-s* being compared to the horses : *indriyāṇi hayān āhuḥ.* But the *sārathi* (charioteer) is compared to *buddhi* : *bhuddhiṃ tu sārathiṃ viddhi* and the owner is *ātman* (Arjuna himself) : *ātmānaṃ rathinaṃ viddhi.*

The great Ācārya-s do not give any hint to clear the doubt.

In the Uttaragograhaṇa section of Virāṭa Parvan the horses of Arjuna are compared to the four horses of Kṛṣṇa (which are named Śaibya, Sugrīva, Meghapuṣpa and Valāhaka). This suggests Arjuna's horses also as four.

In the Droṇa Parvan (147, 62-4, p. 3532) Karṇa's horses are mentioned as four ; this suggests that Arjuna too had only four horses.

In the Nala episode (Vana Parvan, v. 19, p.1147) Nala chose a chariot with four horses only, since they were the best.

In the course of my searches I came across the following verse in the *Mahābhārata* (Jayadratha episode of Droṇa Parvan, 103, v. 1, p. 3368, Gorakhpur edn.) :

evam uktvārjunaṃ rājā
tribhir marmātigaiḥ śaraiḥ.
abhyavidhyan mahāvegaiś
caturbhiś caturo hayān.

'The king (Duryodhana) hit Arjuna with three arrows capable of piercing into the vital parts ; he also hit with four swift arrows the four horses of Arjuna.' This reference decides the issue once for all. Arjuna had only four horses for his chariot.

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ARVIND SHARMA

THE ISSUE OF *SĀDHĀRAṆA DHARMA* VIS-À-VIS *VIŚEṢA DHARMA* IN HINDU ETHICS

Hindu ethics clearly distinguishes between duties which are 'equally obligatory to all' such as self-control, kindness, speaking the truth etc., and those 'which are appropriate to the several classes of society and the stages of life'. The former are called *sādhāraṇa* or *sāmānya-dharma* and the latter *viśeṣa* or *varṇāśrama-dharma.*[1] The purpose of this paper is to answer the following question in this respect : in the event of a conflict between a *sādhāraṇa* and a *viśeṣa-dharma* which should prevail under what circumstances?

II

S.K. Maitra is of the opinion that 'the *sādhāraṇa* duties are obligatory equally for all individuals irrespective of their social position or individual capacity.'[2] Such a standpoint suggests the conclusion in the event of a conflict between the two the universal or *sādhāraṇa-dharma* would take precedence over the specific or *viśeṣa-dharma*. This view, however, is challenged

by S.N. Dasgupta who remarks :

> The statement that the common good (*sādhāraṇa-dharma*) could be regarded as the precondition of the specific caste-duties implies that, if the latter came into conflict with the former, then the former should prevail. This is, however, inexact ; for there is hardly any instance where, in case of a conflict, the *sādhāraṇa-dharma*, or the common duties, had a greater force. Thus, for example, non-injury to living beings was a common duty ; but sacrifices implied the killing of animals, and it was the clear duty of the Brahmins to perform sacrifices. War implied the taking of an immense number of human lives ; but it was the duty of a Kṣattriya not to turn away from a battlefield, and in pursuance of his obligatory duty as a Kṣattriya he had to fight.[3]

Dasgupta then proceeds to illustrate his point with instances from the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Mahābhārata* :

> Turning to traditional accounts, we find in the *Rāmāyaṇa* that Śambūka was a Śūdra saint (*muni*) who was performing ascetic penance in a forest. This was a transgression of caste-duties : for a Śūdra could not perform *tapas*, which only the higher caste people were allowed to undertake, and hence the performance of *tapas* by the Śūdra saint Śambūka was regarded as *adharma* (vice) ; and, as a result of this *adharma*, there was a calamity in the kingdom of Rāma in the

form of the death of an infant son of a Brahmin. King Rāma went out in his chariot and beheaded Śambūka for transgressing his caste-duties. Instances could be multiplied to show that, when there was a conflict between the caste-duties and the common duties, it was the former that had the greater force. The common duties had their force only when they were not in conflict with the caste-duties. The *Gītā* is itself an example of how the caste-duties had preference over common duties. In spite of the fact that Arjuna was extremely unwilling to take the lives of his near and dear kinsmen in the battle of Kurukṣetra, Kṛṣṇa tried his best to dissuade him from his disinclination to fight and pointed out to him that it was his clear duty, as a Kṣattriya, to fight. It seems therefore very proper to hold that the common duties had only a general application, and that the specific caste-duties superseded them, whenever the two were in conflict.[4]

III

The instance provided by Dasgupta from the *Rāmāyaṇa* serves to support his view; but there are four other 'puzzling acts' of Rāma which may now be taken into account :

1. the killing of Tāṭakā which is opposed both to the universal injunction not to kill and the specific

Kṣattriya injunction not to kill a female;

2. the killing of Vālin allegedly in an unfair combat;

3. acceptance of the 'traitor' Vibhīṣaṇa as friend;

4. the public repudiation of Sītā.

Frank Whaling argues that all these cases can be explained by reference to the principles of *rāja-dharma*. Thus the 'true dividing line in the world, according to this reasoning, is not between male and female, or man and animal, or man and demon, but that between *dharma* and *adharma*'.[5] But is this *dharma viśeṣa* or *sādhāraṇa*? On the one hand some actions of Rāma, such as the killing of Vālī clearly involve universal values; on the otherhand, actions such as the killing of Śambūka seem to involve particular values. This leads one to concur with the following assessment of Frank Whaling: the logical dilemma is that *dharma* as an ethical norm and *rāja-dharma* as a social-political norm do not always converge.[6]

In any case it is clear that it is not a straight case of caste-duties taking precedence over general duties. The situation is much more complex. The king, for instance, as a king represents the Kṣattriya rather than a universal norm par excellence, and would presumably mould his conduct in the light of the Arthaśāstra-s. But it may be noted that the *Arthaśāstra* of Kauṭilya (I.3.13) prescribes for all men *ahiṃsā*, *satya*, *śauca*, *anasūyā*, *ānṛśaṃsya* and *kṣamā*.[7]

IV

One may now turn to the *Mahābhārata*, or more specifically the *Bhagavadgītā*, alluded to by Dasgupta. Is it always the case therein that the specific *dharma* takes precedence over universal *dharma*? The *Gītā* (II.31) seems to imply that such may not always be the case. In this verse Kṛṣṇa urges Arjuna to engage in a *dharmya-yuddha* or what we might call a righteous war. The issue to be considered here is that as both the contending parties in this war are Kṣattriya and it is the duty of all Kṣattriya-s to fight, then wherein does the force of Kṛṣṇa's argument lie?[8] If the line is read without *dharmyāddhi* as *yuddhācchreyo'nyat kṣattriya-sya na vidyate* it would be in keeping with the doctrine of *varṇa-dharma* and apply to both Kaurava-s and Pāṇḍava-s. By characterising *yuddha* as *dharmya* obviously something more is intended. The implication seems to be that Arjuna should fight not just because a war is involved but because a righteous war is involved as well. Righteousness would appear to be a universal *dharma*.[9] The discussion hitherto then enables two conclusions to be drawn at this stage :

1. that specific duties need not always take precedence over universal duties

2. that when two parties come in conflict pursuing their specific duties, then an appeal may be made to the meta-level of universal duties.

It can, however, still be maintained that in Hindu

ethics in general specific duties prevail over universal duties. Thus it is legitimate for the Kṣattriya-s to hunt despite the general injunction against killing and for women to commit Satī as part of their *śtrī-dharma* not withstanding the more general injunction against suicide.

There is, however, one stage of life — that of *saṃnyāsa*, which abrogates commitment to *varṇāśrama* duties. Although *saṃnyāsa* is also reckoned as a stage of life and has its own set of rules,[10] in a sense it represents the transcendence of *varṇa* and *āśrama* duties in favour of the pursuit of *mokṣa* alone as the goal of life.[11] The *Yogasūtra-s* refer to the five *yama-s* and the five *niyama-s* — dubbed 'the ten commandments of Yoga'.[12] The *yama-s* — *ahiṃsā*, *satya*, *asteya*, *brahmacarya* and *aparigraha* — are said to be universally applicable *without being conditioned by time and place.*[13] Thus even if only the male elite can enter the state of *saṃnyāsa* on the standard view, entrance into *saṃnyāsa* involves the negation of such exclusiveness. This enables a third conclusion to be drawn : that in a particular stage of life, universal duties clearly take precedence over specific duties.

VI

If one now turns to the consideration of *varṇa*-

dharma-s instead of *āśrama-dharma-s*, a somewhat similar situation seems to emerge. According to the *Bhagavadgītā* (XVIII.42-4) the various *varṇa-s* possess the following characteristics :

> 42. Quietude, self-restraint, austerity, cleanness, long-suffering, and uprightness, knowledge, experience, and belief are the Brāhmaṇa's duties, born of his nature.
>
> 43. Bravery, spirit, constancy, adroitness, and courage to face the foe, generosity and lordliness, are the Kṣattriya's duties, born of his nature.
>
> 44. Tilling the soil, herding cows, and commerce, are the Vaiśya's duties, born of his nature ; and of a Śūdra service is the proper duty, born of his nature.[15]

It soon becomes apparent that while the duties of the Kṣattriya, Vaiśya and Śūdra become progressively specific, those of the Brāhmaṇa-s, at least as enumerated in the *Gītā*, correspond closely to universal duties or *sādhāraṇa-dharma-s*. One popular listing of *sādhāraṇa-dharma-s* runs as follows (*Manusmṛti*, X.63) :

Abstention from injuring (creatures), veracity, abstention from unlawfully appropriating (the goods of others), purity, and control of the organs, Manu has declared to be the summary of the law for the four castes.[16] It is easy to see how closely the duties of a Brāhmaṇa as mentioned in the *Bhagavadgītā* parallel this list.[17] This discussion enables a fourth conclusion to be drawn : that the duties of a particular *varṇa* seem

to correspond at times to universal duties, just as the duties of a particular *āśrama* corresponded to universal duties.

VII

This interpenetration of universal and specific *dharma-s* goes far beyond the simplistic formulation that in Hindu ethics one of them must take precedence over the other in the event of a conflict — or more particularly that the specific duties take precedence over the universal. Hindu ethical thought is much more open and fluid on this issue. This fluidity may be due to the commitment of Hindu axiology to both this worldly and otherworldly values namely, to *dharma*, *artha* and *kāma* on the one hand and *mokṣa* on the other. A little reflection will reveal that specific duties are more congruent with a this-worldly and universal duties with an otherworldly orientation.

It may also not be unreasonable to suggest that it is precisely this fluidity which enabled modern Hindu thinkers to initiate reform by emphasizing universal values. Thus one of Roy's arguments against Satī emphasized the superiority of a life of disinterested action (*niṣkāma-karma*) over death by self-immolation leading to heaven — a desire-oriented activity. Gandhi's attempts to reform Hinduisim may be encapsulated in the statement that he sought to reform Hinduism by emphasizing universal duties over

specific duties, duties which were already embedded in the matrix of Hindu values as expressed in the triple doctrine of the *varṇa-s, āśrama-s* and *puruṣārtha-s.*

Notes

1. For a brief.statement on the distinction see M. Hiriyanna. *The Essentials of Indian Philosophy* (London : George Allen & Unwin, 1948.), p.38. I have used the term *viśeṣa* as a broader category than *varṇāśrama* so as to explicitly include consideration of *strī-dharma, rāja-dharma*, etc.; see P.V. Kane, *History of Dharma-śāstra* (Poona : Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1968.), vol.1, Pt.I, p. 4.
2. Quoted by S.N. Dsagupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy* (Cambridge University Press, 1932.), vol-II, p. 506.
3. ibid., p. 506.
4. ibid.
5. Frank Whaling, *The Rise of the Religious Significance of Rāma* (Delhi : Motilal Banarsidass, 1980.), p. 68.
6. ibid., p. 68, fn.7.
7. P.V. Kane, op.cit., p. 4.
8. See R.C. Zaehner, *The Bhagavad Gītā* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969.), p. 137.
9. It is of interest to contrast here the over-interpretation of righteousness, by Mahatma Gandhi and its underinterpretation by S.N. Dasgupta. For Gandhi's view see Raghavan N. Iyer, *The Moral and Political Thought of Mahatma Gandhi* (New York : Oxford University Press, 1973.), p. 341. For Dasgupta's view see S.N. Dasgupta, op.cit., p. 514.
10. Georg Bühler, tr., *The Laws of Manu* (New York : Dover Publications, 1969.) [first published 1886], p. 204 ff.
11. S. Radhakrishnan, *Eastern Religions and Western Thought* (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1939), pp. 380-1; *The Bhagavadgītā* (Bombay: Blackie & Son [India] Ltd., 1974), p. 122-3.
12. T.M.P. Mahadevan, *Outlines of Hinduism* (Bombay : Chetana Ltd., 1971.), p. 127.

13. *Yogasūtra* II. 31. Interestingly the commentary specifically rejects the 'case of the warrior who says, 'In battle only [I will do injury and nowhere else]', James Haughton Woods, *The Yoga-system of Patañjali* (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1914.), p. 181.
14. It is not without interest that ten such general duties are mentioned by Manu (VI.92) as applying to 'twice born men' belonging to [any of] the 'four orders' (VI.91).
15. W. Douglas P. Hill, *The Bhagavadgītā* (second edn.) (Delhi : Oxford 91 University Press, 1973.), pp. 208-9.
16. Georg Buhler, tr., op.cit., p. 416.
17. It is worth noting that although in the *Manusmṛti* the duties of a Brāhmaṇa are described in specific detail (IV.92ff.) even in that text the 'true Brahmin' is described in universal terms (II.87).

आर् तङ्गस्वामि शर्मा

भवभूतेर्नाटकत्रयी दर्शनानि च

कविमण्डले श्रीकण्ठ इति मीमांसादर्शनमण्डले उम्वेक इति च प्रसिद्धेन काश्यपेन श्रोत्रियेण पदवाक्यप्रमाण-(व्याकरण-मीमांसा-न्यायशास्त्र) पारीणेन भट्टगोपालपौत्रेण नीलकण्ठजतुकर्ण्योः पुत्रेण, चित्सुखाचार्येण तत्त्वप्रदीपिकायां, चित्सुखीव्याख्यात्रा प्रत्यक्स्वरूपाचार्येण नयनप्रसादिन्यां (२६५) भवभूतिरुम्वेक इति निर्दिष्टेन, आनन्दपूर्णविद्यासागरेण खण्डनखण्डव्याख्यायां (३१९) बोधघनाचार्येण तत्त्वशुध्यां च (९०, १७५) निर्दिष्टेन, ज्ञाननिधिशिष्येण भवभूतिरिति नाम्ना प्रसिद्धेन कविकुलतिलकेन रचितं नाटकत्रयम् — मालतीमाधवं महावीरचरितम् उत्तररामचरितं चेति ।

इयं नाटकत्रयी अनन्यसामान्यप्रकर्षेण रसिकानां चेतांसि समाकर्षयति । यद्यपि त्रिष्वपि नाटकेषु कतिपयश्लोकाः समानाकारा एव दृश्यन्ते विशिष्य महावीरचरित-उत्तररामचरितयोः केचन श्लोकाः समानरूपा एव, तथापि पदविन्यासेन शैल्या भावभङ्ग्या च इयं नाटकत्रयी स्वीयम् अनितरसाधारणं स्थानम् अर्हति । मालतीमाधवं घटनापाटवस्य उत्कृष्टम् उदाहरणम् । भाषामाधुर्यस्य भावभङ्ग्युत्कर्षस्य मनोविज्ञानस्य अन्तर्निगूढार्थाभिव्यञ्जनायाश्च उत्तररामचरितम् उत्कृष्टम् उदाहरणम् । कथानकसंविधानस्य संवादस्य चरित्रचित्रणस्य काव्यचमत्कारस्य मूलकथापरिवर्तनस्य च उत्कृष्टम् उदाहरणं महावीरचरितम् ।

दशभिरङ्कैः पूर्णे मालतीमाधवे कथावस्तु कविकल्पितम् । अमात्यभूरिवसोः दुहितुः मालत्याः विदर्भराजामात्यकुमारस्य माधवस्य च परस्परानुरागप्रयुक्तविवाहो वर्णितः । मालतीपितुः स्वामी नृपः मालत्याः विरक्तिभाजनेन परं स्वस्य प्रीतिभाजनेन नर्मसचिवेन नन्दनेन मालतीं परिणाययितुं यस्मिन् दिने ऐच्छत् तस्मिन् दिने मकरन्दो नाम माधवमित्रं मालतीवेषं परिधाय वधूत्वेन तेन सह अयासीत् । एवमादिसंघर्षानुत्पाद्य कविना कथायां शृङ्गार-करुण-रौद्र-वीर-बीभत्स-भयानकादिरसानां वर्णनं कृतम् । नाटकेऽस्मिन् श्रव्यकाव्याङ्गभूतानां प्रकृतिवर्णनानां सविस्तरं दर्शनान्न केवलमिदं दृश्यनाटकं परं श्रव्यनाटकमित्यपि वक्तुं शक्यते ।

सप्तभिरङ्कैः पूर्णे महावीरचरिते रामायणकथा बहुशः कविना परिवर्तिता । नाटकेऽस्मिन् महावीरो रामः वीररसाश्रयत्वेन वर्णितः । रामलक्ष्मणौ विश्वामित्राश्रमे एव सीतां ऊर्मिलां च पश्यतः । अवसरेऽस्मिन् सीतां परिणिनीषोः रावणात् ताटका नाम दूती आगच्छति यां तिरस्करोति राघवः। सीताविवाहशुल्कतया शैवं धनुरारोप्यते। सीताविवाहश्च भवति । रावणामात्यो माल्यवान् शूर्पणखया साकं संमन्त्र्य परशुरामं रामप्रतिपक्षत्वेन संनिधापयति । अनन्तरं परशुरामगर्वभङ्गः । नितरां निर्विण्णो माल्यवान् मन्थरावेषधारिणीं मायाविनीं शूर्पणखां दृष्ट्वा प्राग् दत्तं वरद्वयं कैकेय्या दशरथं अनुस्मारयति । अथ सीतारामलक्ष्मणानां वनवासः । वने जटायुवधः, विभीषणशरणागतिः, रावणपक्षपातिनो बालिनो वधः, सुग्रीवसमागमः, लङ्कादाहः अङ्गददौत्यम्, महति युद्धे रावणो यमपुरातिथिर्भवति,

ततो विश्वामित्रेण रामाभिषेक इतीयं कथा वर्णिता।

राक्षसैः परशुरामोत्तेजनम्, कैकेय्याः चारित्र्यरक्षणार्थं मन्थरारूप-धारिण्याः शूर्पणखायाः कल्पनम्, मिथिलाया एव रामप्रवासः न तु अयोध्यायाः, सुग्रीवविरोधिवालिस्थाने रावणपक्षपातिनो वालिनः कल्पनम्, रामस्य वालिना प्रत्यक्षमेव युद्धकल्पनम् इत्यादिनीभिः कल्पनाभिः मूलरामायणे आरोपिता आपातरमणीयाः दोषा अपि दूरीकृताः।

सप्तभिरङ्कैः पूर्णं करुणरसप्रधानं उत्तररामचरितं नाम नाटकं रामायणोत्तरकाण्डवर्णितां सीतापरित्यागरूपां कथां वर्णयति —

स्नेहं दयां च सौख्यं च यदि वा जानकीमपि।

आराधनाय लोकस्य मुञ्चतो नास्ति मे व्यथा॥ (१.२)

इति प्रतिज्ञां कुर्वन् श्रीरामः निर्मूलात् लोकापवादाद् भीतः लोकाराधन-बद्धश्रद्धः राजगृहात् पतिगतप्राणां पतिपरायणां पूर्णगर्भिणीम् अग्नौ समक्षं विशुद्धां चित्रदर्शनादनन्तरं पुनरपि अरण्यदर्शनमिच्छन्तीं सीतां मुमोच, परं तदीयं हृदयं कदापि न तां विसस्मार। स दिवानिशं तद्-वियोगेन दंदह्यमानाः पुटपाकप्रतीकाशामिव अतिकरुणां दशाम् अनु-भूयमान आस्ते।

कथेयं नाटकोपयोगाय बहुशः परिवर्तिता। परिवर्तनेषु मुख्यतः चित्रदर्शनम्, अदृश्यया सीतया वासन्तीरामयोः कथालापश्रवणम्, वासन्तीसमक्षं रामेण स्वानुरागस्य सीतागतत्वस्वीकरणम्, लवचन्द्र-केतुयुद्धः, वसिष्ठादेः वाल्मीक्याश्रमागमनम्, रामसमक्षं तस्यैव सीता-परित्यागाख्यस्य निर्दयकर्मणः नाटकेन प्रयोगः रामस्य सीतादुःख-दर्शनाद् मूर्च्छा सीतारामसंमेलनं चेति सुखान्तं संवृत्तम्।

अत्र वर्णितः करुणो रसः सभ्यानां रसिकानां मनो रोदयति। नारीचारित्ररक्षणे कालिदासः बाह्यसौन्दर्यवर्णने यथा प्रवीणो भवति तथा भवभूतिः नारीणां आन्तरसौन्दर्यवर्णने प्रवीणो भवति। श्रोणीभारादलसगमना पक्वबिम्बाधरोष्ठी नारी कालिदासीये, इयं गेहे लक्ष्मीः, इयम् अमृतवर्तिर्नयनयोः नारी भवभूतीये।

किं रामेण कृतः सीतापरित्याग उचितः, अपि वा अनागस्कृताम् असहायाम् गर्भमन्थरां सीतां निरासयता रामेण अन्याय्यं नृशंस्यं कर्म कृतम्, इत्येतेषां प्रश्नानां समाधानं मनोविज्ञानरीत्या कर्तव्यस्नेहयोः बलाबलविचाररीत्या कविना दत्तम्। कर्तव्यस्य रक्षणाय सीतां त्यजन् रामः स्वजीवितमेव तत्याजेति वक्तव्यम्। सप्राणोऽपि निष्प्राण एवास्ते। रामः यदि सीतां प्रति नृशंस आसीत् तर्हि आत्मानं प्रति नृशंसतर आसीत्। सीतायाः विरहव्यथातः रामस्य विरहव्यथा अन्यूना भवति। सीता प्रणष्टा यदि तर्हि रामस्य सौख्यं प्रणष्टमिति रामस्य मनोविज्ञानं वर्णयन् भवभूतिः मनोविज्ञानदर्शने स्वीयम् अनितरं प्रावीण्यं दर्शयति।

यथायं कविवरः भवभूतिः अलौकिक्या काव्यशक्त्या अनुपमः तथैव दर्शनेष्वपि अत्युद्भट आसीदितीयं वार्ता अदसीयेभ्यः ग्रन्थेभ्यः ज्ञायते। मीमांसाश्लोकवार्त्तिकस्य व्याख्यां तात्पर्यटीकां लिखन् अयं कविः प्रौढमीमांसक इत्यत्र न संशयः।

भवभूतिः स्वयमात्मानं पदवाक्यप्रमाणज्ञमावेदयति मालतीमाधवे (१.१०) —

यद् वेदाध्ययनं तथोपनिषदां सांख्यस्य योगस्य च
ज्ञानं तत्कथनेन किं न हि ततः कश्चिद्गुणो नाटके।

यत्प्रौढित्वमुदारता च वचसां यच्चार्थतो गौरवं
तच्चेदस्ति ततस्तदेव गमकं पाण्डित्यवैदग्ध्ययोः ॥

इति वदन्नयम् आत्मानं वेदान्ते वेदे सांख्ये योगे च दर्शने निष्णातम् आवेदयति। अनेन स्पष्टं भवभूतिः नानादर्शनतत्त्वज्ञः इति।

तत्र मालतीमाधवे (१.८) —

ये नाम केचिदिह नः प्रथयन्त्यवज्ञां
जानन्ति ते किमपि तान् प्रति नैष यत्नः।
उत्पत्स्यते मम तु कोऽपि समानधर्मा
कालो ह्ययं निरवधिर्विपुला च पृथ्वी ॥

इति विद्यते। अत्र व्याकरणज्ञता अस्य ज्ञायते। किंशब्दस्य तावदाक्षेपार्थत्वम्, अल्पार्थकत्वम्, अवाङ्मनसगोचरानिर्वचनीयार्थकत्वं, प्रश्नार्थकत्वं च प्रसिद्धम्। इह प्रश्नार्थकतां विना अन्येषु अर्थेषु किमपीति शब्दः प्रयुक्त इति भाति। लोके तावत् त्रिविधाः पुरुषाः विद्यन्ते — केचिदज्ञाः केचिदद्वैतब्रह्मरसानुभाविनः काव्यरसविरसाः, इतरे सहृदयहृदयामोदिकाव्यभव्यरसिकाः। तत्र आद्यान् अज्ञान् प्रत्याह — ये केचिदज्ञानिनः अस्माकम् इह प्रबन्धे अवधीरणां ख्यापयन्ति। ते किमपि न जानन्ति, तान् प्रति मम नैष यत्नः। बधिरो गानरसं न जानाति, नापि गर्दभः कर्पूररसं जानाति। अथवा किंशब्द आक्षेपे, ते किमपि जानन्ति? ते किमपि न जानन्ति इत्याक्षेपो वा। ये तु अद्वैतामृतरसिकाः तान् प्रति वदति — ये नाम — ये निश्चयम्। नामेत्यव्ययं निश्चयार्थे। वैषयिकसुखविमुखाः मुमुक्षवः इह मम प्रबन्धे अवधीरणाम् आचरन्ति। ते किमपि अवाङ्मनसगोचरं परं ब्रह्म

जानन्ति । ते नमस्याः तान् प्रति मम नैष प्रयत्नः ।

यावानार्थ उदपाने सर्वतः संप्लुतोदके ।

तावान् सर्वेषु वेदेषु ब्राह्मणस्य विजानतः ॥

(भगवद्गीता, २.४६)

इति नित्यानन्तात्मके परमात्मनि रसिकानां तेषामनेन लाभो नास्ति । तस्माद् उत्पत्स्ते मम तु कोऽपि समानधर्मा इत्यादि प्रतिपादयति । क्षेमङ्करार्थे व्याकरणव्युत्पत्तिसिद्धानां शिवतातिः (६,७) इत्यादि-शब्दानां प्रयोगश्च दृश्यते । एवं च व्याकरणशास्त्रप्रसिद्धं निपातानां अव्ययानां च अनेकार्थत्वं जानात्ययं भवभूतिरिति ज्ञायते ।

एवं रामायणावतारनिरूपणप्रसङ्गे उत्तररामचरितस्य द्वितीयेऽङ्के चतुर्मुखमुखेन वाल्मीकिनं स्तौति — प्रबुद्धोऽस्मि वागात्मनि ब्रह्मणि इति । अथ स भगवान् प्राचेतसः प्रथमं मनुष्येषु शब्दब्रह्मणः तादृशं विवर्तम् इतिहासं रामायणं प्रणिनाय । अत्र कविना वैयाकरणानां परमसिद्धान्तभूतस्फोटवादः प्रदर्शितः । जगतः कारणं स्फोटाख्यः निरवयवः नित्यः शब्दः ब्रह्मैव इति वाक्यपदीये (१.१) —

अनादिनिधनं ब्रह्म शब्दतत्त्वं यदक्षरम् ।

विवर्ततेऽर्थभावेन प्रक्रिया जगतो यतः ॥

अस्य मूलं तु —

चत्वारि शृङ्गास्त्रयोऽस्य पादाः

द्वे शीर्षे सप्त हस्तासो अस्य ।

त्रिधा बद्धो वृषभो रोरवीति

महान् देवो मर्त्यान् आविवेश ॥ (नारायणवल्ली १२.२)

इति श्रुतिः। इयं स्फोटप्रक्रिया अत्र निर्दिष्टा।

पूर्वमीमांसादर्शने भवभूतीयं पाण्डित्यम् अनितरसाधारणमित्यत्र बहूनि उदाहरणानि दृश्यन्ते । श्लोकवार्त्तिकव्याख्यानिर्माणेनैव पूर्व-मीमांसाविचक्षणोऽयमिति सिद्धम् । परम् उम्वेकभवभूत्योरैक्ये एव तत् प्रमाणं भवितुमर्हति । उम्वेकभवभूत्योरैक्यविषये प्रबलप्रमाणे सत्यपि विमर्शकमहाशयेषु विप्रतिपत्तयो विद्यन्ते । तस्मात् नाटकत्रयीत एव उदाहरणानि दीयन्ते।

पूर्वमीमांसादर्शनशब्दः केवलं जैमिनिसूत्रम्, शाबरभाष्यम्, भाट्ट-प्राभाकरप्रस्थानं वा न निर्दिशति परं वेदार्थविचारपराः वेदविहितकर्म-व्रतादिनिरूपणपराः धर्मप्रतिपादकाः वेद-वैदिक-स्मृति-इतिहास-पुराण-गृह्यसूत्र-श्रौतसूत्र-ब्राह्मणादिग्रन्थाः पूर्वमीमांसाशब्दवाच्या इति, परं न उपनिषद इति च द्रष्टव्यम्।

उत्तररामचरिते अरुन्धतीमुखात् कृतब्रह्मसाक्षात्काराणां विप्राणाम् उक्तिषु प्रामाण्यविषयकसन्देहो न कर्तव्यः, तेषां वाग् मङ्गलकारिणी सत्या च भवतीति कथनावसरे —

आविर्भूतज्योतिषां ब्राह्मणानां
ये व्याहारास्तेषु मा संशयोऽभूत्।
भद्रा ह्येषां वाचि लक्ष्मीर्निषक्ता
नैते वाचं विप्लुतार्थां वदन्ति ॥

इतीदं पद्यम् (४.१८) —

सक्तुमिव तितउना पुनन्तो यत्र धीरा मनसा वाचमक्रत।
अत्रा सखायः सख्यानि जानते भद्रैषां लक्ष्मीः निहिताधिवाचि ॥

इति ऋग्वेदीयं सूक्तं (१०.७१.२) सर्वात्मना अनुकरोति । एवं शम्बूकवधं कृत्वा रामः तत्तपसः फलं भवतु इत्यनुगृह्णाति —

यत्रानन्दाश्च मोदाश्च यत्र पुण्याश्च संपदः ।
वैराजा नाम ते लोकास्तैजसाः सन्तु ते शिवाः ॥

इति पद्यम् (२.१२) —

यत्रानन्दाश्च मोदाश्च मुदःप्रमुद आसते ।
कामस्य यत्राप्ताः कामाः तत्र माममृतं कृधि ।
इन्द्रायेन्दो परिस्रव ॥ इति ऋग्वेदीयं सूक्तम् (९.११३.११) अनुसरति ।

एवं महावीरचरिते (३.२) उत्तररामचरिते (४.१) च —

संज्ञाप्यते वत्सतरी सर्पिष्यन्नं च पच्यते ।
श्रोत्रियः श्रोत्रियगृहानागतोऽसि जुषस्व नः ॥

समांसो मधुपर्क इत्याम्नायं बहुमन्यमानाः श्रोत्रियाय अभ्यागताय महोक्षं वत्सतरीं वा पचन्ति गृहमेधिनः इति वदन् पूर्वयुगप्रसिद्धं श्रोत्रियाय अतिथये समांसं मधुपर्कविधानं निर्दिशति । अयं च समांसो मधुपर्क इति गृह्यसूत्रप्रसिद्धिः ।

एवम् ऐतरेयब्राह्मणे (४०) पुरोहितप्रशंसाप्रकरणे येऽर्थाः वर्णिताः त एवार्थाः महावीरचरिते वसिष्ठ-प्रशंसाप्रस्तावे वर्णिताः (३.१८) —

न तस्य राष्ट्रं व्यथते न रिष्यति न जीर्यति ।
त्वं विद्वान् ब्राह्मणो यस्य राष्ट्रगोपः पुरोहितः ॥

एवं शतपथब्राह्मणे त्रयोदशकाण्डे, तैत्तिरीयब्राह्मणे तृतीयकाण्डे च वर्णितः अश्वमेधयागप्रयोगः उत्तररामचरिते अनूद्यते — ननु मूर्खाः

पठितमेव हि युष्माभिरपि तत्काण्डम् इति। एवम् महावीरचरिते —

त्वं ब्रह्मण्यः किल परिणतश्चासि धर्मेण युक्तः

त्वां वेदान्तेष्वचरममृषिः सूर्यशिष्यः शशास। (३.२६)

इति परशुराममुखेन जनकं स्तौति। जनकं सूर्यशिष्यस्य याज्ञवल्क्यस्य शिष्य इति प्रतिपादयति।

अन्यत्र तमसामुखेन कुशलवयोः वाल्मीकिकृतसंस्कारवर्णनावसरे — अद्य खलु आयुष्मतोः द्वादशस्य संवत्सरस्य संख्यामङ्गलग्रन्थिः अभिवर्तते इत्युक्तम्। अयं विषयः वत्सरे वत्सरे शिशूनां जन्मनक्षत्रे शान्त्युत्सवं कृत्वा मङ्गलार्थं करे पटसूत्रादिना स्त्रियो ग्रन्थिं कुर्वन्ति। स तु वलयरूपेण करे तिष्ठति इति गृह्यसूत्रादिषु वर्णितः। एवम् आत्रेयीमुखेन लवकुशयोः वाल्मीकिकृतसंस्कारनिरूपणप्रसङ्गे (द्वितीयाङ्के) — निवृत्तचौडकर्मणोः तयोः त्रयीवर्जम् इतराः त्रयो विद्याः एकादशे वर्षे क्षात्रेण कल्पेन उपनीय त्रयी विद्या अध्यापितौ इति वदति।

चूडाकर्म द्विजातीनां सर्वेषामेव धर्मतः।

प्रथमेऽब्दे तृतीये वा कर्तव्यं श्रुतिचोदितम्॥

गर्भाष्टमेऽब्दे कुर्वीत ब्राह्मणस्योपनायनम्।

गर्भादेकादशे राज्ञो गर्भात्तु द्वादशे विशः॥

इति स्मृतिवाक्यान्यनूदितानि (मनुस्मृतिः, २.३६-७)।

अन्यच्च — प्रवासितां स्वसुतां जानकीं श्रुत्वा निर्विण्णस्य वयसापि वृद्धस्य व्रताद्यनुष्ठायिनो जनकस्य मुखात् पराकसन्तापनप्रभृतिभिः तपोभिः शोषितान्तःशरीरधातोः इति वदति। तत्र पराकः

सन्तापनं चेति व्रतविशेषौ —

यतात्मनोऽप्रमत्तस्य द्वादशाहमभोजनम् ।
पराको नाम कृच्छ्रोऽयं सर्वपापापनोदनः ॥
कुशोदकं च गोक्षीरं दधि मूलं शकृद् घृतम् ।
जग्ध्वापरेऽह्न्युपवसेत् कृच्छ्रं सान्तापनं महत् ॥

इति मनुस्मृतौ (११.२१५, २१२) वर्णितौ ।

एवं योगदर्शनेऽपि भवभूतेरसाधारणं ज्ञानं ज्ञातुं पार्यते । महावीर-चरिते तृतीयाङ्के परशुरामं प्रति वसिष्ठो वदति —

अयि वत्स किमनया यावज्जीवम् आयुधपिशाचिकया । श्रोत्रियोऽसि । पूतं भजस्व पन्थानम् आरण्यकम् । तत् प्राचिनु चित्तप्रसादिनीः चतस्रो मैत्र्यादिभावनाः । प्रसीदतु विशोका ज्योतिष्मती नाम योग-वृत्तिः । ततूप्रसादजं ऋतंभराभिधानं नाम अबहिःसाधनोपधेयसर्वार्थ-सामर्थ्यम् अपविद्धविप्लवोपरागम् ऊर्जस्वलम् अन्तर्ज्योतिषो दर्शनम् । यतः प्रज्ञानम् अभिसंभवति, तद्धि आचरितव्यं ब्राह्मणेन, तरति येन अपमृत्युं पाप्मानम् इति ।

अत्र मैत्री करुणा मुदिता उपेक्षा चित्तप्रसादिनीः भावना इति पातञ्जलयोगसूत्रस्था एव वर्णिता विद्यन्ते । अत्र वाचस्पतिमिश्र-व्याख्या — मैत्रीम् — सौहार्दं भावयतः चित्तस्य ईर्ष्याकालुष्यं निवर्तते । दुःखितेषु च करुणाम् — आत्मनीव परस्मिन् दुःखप्रहाणेच्छां भावयतः चेतसः परापकारचिकीर्षाकालुष्यं निवर्तते । पुण्यशीलेषु प्राणिषु मुदिताम् — हर्षं भावयतः चेतस असूयाकालुष्यं निवर्तते । अपुण्य-शीलेषु उपेक्षाम् — माध्यस्थ्यं भावयतः चेतस अमर्षकालुष्यं निवर्तते ।

ततश्च राजसतामसधर्मनिवृत्तौ सात्त्विकः शुक्लो धर्म उपजायते।

ज्योतिःपुञ्जं निराकारं लक्षयेद् मुक्तिदं भवेत्।

एवम् —

नाविरतो दुःचरितान्नाशान्तो नासमाहितः।

नाशान्तमनसो वापि प्रज्ञानेनैनमाप्नुयात्॥

(कठोपनिषत्, २.२४)

इति श्रुतिः। एता एव योगदर्शनविषयाः वसिष्ठमुखाद् भवभूतिना वर्णिताः। एवं योगकापालिकशाक्तदर्शनानाम् अद्भुतं सामञ्जस्यं कविना मालतीमाधवे पञ्चमाङ्के (१-२) प्रदर्शितम्। कपालकुण्डला वदति —

षडधिकदशनाडीचक्रमध्यस्थितात्मा
हृदि विनिहितरूपः सिद्धदस्तद्विदां यः।
अविचलितमनोभिः साधकैर्मृग्यमाणः
स जयति परिणद्धः शक्तिभिः शक्तिनाथः॥

नित्यं न्यस्तषडङ्गचक्रनिहितं हृद्पद्ममध्योदितं
पश्यन्ती शिवरूपिणं लयवशादात्मानमभ्यागता।
नाडीनामुदयक्रमेण जगतः पञ्चामृतामर्षणा-
दप्राप्तोत्पतनश्रमा विघटयन्त्यग्रे नभोऽम्भोमुचः॥

अत्रोक्तविषयाः शब्दाश्च योगतन्त्रे शाक्ततन्त्रे च प्रसिद्धाः पारिभाषिकाश्च —

इडा च पिङ्गला चैव सुषुम्ना च परा स्मृता।
गान्धारी हस्तिजिह्वा च पूषा वसुवशा तथा॥

अलम्बुषा कुहूश्चैव शङ्खिनी दशमी तथा।

तालुजिह्वा च जिह्वा च विजया कामदा तथा।।

अमृता बहुला नाम नाड्यो वायुसमीरिताः।

इति योगशास्त्रप्रसिद्धानां नाडीचक्रादिशब्दानां प्रयोगः। एतेषां मते अणुः अङ्गुष्ठपरिमाणो वा जीवः। तादृशात्मस्वरूपस्य साक्षात्कारं ये कुर्वन्ति तेषां योगिनां अणिमादिसिद्धयो भवन्ति । यथा आकाशादि-गमनसमर्थास्ते भवन्ति। शक्तयः —

ब्राह्मी माहेश्वरी चैन्द्री वाराही वैष्णवी तथा।

कौमारीत्यपि चामुण्डा चण्डिकेत्यष्टमातरः।।

(उत्तररामचरितव्याख्या, ५.१, चौखम्बा ग्रन्थमाला २४७)

अष्टशक्तीनां नाथः शंकर इत्युक्तम् । एवमादिव्रताचारशीलानां चामुण्डोपासकानां दर्शनम् अत्र निर्दिष्टं कविना । एवं द्वितीयेऽङ्के बौद्धसंन्यासिन्या — गीतश्चायमर्थोऽङ्गिरसा यस्यां मनश्चक्षुषो-र्निबन्धनं तस्यामृद्धिरिति अङ्गिरोवचनप्रकाशीकरणं तात्कालिकबौद्धानां दार्शनिकसिद्धान्तभेदेऽपि आचारांशे सनातनधर्मिभिः सह भेदाभावः इति च ज्ञायते।

मालत्याः दर्शनानन्तरं नैरन्तर्येण मालत्याः चिन्तनेन विषयान्तर-तिरोधानेन मनोवृत्तेः तन्मयत्वाद् माधवीयचिद्रूप आत्मापि मालतीमयो भवतीति कथनावसरे पञ्चमेऽङ्के योगदर्शनवेदान्तदर्शनप्रसिद्धः वृत्ति-सारूप्यवादो निरूपितः। दार्शनिकाः सिद्धान्तमिमं प्रतिपादयन्ति — यद् इन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षानन्तरं परिणामिस्वभावमन्तःकरणं वृत्त्याकारेण परिणतं भवति । अन्तःकरणावच्छिन्नं च प्रमातृचैतन्यं वृत्तावपि

प्रतिफलति । तदेव वृत्तिप्रतिफलितं चैतन्यं प्रमाणमित्युच्यते । सा च वृत्तिः विषयदेशं गत्वा विषयाकारकारिता भवति । विषयाधिष्ठानचैतन्यावरणकमज्ञानं विरोधित्वात् प्रदीपतमोन्यायेन निवारयति —

बुद्धितत्स्थचिदाभासौ द्वावपि व्याप्नुतो घटम् ।
तत्राज्ञानं धिया नश्येदाभासेन घटः स्फुरेत् ॥

इति पञ्चदश्याम् (७.९१) । ततश्च विषयाधिष्ठानचैतन्यं वृत्तिप्रतिफलितप्रमातृचैतन्याभेदेन तडाग-कुल्या-आलवाल-जलन्यायेन एकत्वमापन्नं स्फुरति । योगदर्शने (१.३.४) तत्त्ववैशारद्यां च विषयोऽयं प्रतिपादितः ।

एवम् उत्तरमीमांसादर्शनगतसिद्धान्ता अपि कविना उचितस्थलेषु उपवर्णिता विद्यन्ते । वेदान्तदर्शने सच्चिदानन्दात्मकं निर्विकारं निरुपाधिकं सजातीयस्वगतभेदरहितं स्वप्रकाशं ब्रह्म इत्युच्यते । तस्य विवर्त एव प्रपञ्चः । तत्र विवर्तो नाम उपादानाद् विलक्षण अन्यथाभावः । कारणलक्षण अन्यथाभावः परिणामः । एवं च वस्तुनः यथार्थस्वरूपं परित्यज्य स्वरूपान्तरप्राप्तिः परिणामः । दुग्धस्य दधिरूपेण परिणामः, वस्तुनः स्वरूपमपरित्यज्य स्वरूपान्तरेण मिथ्याप्रतीतिः विवर्तो नाम । रज्जुः स्वरूपम् अपरित्यज्यैव सर्पाकारेण मिथ्यारूपेण भासते । वेदान्तिभिः प्रपञ्चभानस्य ब्रह्मणि परिणामभावो न स्वीक्रियते दुग्धादिवद् विकारित्वप्रसङ्गाद्, अनित्यत्वापत्तेश्च । विवर्तभावस्तु स्वीक्रियते । प्रपञ्चभानस्य ब्रह्मणि मिथ्यात्वेन विकारित्वाभावात् । तथा च यथा ब्रह्मनिष्ठगुरूपदेशवशात् प्राप्तेन तत्त्वमस्यादिमहावाक्योत्पन्नेन तत्त्वज्ञानेन नामरूपात्मकानां निखिलानां प्रपञ्चभेदानां ब्रह्मणि लयो

भवति तथैव चन्द्रकेतुप्रयुक्तेन वायव्यास्त्रेण लवप्रयुक्तस्य वारुणास्त्रस्य कुत्रापि प्रविलयः संजातः । इदं वेदान्ततत्त्वम् —

विद्याकल्पेन मरुता मेघानां भूयसामपि ।
ब्रह्मणीव विवर्तानां क्वापि प्रविलयः कृतः ॥

(उत्तररामचरितम्, ६.६)

इति वदति ।

एवमेव रागिविरागिसाधारण्यात् करुण एक एव रसः काव्यानुशीलनाभ्यासवशाद् विशदीभूतवर्णनीयतन्मयीभवनयोग्यसामाजिकानां निर्भरानन्दरूपत्वेन ज्ञानरूपः । स एव रसः एकः सन्नपि व्यञ्जकविभावादिविच्छित्तिविशेषाद् भिन्न इव भूत्वा परस्परविलक्षणशृङ्गाराद्यात्मना विवर्तते । एवं च एक एव सन्नपि निमित्तभेदाद् भिन्न इव भातीति प्रतिपादयति —

एको रसः करुण एव निमित्तभेदाद्
भिन्नः पृथक् पृथगिवाश्रयते विवर्तान् ।

(उत्तररामचरितम्, ३.४७)

एवं वेदान्ते पूर्वोत्तरमीमांसयोरैक्यं न स्वीक्रियते, अधिकारिभेदात् कालभेदात् जिज्ञास्यभेदाच्च द्वयोरेकविषयत्वं नास्तीति सूत्रभाष्यादौ वर्णितम् । विषयोऽयं भवभूतिना सूचितं दृश्यते ।

यद् वेदाध्ययनं तथोपनिषदाम् ..... ।

इति श्लोके वेदाध्ययनाद् उपनिषदध्ययनं पृथक्कृत्य वदतिं । वेदाध्ययनशब्देनैव उपनिषदामपि पूर्वमीमांसकरीत्या ग्रहणं भवति । तथा च पृथक्कृत्य कथनं तयोरैक्याभावं सूचयतीव विभाति ।

एवं शम्बूकवधं कृत्वा रामः तमाशीर्भिः योजयति — भद्र शिवास्ते सन्तु पन्थानो देवयानाः । प्रतीयस्व पुण्येभ्यो लोकेभ्यः इति । अत्रोक्त अर्थः —

अग्निर्ज्योतिरिह शुक्लः षण्मासा उत्तरायणम् ।

स एतान् ब्रह्म गमयति, एष देवपथः ब्रह्मपथः एतेन प्रतिपद्यमानाः इमं मानवम् आवर्तं नावर्तन्ते इति भगवद्गीतायां (८.२४) छान्दोग्योपनिषत्सु (४.१५) च प्रतिपादितः ।

एवम् आत्महत्तिं चिकीर्षोः जनकमुखाद् आत्महननं नरकमुत्पादयतीति कथनं शब्दतः अर्थतश्च ईशावासीयम् (३) अनुसरति —

असूर्या नाम ते लोका अन्धेन तमसावृताः ।
तान् प्रेत्याभिगच्छन्ति ये के चात्महनो जनाः ॥

TEXTS AND STUDIES

BHAVYA ON MĪMĀṂSĀ

MĪMĀṂSĀTATTVANIRṆAYĀVATĀRAḤ

With English Translation

by

CHRISTIAN LINDTNER

INTRODUCTION

Should one wish to know — and there are certainly good reasons for wanting to do so — what the Bauddha-s in the sixth century A.D. had to say about the contemporary Darśana-s, one should primarily turn one's attention to Bhavya's *Madhyamakahṛdaya* (*MH*), or *Tarkajvālā* (*TJ*), chapters VI, VII, VIII and IX of which deal with Sāṃkhya, Vaiśeṣika, Vedānta and Mīmāṃsā respectively.

While the chapters on Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣika still call for an editor and translator, the chapter on Vedānta was edited and translated (with extracts from the commentary *TJ*) by Olle Qvarnström in his *Hindu Philosophy in Buddhist Perspective*, Lund 1989, whereas the chapter on Mīmāṃsā has been the special object of several studies by Shinjo Nobusada Kawasaki, whose recent book *Issai-chi shiso no kenkyū*, (i.e. *Studies in the Idea of Omniscience*) Tokyo 1992, contains, *inter alia*, an edition of the extant Sanskrit verses of *MH*, i.e. *MHK* (in all 148 verses) along with the Tibetan translation (167 & 67 'extra' verses) as well as a Japanese translation. (The Sanskrit text of *MHK* was edited by myself in *The Adyar Library Bulletin* 59 (1995), p. 37-65, as *Yogācāratattvaviniścayaḥ*. A complete edition and translation of all the chapters of *MHK*, Sanskrit and Tibetan, will be published as the *The Heart of Madhyamaka*. For further references the reader is referred to these works.)

Since there is no complete translation of *MHK* IX in a Western language, and since Kawasaki's edition of the

Sanskrit verses is still open to critique and emendations, I do not have to offer any apology for presenting the interested readers of Sanskrit philosophical literature with a new edition and translation of that important work, *MHK* IX.

In preparing the English translation, I have, of course, carefully compared and consulted the commentary (*TJ*) which — since there can, in my opinion, be no doubt about its authenticity — must naturally remain the final authority in all matters of doubt concerning the understanding of the meaning and (with some obvious provisos) also of the wording of the basic verse-text (i.e. *MHK*).

In attempting to establish the Sanskrit recension of the text I have not only compared Kawasaki's edition (Kawasaki, pp. 407-67) with the only available Sanskrit MS. (cf. Qvarnström, p. 23) — of which a very clear copy is in my possession — but also, of course, with the Tibetan version of *MHK* (as edited by Kawasaki) and *TJ* (Peking and sDe-dge editions). Some critical remarks on a few verses by Lambert Schmithausen, *The Problem of the Sentience of Plants in Earliest Buddhism*, Tokyo 1991 have also been taken into consideration.

In general, it goes without saying, the Tibetan version of *MHK* is indispensable for checking and supporting the words of the Sanskrit verses. Nevertheless, it should be used with some circumspection. Occasionally it leaves out (e.g. 145b) or inserts words (e.g. 31d, 144c), or even paraphrases the Sanskrit (e.g. 87d) in an attempt to render the syntax or argument more clear.

The stern demands of Sanskrit metre, style and syntax

must, in such and similar cases, make us refrain from submitting ourselves to the temptation of 'correcting' the Sanskrit in the light of the Tibetan. Occasionally a reading in the Tibetan (e.g. 34d) and Sanskrit (e.g. 92b) version of *MHK* has been influenced by a reading in *TJ*. Obvious misunderstandings of the Sanskrit occur (e.g. 94c) but are very rare. In a few cases Tibetan reflects bad readings in the Sanskrit MS.(S) used by the translators (e.g. 121a). As a rule, the Tibetan faces insurmountable incumbrances in catching the rhetoric and irony incidental to the author's arguments. Several allusions (e.g. 73 to *Gītā* II.2 ; XV.18) can only be duly appreciated by a *rasika* familiar, like Bhavya, with Sanskrit literature. Nor would the desolate Tibetan *mkhas pa* — even with the assistance of the tacit *TJ* — have had any chance of clearly recognizing the implications of the significant historical allusions to Bhartṛhari (14), Kumārila (15), or the *Mahābhārata* (12, etc.) — not to speak of the tangy list of 363 doctrines (*ad* 19). The connotations of rare and curious technical entries such as *lokapakti* (15d), *magaśāstra* (31d), *saṃsāra-mocaka* (35b), *siddhiyoga* (62a), and *dharmagupti* (68d, etc.), must also have escaped the Tibetan reader. Much the same applies to rare Sanskrit compound formations such as *saṃcintyābhrāntimāraṇa* (38, cf. also 39 and Wackernagel *Altind*. Gr. II.1. p. 69). and *maṇḍalakārikā* etc. (in 141), where — *kārikā* is used, i.f.c., to designate a particular zoological or botanical species.

As opposed to Kawasaki I have no hesitations in normalizing the often inconsistent 'orthography' of our

unique Sanskrit MS. In doing so I am of course assuming that Bhavya consistently wrote a grammatically, and orthographically correct Sanskrit.

There is, as pointed out and discussed by Kawasaki (in his 1989 / 1992 paper 'Discrepancies in the Sanskrit and Tibetan Texts of Bhavya's *Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-Tarkajvālā*' pp. 13) a large number of Tibetan verses that have no correspondence in the extant Sanskrit MS. Likewise, there are a couple of Sanskrit verses that have no correspondence in the Tibetan of *MHK*. They are, however, embedded in the prose of *TJ*. It is clear (from the other chapters of *MH* / *TJ* also) that our work was originally conceived as a unit of verse and prose. At some point in the line(s) of transmission it was decided to extract the verses from the prose. Since then one could, at least for practical purposes, speak of the verses as *MHK*, and the prose as *TJ*. Bhavya himself, it seems, used both titles (*MH* and *TJ*) indiscriminately. Understandably the unknown readers / translators responsible for extracting the verses from the prose ran into the difficulty of having to separate Bhavya's 'own' verses from those that, for various reasons, they did not consider 'original'. The difficulty of making the correct distinction is reflected in the fact that there is, especially in chapters VIII (see 78-84) and IX a handsome discountenance between the Tibetan and Sanskrit recensions of *MHK*. On the whole, however, Kawasaki seems to have solved these difficulties in a satisfactory manner, though a few uncertainties still remain.

In the sequel my only concern is to provide a reliable

translation and to establish a Sanskrit text that, with the support of all available materials (with the exception of the Mongolian versions of *MH / TJ*, and the paper MS. of *MHK* allegedly available in Lhasa) comes as close as possible to what Bhavya actually wrote in the sixth century A.D. Since Bhavya's archetype is, for all we know, irrevocably lost we shall have to remain satisfied, not with absolute certainly, but with a reasonable degree of plausibility.

The Argument : The Pūrvapakṣa (1-17)

According to Mīmāṃsā *apavarga*, or *mokṣa* (1-10) is to be obtained not by *dhyāna* and *jñāna* (as e.g. in Vedānta, cf. 8.51), but by the performance of various rituals alone (*kriyāmātra*). These rituals are prescribed by the authority of *āgama*, the three Veda-s. This *āgama* derives its authority from the fact that it consists of words that are permanent, i.e. not created by a fallible human author. As *āgama* it is reliable because it has been handed down without interruption. As a *pramāṇa*, *āgama* informs us of our ritual duties, and as such it is quite different from *anumāna*. The Bhagavat of the Buddhists (and Jains) is not omniscient and his words are therefore unreliable.

Bhavya's Replies : The Uttarapakṣa (18-167)

If a tradition is to be considered *āgama* it must be true and logical. The highest goal, *mukti* (*apavarga*, *mokṣa*) can only be achieved by *jñāna*, not by *kriyā*. Sometimes the words of human beings are reliable (18-23). The three

Veda-s do, in fact, have a human author, even an evil one (24-31). This is because they prescribe *hiṃsā* etc., which cause *duḥkha*. It is impossible to protect oneself and others against the *duḥkha* of *hiṃsā* by incantations (*mantra*) and such things. Even if done for some holy purpose or in some sacred place, *hiṃsā* is to be rejected. The same goes for *madyapāna* also (32-42).

The reasons for claiming that the words of the Veda-s (the word) are permanent, and thus authoritative, are not valid. Thus the word cannot have a permanent *saṃbandha* to any *artha*. On the contrary, *pratipatti* (an important word !) is based on *saṃketa* (43-9).

As a *pramāṇa*, *āgama* is not essentially different from *anumāna* (here as elsewhere Bhavya follows Dignāga etc.), which also has a manifold (abstract) object. Both are, in the end, based on perception (50-4).

Since *apūrva* and *kriyā* are impermanent their results must also be impermanent. So the Veda-s are obviously wrong in saying that they lead to immortality, i.e. *apavarga* (55-8).

Since the main teachers of the three Veda-s i.e. Brahmā, Viṣṇu (Kṛṣṇa) and Śiva — as seen by many examples in the *Mahābhārata* etc. — lack *jñāna* and are full of *kleśa-s*, they should not serve as authorities. Their immoral behavior cannot be justified by referring to the necessity of *dharmagupti*. Moreover, they lack compassion, and are full of hatred, desire etc. (59-73).

Also, the idea that Viṣṇu has two bodies is absurd, and has only been introduced for the purpose (not of *dharma*-

gupti but) of *vyasanagupti* (74-83). So there is no point in meditating, in terms of yoga, on the body of Hari (83-6).

Since the gods are ignorant of causality (in the Buddhist sense) and full of passions etc. they cannot serve the cause of *dharmagupti*, be it by teaching or by their personal *pratipatti*. So, again, the three Veda-s should be rejected (87-94).

God, as the creator of the world, has already been refuted in Chapter III. If it is now asked what he, hypothetically, has created, some possibilities are examined — and excluded (95-103). Nor can God be considered *eka*, *nitya* etc. (104 -6). In fact, God seems to be cruel and unjust, so it is safer to say that karma, not God, is responsible for the *sṛṣṭi* of the world (107-13). Again, meditation on God will not bring an end to suffering (114-9). Moreover, the Veda-s are wrong when claming that bad karma can be removed by means of water, for karma is bound to *citta* with which water obviously cannot get in touch (120-6). There are other silly doctrines in the Veda-s, e.g. that it is good to throw oneself into fire, and to abstain from food and drinking (127-31). It is, under certain circumstances, all right to eat meat ; it mostly depends on one's motive (132-8). The Veda-s are also mistaken in claiming that trees are sentient beings endowed with a soul (136-46). Again, it is karma that is responsible for 'life' (147).

Finally, one cannot argue that the Veda-s must be authoritative because they are endorsed by various 'authorities', for these authorities are obviously not

always reliable. Some of their statements are true, others are false. As stated above, *āgama* should only be followed to the extent that it satisfies the demands of logic and *anumāna*. The Buddha, on the other hand, is reliable and omniscient in the sense that he knows, and preaches (cf. 88) the *mārga* to *svarga* and *apavarga*. It is quite true that the Jains also refute the three Veda-s, but of course this does not mean that the Buddhists are also Jains (148-67).

So, to sum up, the three Veda-s are full of silly ideas and proposals (*durvihita*), and should therefore be rejected by sensible people. Also, the reasons for attributing the status of *pramāṇa* to the *āgama* of the three Veda-s, are all wrong or inconclusive. What is good in the Veda-s must have been borrowed from other sources. Thus, like Sāṃkhya, Vaiśeṣika and Vedānta, the Darśana of Mīmāṃsā must also be rejected as *ayuktiyukta*.

MĪMĀṂSĀTATTVANIRṆAYĀVATĀRAḤ

मीमांसातत्त्वनिर्णयावतारः

एकेऽपवर्गसन्मार्गध्यानज्ञानापवादिनः ।
क्रियामात्रेण तत्प्राप्तिं प्रतिपाद्यानपत्रपाः ॥ १ ॥

Without any sense of shame some [adherents of Vedānta, namely, Mīmāṃsaka-s] deny that meditation and insight [constitute] the true way to deliverance. They insist that it can only be achieved by rituals.

शास्त्रोक्तव्रीहिपश्वाज्यपत्नीसंबन्धकर्मणः ।
नान्यो मार्गोऽपवर्गाय युक्त इत्याहुरागमात् ॥ २ ॥

They say that according to tradition (*āgama*) there is no other correct way to deliverance than the rituals prescribed in the sacred texts, i.e. [rituals that involve] rice, cattle, butter and participation of one's wife.

रागादिदोषदुष्टत्वात् पुरुषस्य वचो मृषा ।
वेदोऽपुरुषकर्तृत्वात् प्रमाणमिति गृह्यते ॥ ३ ॥

[The Buddha cannot serve as *pramāṇa* :] The word of a human being is false, for he is [always] defiled by desire and other [passions]. Since it does not have a human being as its author, the [self-originated] Veda must be accepted as the [only true] authority.

कर्तुरस्मरणाच्चेष्टो वेदोऽपुरुषकर्तृकः ।
संप्रदायानुपच्छेदादागमोऽसौ तदत्यये ॥ ४ ॥

Also, because no author can be recollected, the Veda does not have a human being as its author. Since it has been transmitted without interruption it [the Veda] is our *āgama*. [Without it...]

अत्यन्ताक्षपरोक्षे हि प्रतिपत्तिः कथं भवेत् ।
अदृष्टलिङ्गसंबन्धे स्वर्गापूर्वादिवस्तुनि ॥ ५ ॥

How could one in fact have any knowledge of invisible things far beyond the senses, such as heaven, *apūrva* [*dharma*] etc., which have no connection with a visible mark ?

नित्यः शब्दो ध्वनिव्यङ्ग्यः संबन्धोऽर्थेन नित्यतः ।
प्रतिपत्तुर्यतोऽर्थेषु प्रतिपत्तिः प्रजायते ॥ ६ ॥

The word that is expressed in sounds is permanent. It is associated with meaning (*artha*) from eternity. It is due to the [word] that one understands the meaning of things when one has understanding.

अद्विप्रवृत्तेरभ्यासात् प्रत्यभिज्ञानतस्तथा ।
शब्दवच्छ्रावणत्वाद्धि नित्यः शब्दोऽवसीयते ॥ ७ ॥

The word is understood to be permanent, because it is never used twice, because it can be repeated, because it allows recognition, and it is audible, just like a sound.

अनुमानात् पृथक् चासौ प्रमाणत्वात् तदन्यवत् ।
एकानेकार्थविषयप्रतिपत्तिरथापि वा ॥ ८ ॥

Moreover, it [*āgama*] is different from *anumāna*, because it is a *pramāṇa*, just like the one different from that [*pratyakṣa*]. It is also an understanding that has an object that is one or many [like *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* respectively].

अदृष्टलिङ्गसंबन्धपदार्थमतिहेतुतः ।
भिन्नगोचरधीजन्मकारणत्वादथापि वा ॥ ९ ॥

Also *āgama* is different from *anumāna*, because it gives rise to an understanding of something [such as heaven etc.] that has no visible connection to a mark, or because it gives rise to an understanding of a manifold object.

अपूर्वोऽपि क्रियाव्यङ्ग्यः क्रिया मोक्षेऽपि साधनम् ।
सोमपानादिका विद्वान् निर्जयेदन्तकं यया ॥ १० ॥

Moreover, duty (*apūrva* = *dharma*) is expressed in [ritual] action, and ritual actions such as drinking *soma* etc., bring about liberation (*mokṣa* = *apavarga*). By means of such [ritual actions] a knowing person may overcome death.

देवर्षिजुष्टशिष्टेष्टं पुराणं वर्त्म शोभनम् ।
वेदार्थबाह्यैः स्त्रीशूद्रैर्युक्तं यत् त्यज्यते त्रयी ॥ ११ ॥

The pristine glorious path [of the three Veda-s] is frequented and taught by the gods and the sages. That the three Veda-s are rejected by women and *śūdra-s* who have nothing to do with the Veda is, of course, quite logical.

यदिहास्ति तदन्यत्र यन्नेहास्ति न तत् क्वचित् ।
चतुष्टयेऽपि धर्मादौ तदेवान्यत्र दृश्यते ॥ १२ ॥

What exists here [in the Veda-s,] that [also exists] elsewhere. What does not exist here, exists nowhere. With regard to the four [aims of man's life, namely] *dharma*, [*kāma*, *artha* and *mokṣa*] — it is the same thing actually seen elsewhere.

दूषयित्वा त्रयीमार्गं हेतुभिर्हेतुवादिनः ।
अनुमानप्रधानत्वात् स्वनयं द्योतयन्ति ये ॥ १३ ॥

[Another point :] Finding faults with the three Veda-s with the help of arguments, certain logicians, putting too much emphasis on *anumāna*, celebrate their personal interpretations ;

पादस्पर्शादिवान्धानां विषमे पथि धावताम् ।
अनुमानप्रधानानां पातस्तेषां न दुर्लभः ॥ १४ ॥

But, as in the case of blind people running on an uneven path with only the contact of their feet, such people are prone to fall when they regard *anumāna* as the most important *pramāṇa*.

न चास्ति कश्चित् सर्वज्ञो नेदानीं दृश्यते यतः ।
सर्वज्ञता हि बुद्धस्य कल्पिता लोकपक्तये ॥ १५ ॥

Moreover, there exists no omniscient person at all, for such [a human being] is not seen nowadays. The [doctrine of the] omniscience of the Buddha has in fact been invented [by his followers] in order to impress people.

अप्रमाणं वचो बौद्धं कृतकत्वात् तदन्यवत् ।
असर्वज्ञश्च संबुद्धः पुरुषत्वात् तदन्यवत् ॥ १६ ॥

The word of the Buddha is no *pramāṇa*, because it is created, just like [the words] of other such [human beings]. Moreover, the Buddha is not omniscient, for he is a human being, just like others.

अप्रमाणं वचो बौद्धं त्रयीदर्शनदूषणात् ।
यद् यथोक्तं (तथोक्तं तद् यद्) हा नग्नाटदर्शनम् ॥ १७ ॥

The word of the Buddha is no *pramāṇa*, for it criticizes the theory of the three Veda-s. Any [theory] that does so is said to be [no *pramāṇa*], as, for instances, the theory of the Jainas.

Reply to the opponent's objections :

तदत्रापि परीक्षन्ते यथाभूतगवेषिणः ।
पक्षपातविषं हित्वा शब्दार्थन्यायकोविदाः ॥ १८ ॥

Those seekers of truth who are clever in figuring out the proper meaning of words abandon the poison of partiality and also investigate this in the following way.

संप्रदायानुपच्छेदादागमस्यागमत्वतः ।
सर्वस्यागमतासिद्धेः किं तत्त्वमिति धार्यताम् ॥ १९ ॥

If *āgama* has the status of *āgama* because it has been handed down without interruptions [cf. 4], then it is established that all [the 363 doctrines] are *āgama* [But this is absurd] ! One should hold on to what is true !

यत् परीक्षाक्षमं युक्त्या वचनं चेत् तदागमः ।
तदेव तावन्मीमांस्यं पश्चात् तेनोदितं हि यत् ॥ २० ॥

If a statement is logically capable of critique, then it is *āgama*. First one must find out that which is [true], and then one must, of course, [figure out,] what it means.

तत्र तत्प्रतिपक्षत्वाज्ज्ञानान्मुक्तिरितीष्यताम् ।
आमयप्रतिपक्षत्वादौषधाद् व्याधिमुक्तिवत् ॥ २१ ॥

We maintain that liberation is due to insight, because it, in this case, is an antidote [to ignorance]. It is like being free from a disease by means of medicine, because it is an antidote to sickness.

क्रियात्वान्न क्रियाभीष्टा कृषिवन्मुक्त्यवाप्तये ।
अधीत्वे सति वाच्यत्वान्मितकालत्वतोऽपि वा ॥ २२ ॥

We do not accept that a ritual [cf. 2] can lead to liberation, because it is just an activity, like ploughing. Also because it, having no understanding, can be expressed in words, or because it only lasts for a limited time.

नृवाक् चेद् दोषदुष्टत्वादप्रमाणमितीष्यते ।
सौवर्णिकादिवाक्येन हेतुः स्याद् व्यभिचारवान् ॥ २३ ॥

If you maintain that the statement of a human being cannot serve as authority, because it is defiled by [various] faults [cf. 3], then this 'reason' is not compatible with [the fact that] the words of a goldsmith and other [experts may be quite reliable].

प्रामाण्यमथ वेदस्य साध्यतेऽकर्तृकत्वतः ।
असाधारणता हेतोः स्यादसिद्धार्थतापि च ॥ २४ ॥

If, alternatively, you want to prove that the Veda has the status of *pramāṇa*, because it has no a creator, then this 'reason' is either too narrow or else it fails to make any sense [to other people].

अनुवादादकर्तृत्वे बौद्धमप्यस्त्यकर्तृकम् ।
पूर्वबौद्धाभिसंबुद्धं यतो बुद्धैरनूद्यते ॥ २५ ॥

If [the Vedic word] has no creator because it is [permanent] repetition, well, then the word of the Buddha may also be without a creator. This is because the Buddha-s just repeat what former Buddha-s have understood.

कृतकत्वानुमानाच्च पक्षबाधानुमानतः ।
कर्तुरस्मरणासिद्धेर्हेतोश्च स्यादसिद्धता ॥ २६ ॥

Still, the reason [because it has no creator] will be unestablished, because one can infer that it does have a creator, and because it cannot be proved that there is no recollection of a creator.

समन्त्रस्यैव संभूतो मन्त्रकर्तुः पुरा यदि ।
शास्त्रं वा समभिप्रेतं तत्कर्तृकमकर्तृकम् ॥ २७ ॥

Opponent : If we say that [the Veda] at first came into the possession of the creator of the *mantra*, i.e. one who had the *mantra*, will it then be acceptable to you that a sacred text with such a 'creator' does not have a creator ?

सकर्तृकत्वं शास्त्रस्य किमेवं न प्रतीयते ।
तत्सहोत्पन्नकर्तृत्वाज्जातिस्मरकृतैर्यथा ॥ २८ ॥

Reply : But, if so, why do you not acknowledge that your sacred text does have a creator ? This is because he becomes a creator at the same time [that the *mantra*] occurs, just like an activity [takes place the very moment] one recollects [an earlier] incarnation.

प्रतिपत्यानुगुण्येन वर्णाम्नायादथापि वा ।
गृह्यते वेदवाक्यानां न किं पुरुषकर्तृता ॥ २९ ॥

Or why not accept that the words of the Veda-s

actually are created by a human being, either because they are consistent with [human] understanding, or because of the tradition of language [or words] ?

इतश्च वेदवाक्यानां मता पुरुषकर्तृता ।
विवक्षितार्थधीजन्मकारणत्वाद् यथेङ्गितम् ॥ ३० ॥

We also think that the words of the Veda-s must have a human author, because they give rise to ideas about meanings that one wants to express in words. It is just like a sign.

अनुमेयश्च वेदोऽयं असत्पुरुषकर्तृकः ।
भूतहिंसासुरापानक्रियोक्तेर्मगशास्त्रवत् ॥ ३१ ॥

Moreover, one can even infer that this Veda must have an evil human being as its author [or creator] ! This is because [the Veda-s] recommend [abhorrent] rituals [such as] slaughter of animals and drinking of alcohol, just like the sacred texts of the [Persian] Maga.

विषोपयुक्तिवद्धिंसा यदि मन्त्रपरिग्रहात् ।
नाभीष्टानिष्टफलदा शास्त्रोक्तेर्वापि दानवत् ॥ ३२ ॥

Perhaps you maintain that violence (*hiṃsā*) does not give an undesirable result, either because one is protected by a mantra, as in the case of consuming poison, or it is prescribed in the holy texts, just as generosity is ?

मन्त्रकर्षणचूर्णाद्यैरागम्यागमनं हि यत् ।
तेनानेकान्तिकः पूर्वो मद्यपानेन चोत्तरः ॥ ३३ ॥

[But this is wrong :] The first [argument] is not to the point, for then one could obviously [justify] illicit intercourse by means of *mantra-s*, seduction, magic, powder etc. The second argument [in 32] is also not to the point [for generosity may be associated] with consumption of alcohol.

आयुच्छेदप्रयोगत्वादिष्टो मन्त्रपरिग्रहः ।
अनिष्टफलदः कर्तुर्विषशस्त्रप्रयोगवत् ॥ ३४ ॥

If one wants to protect oneself with a *mantra* in order to commit a murder, it will have undesirable results for the person responsible. It is as [dangerous as] to employ poison and weapons !

स्वशास्त्र एव चेदुक्ते सिद्धः संसारमोचकः ।
सामान्येन च हेतूक्तौ स्यादन्यतरसिद्धता ॥ ३५ ॥

Opponent : But what if it says so in our [own] sacred text ?

Reply : Then it is also perfectly all right to [murder people in order to] liberate them from *saṃsāra* ! But if the reason is stated in a general sense, would it then be established for any oneof us ? [No ! so it proves nothing.]

यज्ञे पशूनां हिंसा चेन्नानिष्टफलदायिनी।
तादर्थ्याद् ब्राह्मणार्था हि यथेष्टा पचनक्रिया॥ ३६॥

If [the opponent thinks] that it does not give an undesirable result to slaughter cattle during a sacrifice, because one does it for the same purpose that one does something for the sake of a priest. It is, for instance, allright to cook food for him.

भोक्त्रर्थाः पशवोऽभीष्टा भोग्यत्वात् तद् यथाङ्गना।
तस्माद् यज्ञार्थतासिद्धेः पशूनां हेत्वसिद्धता॥ ३७॥

Reply : This must mean that animals are created for the sake of those who eat them, for they have to be enjoyed, just like a woman. Therefore it has not been established that animals [have been created] for the purpose of sacrifice. So the reason [for the creation of animals, namely sacrifice] remains unestablished.

अन्तर्वेद्यां च हिंसेयं संचिन्त्या भ्रान्तिमारणात्।
अनिष्टफ(ल)दा कर्तुरायत्यां तद् यथेतरा॥ ३८॥

Even in a [sacred place such as] Antarvedī this kind of violence (in *yajña*) gives an undesirable result in the future for the person responsible, because it is deliberate cold-blooded murder, just as other kinds [of violence] !

इतश्चानिष्टफलदा हिंसा यज्ञ इतीष्यते।
संचिन्त्य जीवितोच्छेदि दुःखाधानाद् यथेतरा॥ ३९॥

Another reason why we think that violence during a sacrifice has an undesirable result, is that deliberate murder inflicts suffering [upon its victims,] just like other kinds [of violence or slaughter].

यादृक् फलमधिष्ठाने दृष्टे हि कुरुते क्रिया ।
कर्तुस्तादृगदृष्टेऽपि हिंसा वा तद् यथेतरा ॥ ४० ॥

So, surely, whether the authority is seen or not seen, a ritual action brings about a result that corresponds to [the evil action] of one who commits it. This is because it is motivated by violence just like other [ritual actions].

व्याख्यातं मद्यपानादि प्रत्याख्यानाद् यथोदितात् ।
मद्यं न मदहेतुत्वात् सेव्यं धुस्तूरकादिवत् ॥ ४१ ॥

Consumption of alcohol etc. is explained by a prohibition which has the same purpose as [above, namely to prevent undesirable results :] One should not consume alcohol, because it causes intoxication, just as a poisonous apple does.

(न मद्य)पानं निर्दोषं यज्ञे मन्त्रपरिग्रहात् ।
मद्यत्वात् तद् यथान्यत्र दृष्टो मन्त्रपरिग्रहात् ॥ ४२ ॥

One cannot render consumption of alcohol harmless by protecting oneself with a *mantra* during the sacrifice, for [alcohol may still] make one intoxicated.

Thus, for instance, in other cases one is seen to [be intoxicated] because one assumes the protection of a *mantra* !

दृष्टं न लिङ्गमस्तीति यदि स्वर्गाद्यनिश्चयः ।
लिङ्गादनुमि(त)त्वाच्च निश्चेतुर्निश्चितेर्न किम् ॥ ४३ ॥

If [the opponent thinks, cf. 5] that one cannot be certain of heaven and [*apūrva* = *dharma*], since [without the *āgama* of the Veda-s] there is no visible sign, can one who is certain not have a certain understanding by inferring [these things] from a sign ? [In other words, the validity of *āgama* must be ascertained by means of *anumāna*].

अद्विप्रवृत्तेरित्यत्र दीपेऽप्यद्विप्रवृत्तितः ।
व्यभिचारितया हेतोः शब्दनित्यत्वमप्यसत् ॥ ४४ ॥

To say that the word is permanent because it never occurs twice [cf. 7], is also wrong, because the reason is uncertain, since [for instance, the same] lamp also never occurs twice. [Still it is not, on that account, permanent].

सत्त्वादनित्यः शब्दोऽयं क्रियावत् किं न गृह्यते ।
अथ(वा दे)हचेष्टावद्धीहेतुत्वाद् विनाश्ययम् ॥ ४५ ॥

Why do you not accept that the word is impermanent, because it exists, just like a ritual action ? Or that it is impermanent, because it gives rise to ideas, just as the movements of the body ?

अभ्यासप्रत्यभिज्ञानहेत्वोरन्वयहीनता ।
नाभ्यासप्रत्यभिज्ञानेऽनित्येऽदृष्टे क्वचिद् यथा ॥ ४६ ॥

The two other reasons [given above in 7, namely that the word is permanent because] it can be repeated [or studied] and recognized, are not appropriate, for repetition [or study] and recognition are always experienced to be impermanent !

शब्दत्वनित्यतासिद्धेः शब्दत्वं न निदर्शनम् ।
अभिव्यक्तिनिषेधाच्च ध्वनिव्यङ्ग्यो न चाप्ययम् ॥ ४७ ॥

Since it hasnot been established that the word is permanent 'tobe [like] a word' [cf. 7] cannot be used as an example. Moreover, the word cannot be 'expressed in sounds', because 'expression' [manifestation in general] has been refuted [already as being quite impossible]

श्रवणो यदि शब्दस्ते ध्वनिव्यङ्ग्यः कथं मतः ।
प्रतिपत्तिस्तु संकेतादसौ शब्दः प्रसज्यते ॥ ४८ ॥

If you think that the word is audible [cf. 7], why do you also maintain that it must be expressed in sounds [cf. 6] ? [This is unnecessary absurd]. The understanding of [the meaning of a word] depends, in our opinion, on convention. It follows as a word.

संकेतासंभवादादौ प्रतिपत्तिर्न युज्यते ।
संसारवदनादित्वात् संकेतस्यानुवादतः ॥ ४९ ॥

If there is no convention to begin with, then understanding is not possible at all. [Understanding arises] from the repetition of a convention, since this, like *saṃsāra*, is without beginning.

अनुमाने प्रमाणत्वं भिन्नं च न तदात्मनः ।
अतोऽनैकान्तिको हेतुः प्रमाणत्वादितीरितः ॥ ५० ॥

Moreover, what gives *anumāna* the status of *pramāṇa* is that it is not different from the one [of *āgama*] that has the same nature. Therefore, the argument mentioned [in 8] 'because it is a *pramāṇa*', is uncertain.

भिन्नगोचरतासिद्धेर्हेतोश्च स्यादसिद्धता ।
भिन्नगोचरधीजन्मकारणत्वस्य नेतरः ॥ ५१ ॥

Moreover, the [other] reason [for saying that *āgama* is different from anumāna], namely because it has a different object, it gives rise to ideas of manifold objects [cf. 9], is also not valid. [You may think so] but others [such as the Buddhists] do not !

अनेकार्थविनाभावादनुमानमपीष्यते ।
नैकार्थप्रतिपद्धेतुरस्माच्छब्दान्न भिद्यते ॥ ५२ ॥

Since it is impossible without a plurality, we also maintain that *anumāna* gives rise to an understanding of a manifold object. Therefore [we do] not differentiate it [*anumāna*] from language (*śābda* = *āgama*) [which

is, in fact, contained in *anumāna*].

अदृष्टलिङ्गसंबन्धे परार्थादनुमानतः ।
प्रतिपत्तिर्यतो बोध्ये तस्मादर्थान्तरं न सः ॥ ५३ ॥

Since one can understand an understandable object with no visible connection to a mark by inferring it from something else [that is visible], therefore it [*āgama*] is not absolutely different from [*anumāna*] !

नानुमानात् पृथक्छाब्दः परोक्षमतिहेतुतः ।
संबन्धस्मृत्यपेक्षत्वादनुमानं यथा स्वतः ॥ ५४ ॥

Moreover, since it is the cause of an understanding of something beyond perception, language (*śābda* = *āgama*) is not different from *anumāna*. This is because it, like *anumāna* itself, depends on recollection of a connection between [a mark and that which may be inferred from that mark, based on previous experience].

नापूर्वोऽपि क्रियाव्यङ्ग्यः शब्दव्यक्तिनिषेधवत् ।
घटवद् वाप्यभिव्यक्तेरपूर्वोऽनित्य इष्यताम् ॥ ५५ ॥

Moreover, *apūrva* is not suggested in ritual action [cf. 10], [for this can be refuted] just like the manifestation of the word is refuted. Also, we think that *apūrva* is impermanent because, like a jar, it is something manifest.

अनित्यं सोमपानादिक्रि(या)फलमितीष्यते।
क्रियांफ(ल)त्वात् तन्नेष्टा कामनैमित्तिकं फलम्॥ ५६॥

[Moreover], we maintain that the result of ritual actions such as drinking *soma* is impermanent. This is because it is the outcome of an action, as for instance the result of [an activity] motivated by desire.

न मोक्षप्रापिका युक्ता सोमपानादिकी क्रिया।
क्रियात्वात् तद् यथा नेष्टा कामनैमित्तिकी क्रिया॥ ५७॥

A ritual action such as drinking of *soma* cannot possibly make one obtain liberation because it is an action. Likewise, an action motivated by desire is not acceptable.

न जयर्त्यन्तकं तस्मादेनं पन्थानमाश्रितः।
परप्रणेयैर्जुष्टोऽयं विचाराक्षमबुद्धिभिः॥ ५८॥

Therefore, by following this path [of the three Veda-s, [cf. 10 &11] one cannot overcome death. It is only accepted by [people] seduced by others, [people] with minds unable to analyze [things correctly].

त्रयीमार्गप्रणेतॄणां ब्रह्मकेशवशूलिनाम्।
दृष्ट्वा क्लेशात्मिकां चर्यां युक्तं यत् त्यज्यते त्रयी॥ ५९॥

It is quite logical to reject the three Veda-s [cf. 11] when one notices the thoroughly vicious behaviour of the prophets of the path of the three Veda-s, i.e.

Brahmā, Viṣṇu (Kṛṣṇa) and Śiva.

ज्ञानेन ज्ञानिनः पापं दहत्यग्निरिवेन्धनम् ।
अतस्तेजोविशेषाच्च न तेषां प्रत्यवायिता ॥ ६० ॥

As fire burns fuel, thus men of insight [burn] evil karma with their insight. So it must be due to a special power that they do not face an evil destiny.

यत् क्लेशदहनायालं तज्ज्ञानं ज्ञानिनो विदुः ।
नातः प्रकुरुते पापं ज्ञानी तद्धेत्वसंभवात् ॥ ६१ ॥

The kind of insight that men of insight acknowledge is one that is capable of burning away the vices (*kleśa*). Therefore a man of insight does not commit any evil. This is because the cause [of evil, namely ignorance] cannot possibly arise [in him].

सिद्धियोगो न लिप्येत कर्मणा पातकेन वा ।
इति ब्रुवाणैः सन्मार्गान्निष्टैरन्येऽपि नाशिताः ॥ ६२ ॥

Others have been corrupted by those who have deviated from the right way claiming that the yoga of perfection (*siddhiyoga*) is not sullied even by a criminal action [such as the murder of a priest].

तत्त्वार्थदर्शनी बुद्धिः ब्रह्मादीनां न चेष्यते ।
तिलोत्तमायां संरक्तौ कथं ब्रह्मत्रिशूलिनौ ॥ ६३ ॥

Nor do we believe that the mind of Brahmā etc. sees

things as they actually are : How in the world could Brahmā and Śiva be [so stupid as to] fall in love with Tilottamā !

पूर्वं क्रोधाग्निना दग्धो ददाह त्रिपुरं कथम् ।
पूष्णः शशास दन्तांश्च भगस्यापि च लोचने ॥ ६४ ॥

How could [Śiva] burn Tripura without first havng been influenced by the fire of anger ? Or how could he knock out the teeth of Pūṣan, or the two eyes of Bhaga?

ब्रह्महा मद्यपः कामी दृष्टतत्त्वो यदीश्वरः ।
का कथादृष्टतत्त्वानां तत्पद्धत्यनुगामिनाम् ॥ ६५ ॥

If God can kill a priest, drink alcohol and be in love, and still can have seen the truth, what can one say of those who, following his path, have not seen the truth !

कथं च केशवः केशिचाणूरनरकादिकान् ।
व्ययोजयेदकारुण्यादसुभिर्वसुभिश्च तान् ॥ ६६ ॥

And how could Viṣṇu (or Kṛṣṇa) without mercy deprive Keśin, Cāṇūra, (demon) Naraka and others of their lives and their possessions !

पराङ्गनाधनादायी मद्यपः प्राणिघातकः ।
दृष्टतत्त्वो यदि हरिर्जितं शवरतस्करैः ॥ ६७ ॥

If Hari [Viṣṇu / Kṛṣṇa] is [considered] to have seen

the truth when he takes other men's women and goods, when he drinks alcohol and kills living beings, then he cannot compete with bandits and robbers !

प्रजापालनदक्षत्वादसुरान् सुरकण्टकान् ।
नातो दोषो घ्नतोऽप्यस्ति तस्य चेद् धर्मगुप्तये ॥ ६८ ॥

Opponent : If he is good at protecting people, then it is not a sin for him to kill demons who are enemies of gods as long as it is his desire to protect *dharma* (*dharmagupti*).

परस्त्रीद्रविणादानमायाशाठ्यप्रवृत्तयः ।
किं न त्यक्ता हि वाञ्छास्ति तस्य चेद् धर्मगुप्तये ॥ ६९ ॥

Reply : But if it is his desire to protect *dharma,* why not abandon actions such as adultery, theft, deceit and dishonesty ?

अधर्मश्चेन्द्रियो नास्य कथं तत् सृष्टिकारिता ।
अदृष्टदोषैरज्ञत्वात् तत्सृष्टिरथवा कृता ॥ ७० ॥

But if *adharma* is not his domain, why is he responsible for its creation ? Or has it [*adharma*] been created by [gods] who failed to recognize their own faults because they were ignorant ?

तृष्णया पाति लोकं वा तृष्णादासः कथं कृती ।
कारुण्याच्चेत् कथं लोकं मायया सममूमुहत् ॥ ७१ ॥

If it is out of desire that [God] protects the world, how can he, being a slave of desire, be an accomplished [and perfect being as a god should be] ? If on the other hand, he [does so] out of compassion, why did he always confuse the world with all his tricks ?

किं नासुरेषु कारुण्यं मृत्युजात्यादिदुःखिषु ।
सर्वत्र समदर्शित्वान्नारिसंज्ञास्य युज्यते ॥ ७२ ॥

Why does he not have compassion for all the living beings who suffer from death, rebirth etc. ? Since he [is supposed] to regard everything with equanimity, it is not proper for him to have an enemy.

रागद्वेषादिशबलं किमीदृक् चरितं हरेः ।
अनार्यचरितैश्चैवं कथं स पुरुषोत्तमः ॥ ७३ ॥

How can such a behaviour that is so filled with desire, hatred and [ignorance] be ascribed to Hari ! And how can he be a superman when he behaves in a manner so unworthy of a noble man. [cf. *Bhagavadgītā* II.2 and XV.18] !

अन्यैवासौ हरेर्मूर्तिः शैवा यदि विकल्प्यते ।
दृष्ट्वा हि यतयो यां न पुनर्यान्ति पुनर्भवम् ॥ ७४ ॥

If [our opponents, cf. *Bhagavadgītā* IX.11 etc.] imagine that Hari has an entirely different body that is blissful — it is, of course, the one that ascetics see and are no more reborn.

न सती नासती चासौ नासौ सदसती मता ।
तस्मात् सत्त्वादसत्त्वाच्च सदसत्त्वाच्च सा परा ॥ ७५ ॥

It is considered not to exist, not not to exist, not to exist and not to exist, and so it is beyond being, non-being, and being and non-being.

मत्स्यादिमूर्तेः सान्या चेदन्यत्वादच्युता न सा ।
अनन्यत्वादनन्यापि साप्यशान्ता यथेतरा ॥ ७६ ॥

Then, if it is [considered] to be different from the material forms such as fish etc. it cannot, because it is different, be permanent. But if it is the same, because it is not different, then, like the other form, it is also not blissful !

अथाप्यशान्ता तस्यैका शान्तान्यैकात्मनः सतः ।
बन्धकी नाम साध्वी स्याच्छरीरार्धेन संयता ॥ ७७ ॥

If one, on the other hand, [assumes] that this real soul [has two bodies], one that is not blissful and one that is blissful, then his 'chaste wife' is actually unchaste, becuase she is only devoted to one half of his body !

सदादिशब्दावाच्यत्वात् परा चेति न युज्यते ।
सतो हि परता युक्ता युक्ता कारणतापि च ॥ ७८ ॥

Also, if one cannot say that it exists etc. [cf. 75], it is not logical to speak of a 'higher' [form of Hari]. Of course, for something to be 'higher' it must exist, and for

something to be a cause [of creation, it must] also [exist].

कारणत्वप्रतिक्षेपादन्यत्वस्य च पूर्ववत् ।

न कारणं न चान्यासौ नाच्युतश्चाप्यजातितः ॥ ७९ ॥

Since we have already refuted that [God] is the creator of the world, [the refutation of his] being different [from the world] is also like before [as in Ch. III etc.]. He is not the cause [of the world] and [his higher] is not different [from his material form]. Moreover, he is not immortal, for he is not even born !

अच्युतो यदि भावः स्यात् स नष्टः स्याद् रसादिवत् ।

अच्युतो यद्यभावः स्यादसंश्चासौ खपुष्पवत् ॥ ८० ॥

If 'immortal' is something real [that, such as always changes], then it is destroyed like taste etc. If 'immortal' is some- thing unreal, then it is as unreal as a 'flower in the sky'.

सदसत्ता न युक्तैवं यथाग्नेरुष्णशीतते ।

अथाप्यनभिलाप्यः स्याद् युक्तोऽसौ कथमच्युतः ॥ ८१ ॥

It is not possible for him to exist and not to exist, just as it is [not possible] for fire to be hot and cold. Again, how can he possibly be [spoken of as] immortal [if he is also said] to be unspeakable (inexpressible) !

न चास्यानभिलाप्यत्वमात्मत्वात् तन्निषेधतः ।
अच्युतेर्नाच्युतः कश्चिदस्ति चेन्नाच्युतोऽच्युतः ॥ ८२ ॥

Nor can he be unspeakable, for this can be refuted, just as the self [was refuted in Ch.VIII]. But can he not somehow, due to immortality, remain immortal ? — If so, as immortal will he not [always remain] immortal ? [There is no example of this, so it is impossible].

मूर्तिरन्या च या तस्य क्लृप्ता व्यसनगुप्तये ।
कथमालम्बमानास्तां मुच्यन्ते निर्मुमुक्षवः ॥ ८३ ॥

[So there is no immortal form of Hari :] So how can [yogi-s] longing for liberation become liberated by taking as object [of meditation] this other [material] form of his which has only been introduced to cover up a calamity [in your system] !

इन्द्रि(याणीन्द्रि)यार्थेभ्यः कूर्मोऽङ्गानीव संहरन् ।
ओंकारं व्याहरन् स्मृत्या तद्भक्तो मुच्यते यदि ॥ ८४ ॥

If [the opponent] thinks that a devotee of him [Hari] is liberated by withdrawing his senses from the objects of the senses — as a tortoise [withdraws] its limbs — and by mindfully uttering the syllable *Oṃ* [then he is mistaken] :

मुक्तिर्न हरिभक्तानां युज्यते हरिदर्शनात् ।
विकल्पस्मृतियोगत्वात् तद् यथा हरिदर्शनात् ॥ ८५ ॥

The devotees of Hari are not liberated by visualizing Hari, for they are still bound by ideas and recollections, because they visualize Hari.

निर्विकल्पापि धीर्नेष्टा योगयुक्तस्य मुक्तये ।

निमित्तग्रहणान्मिथ्या किं पुनः परिकल्पिता ॥ ८६ ॥

Nor do we accept that the mind of a yogi will become free even if it is non-conceptual. This is because it falsely still holds on to signs. So much the more a mind that is full of images !

रागादिसमुदाचाराद् ब्रह्मादीनां कि(रा)तवत् ।

तत्त्वचिन्तां निराकर्ष्यः संदेहो न हि कारणे ॥ ८७ ॥

Since they are deeply steeped in desire and other [passions], like primitive tribesmen, Brahmā and the other gods do not, of course, have that curiosity about causality which ought to draw it towards scientific studies !

तथ्यधर्मोपदेशेन प्रतिपत्त्यापि वा स्वयम् ।

धर्मगुप्तिर्भवन्ती स्यात् सा द्विधाप्येषु दुःस्थिता ॥ ८८ ॥

Real protection of *dharma* (*dharmagupti*) would consist either in teaching the true *dharma* [to others] or in realizing it personally. But with regard to gods, it is, in both cases, in a bad state !

सर्वे च सृष्टिहेतुत्वं ब्रुवते स्वात्मनः पृथक् ।
कस्यात्र वचनं भूतमभूतं वा विकल्प्यताम् ॥ ८९ ॥

Each one of the gods claims that he alone is the cause of creation. So here one must decide whose word is true, and whose is not true !

तदेकत्वाददोषश्चेद् ब्रह्मापि ब्रह्महा कथम् ।
एकत्वप्रतिषेधाच्च तदेकत्वमयुक्तिमत् ॥ ९० ॥

If one says that there is no problem since they are all one [and the same god], how can it be that only Brahmā is [said to be] a killer of Brahmā. If one denies that they are one and the same [as done in Ch. III], then their unity is illogical.

आत्मभेदेऽपि चायोगात् त्रितयं चेशनं कथम् ।
दुःखहेतौ विमूढानां तच्छान्त्युक्तौ कथास्तु का ॥ ९१ ॥

But assuming that there is no essential difference [among the three gods], how can one's divinity be a trinity? Since they do not know the cause of suffering, how can they tell us how to get relief from it ?

वेदयोगोपदेशादि तदुक्तेर्विकलत्वतः ।
न तावत् तथ्यधर्मोक्त्या शक्तास्ते धर्मगुप्तये ॥ ९२ ॥

Since the teachings etc. in the Veda-s and Yoga are deficient when they are talking about this [suffering etc.], it cannot, first of all [cf. 88] be by teaching the true

dharma that they are [considered] able to protect the *dharma.*

प्रतिपद्विकलत्वाच्च नालं नेतुं परान् शमम् ।

यथा नेता स्वमार्गेण प्रपातपतितः परान् ॥ ९३ ॥

Moreover, since their personal understanding is defic ient, they are not able to lead others to peace [and freedom from suffering]. It would be as if a guide who has fallen into a precipice were to lead others along his own path !

त्रय्यां हेतुविपर्यस्तैः कल्पनाजालकल्पितैः ।

अयुक्तियुक्तं मीमांस्यं युक्तं यत् त्यज्यते त्रयी ॥ ९४ ॥

One must scrutinize the mass of bad logic in the three Veda-ś put together by mistaken arguments that have been arranged by the web of conceptual constructions ! [If one does so] it is logical that the three Veda-s are rejected !

नेशादिकारणं विश्वं युक्तमित्युदितं पुरा ।

सत्यपीशादिकर्तृत्वे किं हि तत् कृतकं भवेत् ॥ ९५ ॥

I have already stated earlier [Ch. III] that the universe does not have God etc, as its cause. Even if one assumes God etc. as its cause, what, exactly, has he created ?

आत्मा तावदजन्यत्वान्न तत्कृतक इष्यते ।
धर्माधर्मौ न तस्येष्टौ तद्गुणत्वाद् यथाधुना ॥ १६ ॥

First of all, it cannot be maintained that the soul has been created by him. This is because it cannot be created at all. Nor can it be maintained that he is responsible for [*dharma* and *adharma*], for they [have always been] his attributes, just as they are so today.

देहोऽपि ताभ्यां निर्वृत्तः सुखदुःखोपलब्धये ।
देहोऽपि देहिनां तस्माद् युक्तो नेशादिकर्तृ(कः) ॥ १७ ॥

Moreover, the body [is necessary] for perceiving pleasure and pain is produced by those two [*dharma* and *adharma*]. Therefore the body that living beings are in possession of, cannot possibly have been created by one of the gods.

कल्पादौ देहिनां देहः प्राक्कृतादृष्टहेतुतः ।
सुखाद्युत्पत्तिहेतुत्वात् तद् यथाद्यतनी तनुः ॥ १८ ॥

The body that incarnated beings possess at the beginning of a *kalpa* must be caused by invisible [*dharma* and *adharma*] done previously. This is because [it is the body] that is the cause of the arising of pleasure and [pain] just as the present body.

ईश्वरस्य यदैश्वर्यं तच्चेत् पुण्यकृतं भवेत् ।
तत्पुण्यपरतन्त्रत्वादीश्वरः स्यादनीश्वरः ॥ १९ ॥

If the almighty status of the almighty God is supposed to be created by good karma, then the almighty is, *eo ipso*, not almighty, since he must depend on that good karma!

ईश्वर(स्य यदैश्वर्य)मकस्माच्चेत् तदिष्यते।

तस्यान्यैरपि सामान्यादीश्वरः स्यादनीश्वरः ॥ १०० ॥

If the almighty status of the almighty God is supposed to be entirely accidental, then he must have this in common with others also. Therefore the almighty God is not almighty !

ईश्वरो ज्ञस्वभावश्चेत् तेन तत्कर्तृकं जगत्।

कारणानुविधायित्वात् सर्वं ते चेतनं जगत् ॥ १०१ ॥

If you say that God consists in spirit, then the world created by him must also, according to you, consist entirely in spirit. This is because [an effect] must be in conformance with its cause.

ईश्वरो यदि हेतुः स्याज्जगत् स्यादणिमादिवत्।

ईश्वरो वा न हेतुः स्याज्जगच्चेन्नाणिमादिवत् ॥ १०२ ॥

If God is its cause, the world would have had to possess subtlety and [the seven other attributes of God, cf. VIII.8]. In other words, if the world does not possess subtlety etc., God could not be its cause.

ईश्वरः कर्मकर्ता चेत् पच्यते न (रकेष्वपि ।
तदन्येषां हि) पाके वा कृतनाशाकृतागमौ ॥ १०३ ॥

If God were responsible for doing karma, he would also have to boil in the hells. If one assumes that it is others than himself that have to boil [in the hells], then actions done are lost, and actions not done come back [This is obviously against the law of karma] !

दुःखहेतोश्च नित्यत्वात् तद्दुःखोपशमः कुतः ।
नोष्णाव्युपशमो दृष्टो ज्वलत्येव विभावसौ ॥ १०४ ॥

Moreover, assuming that the cause of suffering is permanent, how then can such suffering be extinguished? Clearly, as long as a fire is burning its heat is not extinguished !

एकस्य वा विचित्रस्य कथं कार्यविचित्रता ।
नापि चेच्छादिवैचित्र्याद् युक्तैकस्य विचित्रता ॥ १०५ ॥

Moreover, if God is one and not manifold, how can he be responsible for a manifold effect ? Nor can the manifoldness that he, as one, [is considered responsible for] possibly be due to his manifold desires etc.

नित्योऽनवयवः सूक्ष्मः कारणं जगतः किल ।
एकः सर्वगतश्चेति किमाश्च(र्यं ततोऽपरम्) ॥ १०६ ॥

If the cause of the world, as claimed, is a god that is permanent, without parts and subtle, what can be more

odd than to say that he is also one and omnipresent ?

क्रीडार्थं तन्निमित्तं चेत् तस्याः प्रीतिफलं किल।
प्रीतौ स्वपरतन्त्रत्वादीश्वरः स्यादनीश्वरः ॥ १०७ ॥

If his motive for this is allegedly to play, then the result of such [a play] must be pleasure. Since pleasure only depends on itself [for motivation], the almighty god cannot be almighty [since, as said, he is subject to pleasure].

अन्याऽन्यभक्षणाद् भीतैस्तिर्यग्भिर्दुर्लभोत्सवैः।
निष्पेषच्छेददाहादिदुःखार्तैर्नारकैरपि ॥ १०८ ॥

नृभिर्जन्मजरारोगभयशोकक्लमार्दितैः।
प्रीयते यो नमस्तस्मै रुद्रायान्वर्थसंज्ञिने ॥ १०९ ॥

Homage to the [terrible god] Rudra whose name corresponds to what he actually is : He delights in the hapless animals that are afraid of being devoured by one another, and also in the inhabitants of hell who are tor-mented by clashings, cuttings, burnings etc., [and he also delights in] human beings haunted by rebirth, old age, disease, fear, sorrow and exhaustion.

कृपणा धनिनो यद् वा परान्नादाश्च सात्त्विकाः।
स्वर्गे चाधर्मिणः केचिद् व्यक्तमीश्वरचेष्टितम् ॥ ११० ॥

It is obviously the whim of God that some miserly

men are rich, that some good men live as parasites, and that some immoral people [are reborn] in heaven !

अल्पायुषो गुणधना दुर्वृत्ताश्च चिरायुषः ।
दातारश्चाल्पविभवा व्यक्तमीश्वरचेष्टितम् ॥ १११ ॥

It is obviously the whim of God that men rich in virtues have a short life, that rogues have a long life, and that generous people have little wealth !

बौद्धा हि सुखिनः केचित् (तद्) भक्ता दुःखिनश्च किम् ।
ईश्वराज्ञाविधानाच्च पुण्यभाक् किं न पापकृत् ॥ ११२ ॥

Some Buddhists are, naturally, happy, but why are [some of] their devotees suffering ? Why do some good people, following the commandments of God, not commit evil ?

वैचित्र्यकर्मणोऽज्ञस्य तद्धेतुत्वेन वाच्यता ।
एतेन सृष्टिकर्तृत्वं प्रत्युक्तं ब्रह्मकृष्णयोः ॥ ११३ ॥

The answer to one who does not understand manifoldness and karma is that it [karma] is its cause. Hereby I have refuted that Brahmā and Kṛṣṇa are responsible for the creation [of the world etc., cf. 95].

संयमितमतिद्वारः स्थापयित्वा शिवे मनः ।
तथोंकारमभिध्यायन् धारयन् धारणां हृदि ॥ ११४ ॥

क्षित्यादिधारणाभ्यासात् प्राक्समाहितमानसः ।
ईशे प्रसन्ने दुःखान्तं गच्छतीत्येतदप्यसत् ॥ ११५ ॥

It is also wrong to think as follows [in the *Śivatantra*]: Having closed the door of the mind, [the yogi] places his mind in Śiva. Then he meditates on the syllable *Oṃ* while fixing his concentration in his heart.When one has thus first concentrated one's mind by trying hard to keep it concentrated on earth etc., one becomes free from suffer-ing, when the lord [Śiva] is propitious.

मनोज्ञानोदयो यावत् तावन्मुक्तिर्न युज्यते ।
मनोज्ञानोदयात् पूर्वं यथा मुक्तिर्न युज्यते ॥ ११६ ॥

[It is wrong, for] as long as a mental cognition arises there cannot possibly be liberation. Likewise there cannot possibly be liberation before a mental cognition arises.

मुक्तिर्नेश्वरभक्तानां युज्यते स्थाणुदर्शनात् ।
उपलम्भविहारित्वात् तद्यथा स्थाणुदर्शनात् ॥ ११७ ॥

It is illogical for the devotees of God to become liberated by seeing [an image of] Śiva, because [their mind] is fixed on an object, just as when they see an image.

दुःखे हेतुर्यदीशः स्यान्नित्यत्वात् सोऽप्रतिक्रियः ।
अतो दुःखान्तगमनं नेश्वरादस्ति कस्यचित् ॥ ११८ ॥

Moreover, if God were the cause of suffering, then it cannot be counteracted, because it is permanent. Therefore it is not [possible] for any [devotee of God] to reach the end of suffering by [seeing] God.

एतेन शेषाः प्रत्युक्ता ब्रह्मविष्ण्वात्मवादिनः ।
प्रीतिश्चैवमयुक्तत्वान्नेशादौ धीयते धियः ॥ ११९ ॥

Thus the remaining adherents of Brahmā, Viṣṇu and the Soul have been refuted. And so one should not take any pleasure of mind in God etc., for that would be illogical.

पापप्रक्षालनं चाद्भिः शुभादिक्रयविक्रयम् ।
दृष्ट्वा दुर्विहितं त्रय्यां युक्तं यत् त्यज्यते त्रयी ॥ १२० ॥

Moreover, when one sees that it is recommended in the three Veda-s that one washes away one's sins with water as a sort of trade in good and [bad karma], it is logical that the three Veda-s are rejected.

पापं प्रक्षाल्यते नाद्भिरस्पृष्टेरनिदर्शनात् ।
अक्लेदाद् वासनाधानात् स्मृतिज्ञानशुभादिवत् ॥ १२१ ॥

Sins [bad karma] cannot be washed away with water. This is because it cannot be touched, it cannot be seen, it cannot be moistened, and because it is determined by mental impressions just like memory, knowledge etc

न पापं पातयत्यम्भः पौष्करं जाह्नवादि वा ।
स्पृश्यत्वात् क्लेदनाच्चापि गृहस्यन्दिकपूयवत् ॥ १२२ ॥

Water from the Puṣkara (*tīrtha*), the Ganges etc., cannot remove one's sins. This is because it can be touched and because it can be moistened, just like the stinking drainage water in the house.

अवगाहादिना क्षये प्राक्कृतापुण्यकर्मणाम् ।
कृततीर्थाभिषेकानां दुःखं न स्यादहेतुकम् ॥ १२३ ॥

If by bathing [in a river etc.], one could get rid of one's bad karma done earlier would this not create unfounded suffering for [innocent people] who make an ablution [at the same] bathing-place !

न च (कर्म)क्षये चापि न कश्चित् पातकी भवेत् ।
संशुच्यत्यन्तरात्माद्भिरित्युक्तिश्चेत् तदप्यसत् ॥ १२४ ॥

Opponent : But assuming that karma cannot be destroyed, then nobody can get rid of his sins ! It is the inner soul that is affected by the 'water' [of ablution].

Reply : If you say so, this is also wrong.

सन्तानान्तरसंक्रान्तं न पापमिति गृह्यते ।
अमूर्तत्वाद् यथा रागद्वेषमोहाद्यसंक्रमः ॥ १२५ ॥

It is inconceivable that a sin is transferred from the soul of one person to that of another. This is because [sin, as bad karma] is not something material. Likewise,

desire, hatred, delusion etc., cannot be transferred [from one soul to another].

न दानग्रहणं युक्तं पुण्यादेरिति निश्चयम् ।
चित्तेन संप्रयोगित्वात् तद् यथा सुखदुःखयोः ॥ १२६ ॥

One can be sure that it is not possible to give and receive good and [bad karma]. This is because it is bound up with the mind. The same goes for pleasure and pain.

ब्रह्मलोकादिगमनं ज्वलनादिप्रपाततः ।
दृष्ट्वा दुर्विहितं त्रय्यां युक्तं यत् त्यज्यते त्रयी ॥ १२७ ॥

Seeing, in the three Veda-s, the bad rule that one can go to the world of Brahmā etc., by hurling oneself into flames etc., it is logical that the three Veda-s are rejected.

हेतुर्नाग्निप्रपातादि ब्रह्मलोकाद्यवाप्तये ।
(प्राणबाधे कारणत्वा)च्छलभादिप्रपातवत् ॥ १२८ ॥

Throwing oneself into a fire etc., is not the cause of obtaining the world of Brahmā etc., this is because one only brings harm upon oneself, just as when a night-moth throws [itself into a fire].

नान्नपानपरित्यागः स्वर्गप्रापक इष्यते ।
क्षुत्संतापादिहेतुत्वादनिच्छानशनादिवत् ॥ १२९ ॥

Nor do we accept that abstention from food and drinking can bring one to heaven. This is because it only brings about hunger, pain etc., just as in the case of anorexia etc.

अभोजनादौ पुण्यं च त्यागात् पापनिवृत्तिवत् ।
सत्यत्यागादिभिर्हेतोः स्यादेवं व्यभिचारिता ॥ १३० ॥

Opponent : But it is good karma not to eat etc., for it is a kind of renunciation, just as when one abandons evil. Reply : If so, your argument is rendered inconclusive by the fact that one can renounce truth etc. [is a bad thing].

भुक्तित्यागो न पुण्याय यत् क्रियेयमपातका ।
यच्छुभमनस्कारस्य त्यक्तमनसिकारवत् ॥ १३१ ॥

Abstention from food does not [in itself] lead one to good karma, for [in itself] such an action [as eating food] is not sinful. It would be like a man of good intentions having abstained from his intentions !

त्रिकोटिशुद्धं यन्मांसं न तद् भक्षितमेनसे ।
रसादिपरिणामित्वाद् भैक्षान्नं न यथैनसे ॥ १३२ ॥

It is not to be considered a sin to eat meat if only it is pure from the three points of view. This is because [meat is only] a transformation of juice etc. Likewise it is not a sin to eat begged food.

न मांसभक्षणं भोक्तुं भुज्यतेऽपापकारणात् ।
क्षुत्प्रतीकारहेतुत्वाद् यदृच्छागतभक्तवत् ॥ १३३ ॥

It is not from an evil motive that one is inclined to eat meat, because it is in order to counteract hunger, as in the case of a meal obtained unexpectedly.

अशुचित्वादभक्ष्यं चेन्मांसं कायोऽपि चिन्त्यताम् ।
बीजस्थानादुपस्तम्भादशुचिर्विट्कृमिर्यथा ॥ १३४ ॥

If you think that meat is not to be eaten because it is impure, then think of your own body also. It is caused and supported by seeds — just as an impure worm feeding on ordure.

शुक्रादिसंभवादेव मत्स्यमांसं विगर्हितम् ।
तद् घृतक्षीरादिहेतोः स्यादेवं व्यभिचारिता ॥ १३५ ॥

If you find it reprehensible to eat meat and fish because it is born from *semen virile* etc., then this reason is not compatible with the [fact that] butter, milk etc., [also have the same origin] !

मांसादः प्राणिघाती चेत् तन्निमित्तत्वतो मतः ।
अजिनादिधरैर्हेतोः स्यादेवं व्यभिचारिता ॥ १३६ ॥

If you think that a carnivorous person kills an animal because [killing] must be his inner motive, then [some] wear leather renders this argument quite uncertain.

न मांसभक्षणं दुष्टं तदानीं प्राण्यदुःखनात्।
मुक्ताबर्हिकलापादितण्डुलाम्बूपयोगवत्॥ १३७॥

It is not a sin to eat meat, for while doing so one does not make the living animal suffer. It is just [as harmless] as making use of pearls, a peacock's tail etc., and grain of rice and water.

संकल्पजत्वाद् रागस्य न हेतुर्मांसभक्षणम्।
(तद्)विनापि तदुत्पत्तेर्गवामिव तृणाशिनाम्॥ १३८॥

Eating meat is not the cause of desire, for it arises from the will. This is [clear] from [the fact] that it also arises without this, as in the case of cattle eating grass.

अचेतनेषु चैतन्यं स्थावरेषु प्रकल्पितम्।
दृष्ट्वा दुर्विहितं त्रय्यां युक्तं यत् त्यज्यते त्रयी॥ १३९॥

Seeing in the three Veda-s the bad doctrine that an imagined soul exists in things that have no soul, it is logical that the three Veda-s are rejected.

सचित्तका हि तरवो न चतुर्योन्यसंग्रहात्।
मध्यच्छेदेऽपि वास्पन्दाज्जडत्वे सति लोष्टवत्॥ १४०॥

Of course trees do not have a soul, for they are not included in the four [groups of living beings] arising from a womb. Moreover, they do not move even when cut right through, it being a fact that they are inanimate like a clod.

स्पर्शतो यदि सङ्कोचाद् यथा मण्डलकारिका ।
सचित्तके तथाभीष्टे स(मङ्गाञ्)जलिकारिके ॥ १४१ ॥

If you still are convinced that various kinds of mimosa have a soul, because of their contraction when touched, just like a millepede.

वह्निसंस्पृष्टकेशाद्यैः स्याद्धेतोर्व्यभिचारिता ।
चूर्णपारतसंसृष्टकेशैर्वापि विशेषतः ॥ १४२ ॥

Then thereason [given by you] is rendered uncertain by [the fact that] hair etc., touched by fire [also are contracted without, therefore, being alive], and, in particular, by [the contraction of] hair that has been treated with pulverised quicksilver !

चिकित्स्यत्वान्न तरवो युज्यन्ते हि सचित्तकाः ।
विनष्टस्यापि मद्यादेः प्रत्यापत्तेश्च संशयः ॥ १४३ ॥

Of course it is not possible [to claim] that trees have a soul just because they can be healed. [This reason would be] inconclusive because something like wine that has lost [its spirit] can have it restored. [This does not imply that it has a soul].

समानप्रसवाद् वृद्धेर्दोहदाच्च सचित्तकाः ।
ऋतुजत्वात् तथा स्वापान्नापीष्टास्तुरगादिवत् ॥ १४४ ॥

Opponent : But can trees not be maintained to have a soul because their procreation is similar, because they

grow [as they bud before season by the touch of a lovely girl etc.] because they are born in season, and because they can sleep, just like a horse etc. ?

दद्रु(विद्रुम)वैडूर्यकेशहेमाङ्कुरादिभिः ।
व्यभिचारात् तु तरवो न सिध्यन्ति सचित्तकाः ॥ १४५ ॥

Reply : Trees cannot be proved to have a soul, for this is at variance with [the fact that] ulcers, corals, cat's eyes, hair, golden nuggets and the like [can grow cf. 144, without having a soul].

अचित्तकत्वादेवैषां दोहदाद्यप्रसिद्धतः ।
हेतवः स्युरसिद्धार्था गदैश्च व्यभिचारिणः ॥ १४६ ॥

Since all these are absolutely without soul, the [five arguments given, namely] *dohada* etc. are not established. Therefore the arguments [*dohadāt* and *svāpāt*] are either meaningless, or [in the case of the remaining three] rendered inconclusive by [the fact that] diseases [such as leprosy occur without being animate etc.].

सत्त्वकर्माधिपत्येन कालजाः पादपादयः ।
नरके स्वर्गलोके च शस्त्ररत्नद्रुमा यथा ॥ १४७ ॥

It is due to the overwhelming power of the karma of creatures that trees etc., gradually grow. The same goes

for the [trees with the] swords in hell and the jewel-trees in the world of heaven.

यथार्थो हि त्रयीमार्गो ब्रह्मोक्तेर्वैदिकादिवत् ।
अ(तीता)नागतज्ञैर्वा तदुक्तेश्चेत् प्रसाध्यते ॥ १४८ ॥

What if [the opponent] tries to prove that the way of the three Veda-s is true either because it has been preached by Brahmā, or because it has been preached by [sages] who know the past and the future, as in the case of [something said] by a learned doctor for instance ?

[149-167 available only in Tibetan] :

Reply : The argument that [the way of the three Veda-s] 'has been preached by Brahmā' is given by those who make him the creator [of the world etc.]. I have already proved that this is a wrong idea. Therefore you cannot be sure of this [argument]. (149)

In some cases he sees things as they are, but [his words] are not always true. Likewise the words of cow-herds and madmen are not always true. (150)

Even animals and so on may have knowledge of the past and the future [cf. 148]. But it is not everything [the sages] have said [that they have understood]. Therefore [their words] must be analyzed for arguments. (151)

[In 12 the opponent said] that the *dharma* etc., found here [in the three Veda-s] is also to be found elsewhere.

But actually in some cases [the words of the Veda-s] are like the 'syllables' of a worm [carved in wood], in other cases they just happen to be nicely spoken. (152)

For example, some [jeweler] may spot a jewel in a pile of waste. He recognizes it as he is aware of its power and origin. (153)

It would be like [a Buddhist] discovering some nice remark in the three Veda-s ! A jewel does not [originally] belong to a heap of waste in an alley ! (154)

If one does not investigate what is logical and what is not logical by means of *anumāna* free from faults, then one's understanding will be formed by other [traditions], and therefore one will be in doubt about other traditions (*āgama*). (155)

It is like a man wanting to cross a large river who gets hold of a boat. Likewise one must first hold on to *anumāna*, even if one has to abandon it [later on]. (156)

Following mere words (*śabdamātra*), and going along with the past like blind men here in this circuit fools revolve in *saṃsāra*. (157)

Just as blind men without anything to hold on to must follow a dreadful path, thus it is all too easy to fall for those who put too much emphasis on the mere words [of *āgama*] (*śabdamātrapradhāna*, [cf. 14]). (158)

The epithet 'omniscient' [in 15, can correctly be

applied to the Buddha] in certain cases. The word 'lion' is also true [to life] in some cases [when speaking of real lions], but occasionally it is used in a figurative sense [e.g. when speaking of brave men etc.,]. (159)

In our opinion the *dharma* and *nirmāṇakāya* do not belong to a human being. Nor can Tathāgata be proved to be [a human being, as assumed in 16]. Therefore [the example in 16 is also] not conclusive. (160)

Opponent : If you are entitled to opine that Bhagavat is not omniscient, am I not likewise [entitled to opine] that Śaṃkara [Śiva], Viṣṇu etc., know [everything]. (161)

Reply : If it were true that their kind of knowledge were omniscient, then they still seem to see [things] with the cataract [of ignorance, *avidyāpaṭala*] ; they do not seem to see [things] with a clear eye ! (162)

If, on the other hand, you think that they are omniscient in the sense that they know enough, this argument is not valid, for lepers etc. [also know 'enough', without being truly omniscient]. (163)

Opponent : But [the Buddha only] knows certain things, he does not know everything ! — Reply : What is it that the Muni does not know ? Is it the way to *svarga* and *apavarga* ? [No !] For he teaches [the way] based on this teaching ! (164)

Opponent : Even though he teaches [this way] it may be wrong ! — Reply : If you have this [silly] idea, it must

be due to ignorance ; the reply to this has already been given [in 163]. (165)

Moreover, the standpoint that [our] sacred texts, ideas and words [are not valid, because they are created, cf. 16] should be answered in the same way : [The mind] that analyses is uncertain, since it is created ; therefore [the argument is] fallacious. (166)

Just because I think that the three Veda-s can be criticized in the same way that the Jains do, this does not mean that I follow their religion (*sādhya*). Therefore the comparison [in 17] is no good ! (167).

Apparatus Criticus

Sigla :

M Unique Sanskrit MS of *MHK*, cf. Qvarnström, 1989, p. 23.

K Kawasaki's ed. of *MHK*, 1992 ; for the basis of which see p. 471.

S Emendations to K proposed by Schmithausen, 1991, cf. p. 118.

[ ] Lacuna in M, filled in by K, mostly following a conjecture by V.V. Gokhale or R. Sāṃkṛtyāyana (not specified here), and by myself (with some exceptions : 114a, 128c and 131d).

1d *-trapāḥ* K :- *trapā* M
2d *yukta* : *ukta* M : *bhukta* K
3c *-tvāt* K : *tvā-* M
6c *'rtheṣu* K : *'rtheṣuḥ* M
7b *-jñānatas* K : *-jñānas* M
7c *śabdavac* K : *śabdavic* M
8b *-tvāt* K :- *tvā M*
8d *athāpi* M : *yathāpi* K
10a *-vyaṅgyaḥ* K : *-vyaṃgaḥ* M
10c *vidvān* K : *vidvā* M
12d *evān-* M : *naivān-* K
13d *sva-* K : *sa-* M
17b *-darśanadūṣaṇāt* : *-dūṣaṇadarśanāt* MK
18b *-nyāyyakovidaḥ* : *-nyāyyakovidā* K : *-āyatakovidā* M
20a *-kṣamaṃ* K : *-kṣasaṃ* M
21d *auṣadhād vyādhimuktivat* K : *oṣavādyadhimuktivat* M
22a *kriyātvān na* K : *kriyatvānu* M
23b *itīṣyate* K : *itīkṣate* M
23d *-cāravān* : *-cārivan* K : *-cāravan* M
24b *'kartṛkatvataḥ* : *kṛtṛmatvataḥ* M : *'kartṛmatvataḥ* K
25b *akartṛkam* K : *atkartṛkam* M
26a *-tvānumānāc ca* K : *-ānumānatvāc ca* M
27d *tatkartṛkam* : *tat kartṛkam* K
29b *varṇāmnāyād* : *varṇṇām nāyād* K
30d *yatheṅgitam* : *yathegitam* M : *yathehitam* K

31b *asat-* K : *asa-* M
31d *kriyokter* : *kṛyokter* M : *mithyokter* K
32a *-vad dhiṃsā* K : *ṛthasiddhitsā* M
33a *mantra-* K : *manu-* M
34b *mantra-* K : *manu-* M
35a *-śāstra* K : *-śāstre* M ; *-mocakaḥ* K : *-mocakāḥ* M
35d *anyatara-* : *anyataraḥ* M : *anyatarā-* K
36a *yajñe* K : *yajño* M
36c *hi* M : *ni* K
37a *bhoktrarthāḥ... 'bhīṣṭā* K : *bhoktṛrthāḥ...bhīṣṭāḥ* M
38b *saṃcintya-* : *saṃcintya* K : *saṃcitya* M
38d *āyatyāṃ* : *āyatyām* K : *āvyatyāṃ* M
39c *saṃcintya-* : *saṃcintya* K
40b *kriyā* K : *kṛpā* M
41a *vyākhyātaṃ* M : *vyākhyānaṃ* K
41d *dhustūra-* : *dhuntūra-* MK
43a *dṛṣṭaṃ* K : *iṣṭaṃ* M
43c *ca* K : *catri* M
44a *atra* K : *ad* M
44b *dīpe 'py advipravṛttitaḥ* : *dīpe 'py advipravṛttinā-* K *dvīyenọdvipravṛttinā* M
46d *'dṛṣṭe* K : *iṣṭe* M
48b *-vyaṅgyaḥ* K : *-vyaṃgaḥ* M (cf. 10a)
49a *saṃketāsaṃbhavād ādau* K : *saṃketāsaṃbhavādau* M
50c *hetuḥ* K : *hetu-* M
52d *asmāc chābdāṇ* : *asmāc chabdān* K : *asmābdān* M
54a *chābdaḥ* : *chabdaḥ* K
55a *kriyā-* K : *kṛyā-* M
55d *'nitya iṣyatām* K : *nityadṛṣyatām* M
56a *-pānādi-* : *-pānādi* K
56c *tad yathā* : *varttante* MK
57b *kriyā* K : *kṛyā* M (cf. 55a)
57c *-tvāt* K : *-tvā* M
58d *vicārākṣama-* K : *vicārakṣama-* M
60a *pāpaṃ* K : *māyaṃ* M

60d *pratyapāyitā* : *pratyapāyinā* K
62d *nāśitāḥ* K : *nāśritā* M
63b *na ceṣyate* : *niṣedhyate* K : *te* M
64b *tri-* K *tṛ-* M
64c *śaśāda* K : *śaśānta* M
66d *tān* K : *tā* M
67d *jitaṃ* K : *jitaḥ* melius ?
69c *tyaktā vā* : *tyaktādi-* K
70a *adharmaś* K : *athadharmaś* M
70b *-kāritā* : *-kārite* M
71a *tṛṣṇayā* K : *kṛṣṇayā* M
71d *samamūmuhat* K : *samubhūbhuham* M
72b *mṛtyu-* K : *mṛtyur* M
73b *īdṛk caritaṃ* : *īdṛk-caritaṃ* K
74a *mūrtiḥ* : *mūrtti* M
74b *yadi* K : *yayad* M
74c *yāṃ na* : *yānti* MK
74d *punar* M : *na ye* K
75d *sā parā* : *sāparā* melius ?
76b *acyutā* K : *acyuto* M
78a *śabdāvācya-* : *-śābdavācya-* MK
80b *sa naṣṭaḥ* : *saṃnasau* M : *saṃnaṣṭaḥ* K
80d *asmś cāsau* (*sive asadātmā*) : *saṃtmaka-*M *asṃś cātma-*K
82d *nācyuto 'cyutaḥ* M : *nācyutaś cyutaḥ* K
83b *kḷptā* K : *kuptā* M
87d *saṃdeho* : *sandahyo* M : *sandehyo* K
90d *ayuktimat* K : *ayuktima* M
92a *-yogopadeśādi-* : *-yogopadeśādi* K : *-yogapadeśādi* M
92b *vikalatvataḥ* : *vitathatvataḥ* MK
93b *parāñ* : *parāṃc* K ; *netā* K : *naitā* M
94b *kalpanājālakalpitaiḥ* K : *svakalpādaujanmakatam* M
99b *puṇyakṛtaṃ* : *puṇyaṃ kṛtaṃ* MK
100b *akasmāc cet* M : *ākasmikaṃ* K
101a *jña-* K : *jñaḥ* M
102d *jagac* K : *jaga* M

104c *dṛṣṭo* K : *duṣṭo* M
106c *sarvagataś* : *sarvataś* MK
109b *-klamārditaiḥ* : *klamāttaraiḥ* M : *klamāntaraiḥ* K
110a *yad vā* : *yat vā* K
111b *cirāyuṣaḥ* : *cirāyuṣāḥ* MK
112d *kiṃ* : *kan* M : *ko* K ; *pāpakṛt* K : *pānakṛt* M
113a *vaicitrya-* : *vaicitryat* M : *vaicitryāt* K
114a [*saṃyamita*...] [*saṃyamaka-*.... K
114d *dhāraṇāṃ* : *dhāraṇaṃ* K
115c *duḥkhāntaṃ* : *duhkhārttaṃ* MK
115d *asat* : *asan* MK
118a *hetur yadīśaḥ* K : *hetu yadīśa* M
120b *-krayavikrayam* K : *kriyavikriyam* M
121c *vāsanādhānāt* K : *vāsanādhānā*
121d *-jñāna-* K : *-jñānāt* M
122c *-tvāt* K : *-tvā* M
122d *-kapūyavat* : *kamāpnuvat* M : *kaphāpavat* K
123a *kṣaye* K : *kṣaṇa* M
123b *prākkṛta-* K : *prākṣitā* M
124d *asat* : *asan* K
128b *-lokādyavāptaye* K : *-lokādyathāptaye* M
128c [*prāṇabādhakāraṇatvā*] *c* : [*prāṇāpakāratvā*] *c* K
130a *ca tyāgāt* K : *cetyāśāt* M
131a *bhukti-* : *bhuji* M : *bhuñji-* K
131b *yat kriyeyam apāpakā* : *yatkriyāyām apāpakāt* K : *yatkriyāyām apātakāt* M
131d [... *tyaktamanasikāravat*] : [... *manasikāratyāgavat*] K
132a *māṃsaṃ* K : *māsaṃ* M
132d *yathainase* K : *yathenase* M
134d *aśucir* : *aśuci-* MK
135c *-kṣīrādyaiḥ* : *-kṣīrādir* MK (*-kṣīrādi*-melius) ?
136c *-dharair* K : *-dharai* M
137c *-kalāpādi-* : *-kalāpādi* K
138c [*tad*] : [*tad-*] K
139c *dṛṣṭvā... trayyāṃ* S : *dṛṣṭyā... trayyā* K

140d *jaḍatve* S : *jātve* M : *jāḍyatve* K
141d *-jali-* K : *-jālȧ-* M
142a *-keśādyaiḥ* S : *-keśādau* K
144c *ṛtujatvāt* S : *ritujanāt* M : *ṛtujanāt* K
144d *nāpīṣṭās* K : *cāpiṣṭās* S
145c *tu taravo* : *rūpāṇān* M : *rūpāṇāṃ* K : *tarūṇāṃ* (& *te aut tair*) ? S
145d *na sidyanti sacittakāḥ* K : *na sidhyati sacittatā* S
146b *-siddhataḥ* MK : *-siddhatā* S
146d *gadaiś* K : *gaṇḍaiś* S (male, ut etiam *vyabhicāritā* etc.)
148b *brahmoktėr* K : *brahmoktai* M

NOTES AND REVIEWS

The Adyar Library and Research Centre

The Library has been functioning satisfactorily in spite of depletion of staff. Pandit Ramachandra Sarma retired in 1998 due to old age. Dr. S. Sankaranarayanan, Honorary Professor, left the library in September 1999 to join the Adi Sankara Nilayam, Chinmaya International Foundation, Veliyanadu, Kerala, to work on their Śaṅkarabhāṣya project. Pandit Thangaswami Sarma, Honorary Professor, is not well and is not able to work actively as before. Dr. K.V. Sarma has to look after his own Research Institute, Sri Sarada Education Society Research Centre, Adyar, and is not able to give full-time attention to the library activities. The Director is on the look out for some willing honorary workers.

The computers at the Library premises are being used for composing texts for publication in Devanāgarī, Roman with diacritical marks and in English. Miss. T.M. Ramani is looking after the typesetting in Devanāgarī and Roman diacritical. We are in need of assistance in this work also. The computerization of the inventory of the Library is progressing.

Recent Publications

1. *The Adyar Library Bulletin* vol. 63 (1999).

2. *Caturdaśalakṣaṇī*, Part II with Ṭippaṇī by Paṭṭābhirāma Śāstrī, edited by the Late N. Santanam Aiyar and revised with Introduction by R. Thangaswami Sarma.

3. *Śrī Veṅkaṭeśa Suprabhātam* with English exposition and notes by T. Venkatacharya.

4. *Bhavya on Mīmāṃsā*, edited with English translation and notes by Chr. Lindtner.

5. *Viṣṇu-sahasranāma* with the bhāṣya of Śrī Śaṃkarācārya translated into English by R. Anantha-krishna Sastry (reprint).

6. *Varivasyārahasya* and its commentary *Prakāśa,* by Śrī Bhāskararāya Makhin, edited by Pandit S. Subrahmanya Sastri (reprint).

7. *Amarakośa*, vol. III (Index), critically edited with Introduction by Prof. A.A. Ramanathan (reprint).

8. *Tirukkuṛaḷ* with English translation by V.R. Ramachandra Dikshitar (reprint).

Works ready for Publication

1. *Madhyamakahṛdayam* of Bhavya, complete edition in Devanāgarī by Chr. Lindtner.

2. *Descriptive Catalogue of MSS on Astronomy and Mathematics* by K.V. Sarma.

3. *Textual Criticism* by K. Kunjunni Raja.

4. *Darśanamañjarī* by R. Thangaswami Sarma.

5. *The Haṭhayoga Pradīpikā* of Svātmārāma with the commentary *Jyotsnā* of Brahmānanda and English translation (reprint).

6. *Lakṣmī Tantra,* edited by V. Krishnamacharya (reprint).

7. *Indian Theories of Meaning* by K. Kunjunni Raja (reprint).

OBITUARY

J.W. de JONG

It is with profound regret that I have just received news that an old friend and a great scholar, Jan Willem de Jong, recently passed away in Canberra, Australia.

His Ph.D. thesis from the University of Leiden, *Cinq chapitres de la Prasannapadā*, Paris 1949, still remains an indispensable book for all students of Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti. It was the first item in a long list of books, articles and reviews that by 1986 had reached a total of no less than 532.

Personally, I always benefited from reading his books and articles, and from consulting his learned and often very critical reviews. Many colleagues, I have often heard, feared having their books reviewed by de Jong in the *Indo-Iranian Journal* of which he was the editor for several years. As a rule, de Jong would seldom tolerate scholars expressing themselves about the interpretation of texts they were unable to read in the original language, be it Tibetan, Sanskrit, Pāli or Chinese, languages in which the reviewer himself was fluent. Numerous books failed to meet these reasonable demands and a review of de Jong is therefore often to be seen as a necessary supplement to the original book.

From scores of letters to me, I can confirm that de Jong was very generous with his time when he found it worthwhile. He would read my books in Danish and offer sound and helpful suggestions. He would never

fail to provide me with off-prints of his reviews etc., and he would always encourage me to publish my papers in the *Indo-Iranian Journal.*

Under these circumstances, it will be understood that I was very pleased to see that de Jong (in his last letter to me, dated 20 September 1999) fully shared my conviction of the necessity of studying the Buddhist sources of the Christian gospels. He had an open mind that unfortunately is rare among colleagues.

Two of my most recent books containing Danish translations of fundamental Buddhist texts also contained several fundamentally new points of view. The significance of my new ideas was immediately grasped by de Jong, who concluded his careful review with the encouraging words: It is to be hoped that an English version of this important work will be published soon. (*IIJ* 42: 263-6. 1999).

Scholars with the erudition, the critical sense, the generosity and the open-mindedness of the late de Jong are rare. His demise, therefore, remains a great loss to scholars as well as to his personal friends. It is — to use one of his favourite phrases — 'a great pity' that we can no longer benefit from his critical remarks. In particular I had looked forward to present him with a fresh copy of my critical edition of the Sanskrit text of Bhavya's *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā* soon — but too late — to appear in the Adyar Library, where my late friend had also published his edition of Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* back in 1977.

CHRISTIAN LINDTNER

OBITUARY

R. THANGASWAMI SARMA

R. Thangaswami Sarma, Honorary Professor in the Adyar Library and Research Centre since 1994, passed away on 21st August 2000. Born in 1924 at Chidambaram and educated at the Annamalai University and then at the Sanskrit College, Madras, he was a Śiromani in Nyāya, Vyākaraṇa, Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta and Vidvan and Praveen in Hindi. He worked as a lecturer in the Presidency College, Madras and then in the Sanskrit Department of the Madras University. After retirement, he worked in different capacities — Śāstrachūḍāmaṇi Professor at the Kuppuswami Sastri Research Institute, U.G.C. Professor under the scheme for University level book writing and Senior Fellow of the ICPR (New Delhi). He was also the recipient of the Certificate of Honour for Sanskrit from the President of India, in 1994.

He was a brilliant traditional Sanskrit scholar. He worked with me in the Sanskrit Department of the Madras University, and was very helpful in revising the edition of Umveka's commentary, with the help of the only available palm leaf manuscript in the Adyar Library. (At the time of the first edition, the palm leaf MS. could not be used since it was too brittle ; but for the second edition, the repaired manuscript was available.)

He was associated with Shree Bharatalaya, Madras

for nearly fifteen years, and was a recipient of the award *Bharatakalānipuṇa* from that institute. He edited parts of the proceedings of the Adyar Library Colloquium on Relations and summarised them in Sanskrit. He has also written many articles in Sanskrit, Tamil and Hindi in journals and felicitation volumes. His main publications are :

Mīmāṃsāmañjarī, Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi, 1996.

Sarvadarśaneṣu Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa Vimarśaḥ, The Adyar Library and Research Centre, 1992.

Advaitamīmāṃsā Literature : A Bibliographical Survey, University of Madras, 1980.

Ślokavārttika Vyākhyā of Umveka, revised second edition (with Dr. K. Kunjunni Raja), University of Madras, 1971.

Caturdaśalakṣaṇī, Part II with Tippaṇī by Paṭṭābhirāma Śāstrī, edited by N. Santanam Aiyar and revised with introduction by R. Thangaswami Sarma, The Adyar Library and Research Centre, 2000.

Darśanamañjarī, University of Madras, second edition being published from the Adyar Library.

K. KUNJUNNI RAJA

REVIEWS

THE METHOD OF THE VEDANTA : A CRITICAL ACCOUNT OF THE ADVAITA TRADITION by SRI SWAMI SATCHIDA-NANDENDRA SARASVATI. Translated by A.J. Alston. Motilal Banarsidass, New Delhi, 1997. Pages xxxiv+ 975. Price Rs. 950.

The fundamental principles of Advaita are — Brahman is the only reality, the soul is none other than Brahman, the world is an illusion and the knowledge that the true nature of the soul is Brahman is the sole means to liberation.

These fundamentals were systematized by Gauḍapāda in his *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā* and by Śaṃkara in his Bhāṣya-s on the Upaniṣad-s, the *Bhagavad Gītā* and the *Brahma-sūtra-s*. Prior to Śaṃkara, there were some schools who held the view that *kārya* or action alone could be the ultimate import of any sentence. There was the view that liberation could be attained by the elimination of the universe (*prapañca-pravilayavāda*) and through the elimination of desire (*kāma-pradhvaṃsavāda*) and also through meditation (*prasaṃkhyāna*).

Bhartṛprapañca, a pre-Śaṃkara Vedāntin, upheld the philosophical position that Brahman, the Ultimate Reality, is endowed with attributes (*saguṇa*) and that there is the relation of difference-cum-identity (*bhedābheda*) between Brahman and the souls and Brahman and the world. He also maintained that knowledge and action are conjoint means (*jñānakarma-samuccaya*) to liberation. All these are in conflict with the fundamental doctrines of Advaita. Śaṃkara has critically examined these views and rejected them in his commentaries.

In the post-Śaṃkara period, Bhāskara upheld the view-points of Bhatṛprapañca and attacked severely the philosophical positions of Advaita, the preceptors of Advaita of post-Śaṃkara period show considerable originality by offering interpretations. The variation in their interpretation of the Advaita doctrines relates only to the technique of their exposition and not to the content. Sureśvara, Padmapāda, Prakāśātman, Sarvajñātman,

Vimuktātman, Vācaspatimiśra and Ānandabodha are the pre-eminent preceptors whose views on the Advaita concepts are noteworthy. Citsukha and Śrī Harṣa have directed their attention mostly to a critical examination of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika categories.

The book under review is an English translation by Alston of the Sanskrit work *Vedānta-prakriyā-pratyabhijñā* by Swami Saccidanandendra, dealing with the pre-Śaṃkara philosophical views, the views of Bhāskara and those of the post-Śaṃkara Advaitins.

This work is a significant landmark in contemporary Advaita scholarship. The world of scholars is greatly indebted to Prof. Alston for presenting a faithful and lucid English translation of the Sanskrit work. It is recommended to serious students of Indian Philosophy.

N. VEEZHINATHAN

FORMS OF THE GODDESS LAJJĀ GAURĪ IN INDIAN ART by CAROL RADCLIFFE BOLON. Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Pvt. Ltd., Delhi, 1997. Pages 89, Illustrations 129. Price Rs. 350.

Lajjā Gaurī is a well known Goddess of Hinduism, also known by different names like Reṇukā, Nagna Kabandha and Aditi. The best known images of this deity have a female torso and a lotus flower in place of a head while her legs are bent up at the knees and drawn up to each side. This is sometimes explained as expressing fertility and well being in Indian art. There are no ancient texts to explain the figure.

Carol Bolon charts the changes in the form of the goddess over a period of four centuries and brings a new appreciation of her rich symbolic meaning and cultural context. This seems to be the first serious study of the iconography and symbolism of this 'nude squatting woman'. In the first two chapters the images of Lajjā Gaurī are described giving data for analysis, and an attempt is made to trace the change during a few centuries in certain regions of India. Major reference books do not give much

information. Thus T.A. Gopinatha Rao and T.N. Benarji say, 'Unfortunately no ancient text describing Lajjā Gaurī images is known.' In the present volume four forms of Lajjā Gaurī have been identified — Uttānapad pot, Lotus-headed without arms, Lotus-headed with arms and Anthropomorphic. We welcome this excellent monograph on Lajjā Gaurī.

K.K. RAJA

BUDDHIST MONASTIC DISCIPLINE: THE SANSKRIT PRĀTIMOKṢA SŪTRAS OF THE MAHĀSĀṄGHIKAS AND MŪLASARVĀSTIVĀDINS by CHARLES S. PREBISH. Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1996 (First Indian edn.). Pages iii+156. Price (hard cover) Rs. 175.

This important little book (apparently, first published in the United States in 1974) gives to the interested English reading student the basic text in translation of two variant rules (in the sense of a collection of monastic regulations), governing Buddhist monastic discipline, for the two sects mentioned in the title: The Mahāsāṅghika-s (Ma) and the Mūlasarvāstivādin-s (Mū). The texts here translated are from surviving ancient Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit versions.

The first section of the work, 'The Rise of Buddhist Monasticism: An Overview', establishes the historical basis for the rules. The Buddha ordained his first disciples, the formerly sceptical ascetics, whose company he had abandoned before attaining the Great Enlightenment, on the occasion of his preaching the first sermon to them in the deer park at Sarnath. After that the Saṅgha grew rapidly and provision had to be made for the guidance of the monks, who at the beginning observed a completely wandering life (*parivrājaka*). As it turned out, beacuse of the increasing numbers of individuals involved, the Buddha transferred to the community the authority to ordain novices and fully-professed members.

In the earliest period the wandering was suspended during the rainy season and this subsequently led to the building of

individual quarters for the monks and nuns and eventually, as the community grew and spread throughout a large section of India, to elaborate monastic establishments to accommodate the needs of numerous permanent residents. Under these conditions there had to be rather specific regulations to maintain good order in community life. The regulations were, also necessary to help the monastics to concentrate their attention on the spiritual goals of their way of life. In part, too, the variations in the ordinances reflected the growth of Buddhist sectarianism from the period of the second century following the Buddha's floruit. Further, in the opening section, Prebish outlines the content of the distinct sections of the Prātimokṣa and in the concluding sections provides a complete and literal translation of two variations of the Prātimokṣa. The dating of the compilation of the texts, translated in Prebish's work, is for the Ma, first century B.C. to first century A.D. and for the Mū, seventh century A.D.

It should be noted that the recitation of the Prātimokṣa (Pāli, Pātimokkha) today constitutes the central act of the Theravāda Saṅgha of monastics when they gather to observe the twice-monthly Uposatha (Pāli) day. The recitation, therefore, continues to be an act of remembrance of the ideals of the monastic life and of the punishments that should accrue to the person failing to observe the regulations.

The rule is divided into groups, partly based on tradition and partly depending upon the severity of punishment for breaking particular ordinances. The most serious offences are the *pārājika dharma-s*. 'They include : 1. sexual intercourse, 2. theft, 3. deprivation of life (of a human), and 4. false proclamation of superhuman faculties ... Violation of any one of the *pārājika dharma-s* results in permanent expulsion from the saṅgha.' (p. 11) Among the lesser offences are the *pāyantika dharmas*. It is surprising to read that they included 63. In tickling with the fingers, there is a *pāyantika*. 64. In playing in the water there is a *pāyantika* (p. 87). Perhaps these were intended for the child members of the saṅgha who did not receive full ordination until the age of

twenty. The modern Pātimokkha in its Theravāda form includes a total of 227 regulations.

CHARLES S.J. WHITE

THE DĀSAS, DASYUS AND RAKṢASES IN THE ṚG-VEDIC LITERATURE by JYOTISH NATH. Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, Calcutta, 1996. Pages ii+124. Price (hard cover) Rs. 200.

Euhemerus, a Greek, writing around B.C. 300, said that the myths and cults of the gods developed from stories of ancient heroes and conquerors (hence, Euhemerism). Professor Nath's book offers a similar argument as background to proposing answers to the difficult questions of determining to whom the *Ṛgveda* refers by the designations, indicated in the title. Nath, perhaps without exception, characterizes the deities of the Veda, including Indra and Viṣṇu, as divinized heroes of the Vedic Āryan invasion of India against whom the pejorative references to Dāsa-s, Dasyu-s and Rakṣas-es apply, as referring to the kings, other individuals, and peoples whom the Vedic Āryans defeated. Nath seems to accept the external invasion theory for Āryan origins in India although he does emphasize the historical continuity between the Irano-Āryan and Indo-Āryan groups. Nath's theses are supported by extensive references to the scholarly speculations of his predecessors as well as quotations from relevant Ṛgvedic texts in Sanskrit with accompanying translations.

1. In the case of the Dāsa-s his sources lead him to conclude that the Dāsa-s were a dark-skinned people of North-western India who developed a civilization, based upon 'plough agri-culture'. In the middle of the second millennium B.C. non-Vedic Āryans entered India and established peaceful co-existence with the Dāsa-s — creating a kind of blended civilization. It is this blended group that the Vedic Āryans ruthlessly slaughtered. As the Vedic Āryans settled down and adopted an agricultural way of life, their attitude toward the Dāsa-s moderated, and they

possibly accepted the pre-Vedic Āryans into their community while continuing to exclude the non-Vedic peoples from the sacrifices. Names survive in the Veda in reference to the Dāsa leaders whom the Vedic Āryans defeated.

2. The Dasyu-s represent a special group of Dāsa-s and eventually came to be personified in the conflict recorded between Indra and Vṛtra, the 'dragon', who holds back the waters. Ahi another name for Vṛtra, is identified with the group of Dāsa-s who held back the waters, by damming rivers to use for agricultural irrigation. Their defeat by the Vedic Āryans assured access to the river waters and survival in their newly conquered lands.

3. The Rakṣas-es were noteworthy for their uncivilized ways, such as eating uncooked food. Eventually, in their defeat they were pushed back into the forested and uninhabited lands. Over time they became identified with black magic and negative forces, arrayed against the Vedic Āryans. They were identified with *māyā*, 'the unfavourable power-substance which would inflict danger, disease, harm, fear, ill-luck, etc. upon the Vedic people in their new settlement in the Indian territory.' (p. 98).

Professor Nath concludes his study with an appendix on the Asura. He explores this term from the points of view of two prevailing theories: 'according to the first interpretation, the proposition that the professors of the Deva religion opposed the Ahura religion [,] while in Iran the Iranians opposed the Deva worshippers by demoting the Daevas to demons [,] was the cause of the emergence of the pejorative sense of the word "asura" in Indian literature except for some Ṛgvedic occurrences,.. According to the [second], the word "asura" (=Iranian "ahura"), which meant "Lord" both in the Avesta and the older religion of the Vedas, underwent such a change of meaning independently in India that it implied the sense of demon thenceforward.' (p. 99).

It is a fascinating experience to read through Nath's exhaustively argued and substantiated claims for the positions that he promotes in the debate over Āryan influences, origins,

invasions, and the related matters of identifying the different pre-Āryan groups in India. Although one should not conclude that Professor Nath's presentation is beyond dispute, nevertheless, this work can serve a useful handbook for Indological students who wish to study the original context of the Indo-Āryan argument without the ideological special pleading, currently the order of the day.

CHARLES S.J. WHITE

THE TWO SOURCES OF INDIAN ASCETICISM by JOHANNES BRONKHORST. Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1998 (First Indian edn.). Pages viii+117. Price (hard cover) Rs. 195.

This first Indian edition of Bronkhorst's study is a revision of the original volume, published in Bern in 1993. There have been minor changes in the new edition. It has been common to consider the evolution of Indian religion from the Vedic period onward as a kind of seamless process in which the fire sacrifices gradually gave way to an internalization of the sacrifice in meditation until the whole Vedic system was put aside by the most advanced mystics in the Upaniṣadic writings.

Bronkhorst's contention is that from the beginning of Indian religious literature, there are two discernible paths towards the ascetic goal. One of them he identifies with the Vedic sacrifice itself which led its Brahmin practitioners to various ascetic disciplines, mainly to acquire power in this world and a better life hereafter. The other he traces to non-Vedic origins and was associated with the Śramaṇa-s whose goal was to discover the true nature of the self.

One of his routes of analysis involves an examination of the *āśrama-s*. It appears to Bronkhorst that these were put into their life-stage sequence rather late in the Dharmasūtra literature. Earlier the four or three (excluding *saṃnyāsa*) were options of parallel rather than sequential force. The third stage, *vānaprastha,* was the last stage in the Brahmin path and allowed the ascetic to continue the fire sacrifices for which he, normally, also had to

have a wife — as distinct from the celibate Saṃnyāsin. In some cases *vānaprastha* might have been assumed at a young age although the *vānaprastha* role may also have served as a first step in social adjustment to remove the elderly from family life and to enable the sons to assume control of the family wealth and occupation.

Eventually, a kind of assimilation took place such that the final list of the *āśrama-s* gives, the temporal sequence : '*brahma-cārin*, *gṛhastha*, *vānaprastha*, *parivrāja* (or *saṃnyāsin*)...' (p. 11). Among the various Śramaṇa groups some seemed to spin off to become separate religions, notably the Jains and Buddhists. Bronkhorst points out that Buddhism is not really consonant with either the Brahmin or Śramaṇa ascetic mode and actually is a third option in the Indian religious setting (See, Chapter 12, Concluding Observation). In Hinduism the search for the self through celibate *saṃnyāsa* eventually replaced the Brahmin path to ascetic goals although the former adopted, with the use of *mantra*, the Vedic emphasis upon the text with its own independent methodology.

Bronkhorst's elegant analysis seems to settle the question of ascetic origins in Indian religion in a truly ascetic manner — eliminating all excess of explanatory elaboration in a lean and convincing argument that leaves no residue of doubt.

CHARLES S.J. WHITE

DIE RELIGION DES ṚGVEDA (THE RELIGION OF THE ṚGVEDA) Part 1. THE RELIGIOUS SYSTEM OF ṚGVEDA by THOMAS OBERLIES. Publications of the De Nobili Research Library, Vienna, vol.XXVI, 1998. Pages 632.

This volume is the first of the three as planned by the author on *The Religion of the Ṛgveda*. The author's goal seems to be to replace the work of Herman Oldenberg : *Religion of Veda* published in 1894. As a student of the great Indologist Paul Thieme, Oberlies presents his habilitation work through this publication.

This volume deals with the hymns to Soma in *Ṛgveda*. Its goal is to analyse the hymns in their context, form and composition. The theme of all Soma-hymns is the solemn ritual of pressing, purifying and mixing of Soma. The culmination of the cleaning of Soma is that moment in which the earthly juice is transformed into heavenly ecstatic drink. That is what happens through the singing of the Soma-hymns.

The book also highlights the rich imagery of these hymns, and through that hints at the complexity of the divine form, envisaged by this composition. Wasson's theory of Soma being a kind of mushroom has been rejected by many Sanskritists including Prof. Brough.

There are several publications on the *Ṛgveda* and its fascination remains unexhausted. The secondary literature used in preparing this volume is given in 136 pages. That is only an indication to the vastness and variety of the research interest of the scholars on the Vedic literature.

The De Nobili Research Library publication, Vienna, has presented this volume with meticulous care and scientific classification. There are three indices : one on subject matter (Index rerum) in about 66 pages (553-619), one on the quotations (Index locorum) (620-27) and one on the verbs (Index verborum). This work will be an important contribution to Indology.

ANAND AMALADASA

IM TOD GEWINNT DER MENSCH SEIN SELBST (IN DEATH MAN REALIZES HIS SELF) THE PHENOMENON OF DEATH IN THE RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS OF ASIA AND THE WEST edited by G. Oberhammer. The Austrian Academy of Science, Vienna, 1995. Pages 356.

This publication is the result of an interdisciplinary symposium organized by G. Oberhammer on the phenomenon of death from the perspective of religious hermeneutics in 1992 in Vienna. It was the fifth in the series of such symposia to bring together

the complex phenomenon of death, resurrection, and final liberation, especially the liberation in one's life-time (*jīvanmukti*) in order to gain a common perspective.

The chosen theme here does not limit death only to a physical-biological event or to a sociological aspect, but places it in the specific horizon of a religious understanding of Existence. Since hermeneutics of religion, which understands religion as an existential of the human and so as constitutive dimension of human existence, must try to think of death as an extreme situation of existence from the point of view of achieving the total culmination of religion.

The symposium had its focus on the phenomenon of death from the faith perspective of Hindu and Buddhist religious traditions and the insights of Western Christian reflection on this phenomenon. Professor L. Schmithausen deals with the humans, animals and plants and their relation to death from the earlier Upaniṣad-s. J.C. Heesterman talks about fire, soul and immortality from the point of view of Vedic ritual. W. Halbfass takes up the theme of relation between karma and death and A. Wezler focuses on death as means of expiation according to Dharmaśāstra-s. G. Oberhammer has two entries here apart from introducing the theme — namely death in the spirituality of Pāśupata tradition and Śaṃkara's teaching of liberation in one's lifetime. M. Hulin deals with *jīvanmukti* and *ekajīvavāda* (solipsism) in the later Advaita of Prakāśātman and Sarvajñātman. Sh. Ueda concentrates on death from the Zen-Buddhist perspective.

T. Vetter takes up the question of attaining the deathless state while alive, an analysis of the concept of *amata* in earlier Buddhism. Hendrik M. Vroom discusses Religion as interpretation of death based on the prayers for death ceremony in the Judeo-Christian tradition. Finally, Johann Reikerstorfer offers critical reflections on this theme from the Western perspective.

There are several publications on this theme. But this book

looks at death cross-culturally from the point of view of hermeneutics of Religion. 'The death is perhaps the only moment of religious self-realization of the human, in which Religion reaches its culmination as enabling the total and absolute Encounter.' Different traditions use different metaphors to mediate this meaning as an identity of the *ātman* with Brahman, or as *nirvāṇa* or the resurrection of the dead.

In death the humans find fulfilment. The human in the finality, and radicality of the final culmination is no more to be surpassed, which we call death and from which one can rightly hope that one always remains anchored in it from the 'Otherside of the Existent' as the freely tending towards of the 'transcendental letting-go'. Thus this publiaction is a valuable contribution to this perennially challenging theme of humanity.

ANANDA AMALADASA

DEVĪ GĪTĀ translated by SWAMI SATYANANDA SARASWATI. Devi Mandir Publications, Napa, and Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1991. Pages 260.

The *Devī-gītā*, or song of the Goddess forms part of *Devī-bhāgavata* and is often taken as an independent text. It expounds the Advaita views of Śrī Śaṃkara and uses *Vedāntasāra* and the *Pañcadaśī*; there is also an attempt to reconcile the Tantra with Vedic practices. The Goddess is portrayed not only as the destroyer of demons, but also as a teacher to her devotees. The first chapter sets the scene when Devī appears before the Gods as a bright light and reveals herself as Umā Haimavatī (as in the *Kena Upaniṣad*), and establishes her identity with Brahman. Even a tradition makes *Umā* identical with *Om* (by the transposition of the letters — *aum*). The second chapter deals with the philosophy and Her relation to Brahman as Māyā. Importance of devotion is stressed as superior to knowledge and action; the meaning of *tat tvam asi* and the mystic significance of the syllable *hrīm* are explained. The progressive stages of meditation through the eight limbs of yoga and the

Tāntric Kuṇḍalinī are discussed. Holy places, *vrata-s* and festivals pleasing to Her are also described. *Bhagavad Gītā* IV.7 is quoted (*yadā yadā hi*). This book is next in importance only to the *Devī-māhātmya* ; and will be of great interest to devotees.

The text is given in Devanāgarī and Roman transliteration and translated into English by Swami Satyananda Sarasvati of Devi Mandir. The English translation tries to follow the Sanskrit word order as far as possible to give the readers a taste of the Sanskrit syntax. The appendix explains the system of worship with the nine lettered *mantra*. The *Devī Sūkta* from the *Ṛgveda* is also given with translation.

K.K. RAJA

SURUPARAGHAVAM by ELATTUR RAMASWAMI SASTRI edited by R. Harihara Subramani, Chennai and R.Y Narayanan, Tiruvananthapuram, 1999. Pages xxii+187. Price Rs. 150.

Elattūr Rāmasvāmi Śāstri (A.D. 1823-1887) was a remarkable poet patronized by the kings of Travancore: Uttram Tirunāl Mahārāja (A.D. 1849-60.), Āyilyam Tirunāl Mahārāja, Viśākham Tirunāl Mahārāja (A.D. 1880-85) and Mūlam Tirunāl Mahārāja. Śāstri was a voluminous writer and has many works to his credit. One of the most important is the Mahākāvya named *Surūparāghavam* on the model of Bhaṭṭikāvya and the *Subhadrāharaṇa* of Nārāyāṇa, illustrating grammatical rules and figures of speech and at the same time narrating the story of the *Rāmāyaṇa.* The present edition ends in the middle of the eighth canto since the available manuscript is only up to that.

K.K. RAJA

THE ISHA AND OTHER UPANISHADS by N. JAYASHANMUGAM edited by S. Rajendran. Mrs. R. Savithri, Aravindar Illam, Annamalainagar, 1998. Pages 114. Price Rs. 150.

This book is a collection of seven articles of Professor N. Jayashanmugam on Upaniṣadic studies published in various journals including *ALB* (vol. 58 on 'Anti-Asceticism of the *Īśa Upaniṣad*'). *Īśa* is the first among the major Upaniṣad-s. The

author says : if *Īśa* is properly understood it becomes the key to understand other Upaniṣad-s. Hence *Īśāvāsya Upaniṣad* gets an important place in this collection.

The author has studied the Bhāṣya of Śaṃkara and has also been influenced by Aurobindo. Following Swami Nikhilananda he shows that the study of Upaniṣad-s was not confined to *saṃnyāsin-s* as in the tradition of Śaṃkara Ācārya but was open to all interested in *jñāna*.

T.M. RAMANI

AYURVEDA REVOLUTIONIZED (INTEGRATING ANCIENT AND MODERN AYURVEDA) by EDWARD F. TARABILDA. Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Private Ltd., Delhi. 1998 (First Indian reprint). Pages ix+205. Price Rs. 195/-

This is an attempt to revitalize Āyurveda. The author claims seven disease tendencies which are fundamental to the treatment of diseases ; he claims that Caraka has hinted at these. He says that Āyurveda is not rooted in individual constitution as believed by physicians. *Āyurveda Revolutionized* is a challenge to the accepted fundamental principles of Āyurveda. This claim has to be examined carefully by scholars and practitioners before accepting it. Experience of twenty years is not enough. The mixing of Vedic astrology makes the problem more complicated. Ed Tarabilda established the Institute of Traditional Medicine in Santa Fe, New Mexico nearly twenty years ago. Only time can decide the question of the superiority of the modern Āyurveda mixed with Vedic astrology over classical Āyurveda.

K.K. RAJA

HYMN TO SRI DAKSHINAMURTI WITH MAANASOLLAASA translated by NAGESH D. SONDE. Vasantic Prakashan Santa Cruz, West Bombay 400 054, 1994. Pages 92. Price Rs. 25/-

Śrī Dakṣiṇāmūrti Stotra ascribed to Śaṃkarācārya, with its commentary *Mānasollāsa* ascribed to Sureśvara, forms an important popular book on Vedānta with the stress on the

importance of the teacher. The text consists of ten verses identifying the teacher with Dakṣiṇāmūrti, considered to be an incarnation of Śiva. The name of the translator is not given. Śaṃkara believed in three levels of reality, unlike Nāgārjuna and Gauḍapāda, *pāramārthika*, *vyāvahārika* and *prātibhāsika*. But here *vyāvahārika* is included in *prātibhāsika*. Hence the ascription of the text to Śaṃkara and the commentary to Sureśvara is not accepted by some scholars. The present edition will be useful for the general reader to get at the popular meaning.

K.K. RAJA

REIKI WAY OF THE HEART by WALTER LÜBECK. Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi. 1996. Pages 185. Price Rs. 175/-

The Reiki Path of initiation claims to be a wonderful method for inner development and holistic healing. This is the revised and expanded sixth edition. Reiki is a popular esoteric path of perception describing the ability to use the universal life energy to heal oneself and others. The book describes the path of initiation through the three Reiki degrees and shows what can be experienced and how life can change through progressive contact with Reiki energy. This book gives information about the possibilities and experiences offered by Reiki on the basis of exercises that are easy to learn.

K.K. RAJA

THE COMPLETE REIKI HANDBOOK: BASIC INTRODUCTION AND METHODS OF NATURAL APPLICATION AND A GUIDE FOR REIKI PRACTICE by WALTER LÜBECK. Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1998. Pages 191. Price Rs. 85.

Reiki is a Japanese word for 'universal life energy'. People are now getting interested and enthusiastic about the Reiki method of natural healing, which enables one to channel one's inner energy to oneself. The author Walter Lübeck is an experienced Reiki master.

The handbook describes the secrets and possible uses of this

subtle healing force. The Reiki positions are presented in clear illustrations and their effects and the subtle energy system (*cakra-s*) are described in detail. 'The drawings in the book show nude bodies to demonstrate the hand positions clearly and intimately ; but it does not mean that they should be practised in the nude. Normally the participants remain fully clothed.' Initiation by a trained master is recommended.

K.K. RAJA

LORD SWĀMINĀRĀYAN (AN INTRODUCTION) by SĀDHU MUKUNDACHARANDĀS. Swāminārāyan Aksharpith, Shāhibaug Road, Amdāvād. 380 004, India, 1999. Pages 79. Price Rs. 25/-

Swāminārāyan (A.D. 1781-1830) was a Hindu religious leader from Gujarat who accepted the *puṣṭi sampradāya* of Vaiṣṇavism. He allowed Parsis, Muslims and the lower strata of Hinduism into his fold. He inspired thousands to give up their wanton life and uplifted them into the Hindu dharma. He was a proponent of the paths of *bhakti* and *jñāna*, and a teacher of *Bhāgavata-dharma*.

Monier Williams said that their doctrine is towards purity of life, by suppression of passions and complete devotion to the supreme spirit.

K.K. RAJA

SAMANTABHADRA'S ĀPTAMĪMĀṀSĀ : CRITIQUE OF AN AUTHORITY translated and edited by NAGIN J. SHAH. Sanskrit-Sanskriti grantha mālā. 7, Dr. Jagruti Dilip Sheth, Nehru Nagar, Char Rastra, Amawadi, Ahmedabad, 1999. Pages 102. Price Rs. 108/-

Āptamīmāṃsā by Samantabhadra (c. A.D. 550) laid the foundation of anekānta logic and provided a model for later authors like Akalaṅka, Vidyānanda and Yaśovijaya. The present edition along with English translation, introduction, notes and Akalaṅka's Sanskrit commentary *Aṣṭaśatī* by Nagin J. Shah can be recommended for the serious scholars of Jaina philosophy.

The Introduction clarifies several points of Jaina philosophy.

The notes and comments added to the English translation enhance the value of the book.

For presenting a synthesis of all philosophical views in a point the Jaina thinkers divised a methodology of *saptabhaṅgī* (the sevenfold predication). The *Āptamīmāṃsā* in 114 verses divided into ten sections, each of which sets forth the Jaina position on some particular problem of philosophy, is presented here in a lucid and reliable manner.

K.K. RAJA

PROF. K.V. SARMA FELICITATION VOLUME: BEING STUDIES ON INDIAN CULTURE, SCIENCE AND LITERATURE. Sree Sarada Education Society Research Centre. Adyar, Chennai. Pages 470. Price Rs. 500/-

This sumptuously got up Felicitation Volume to Professor K.V. Sarma, presented to him on his 81st birthday, contains 64 research papers on Indology from his friends, colleagues and students like V.N. Jha, S.D. Laddu, Satya Vrat, Tapasvi Nandi, Sushma Kulashreshtha, E.R. Rama Bai, A.V. Subrahmanyan, S.G. Khantawala and Kalpakam Samkaranarayanan. Bibliography of the writings of K.V. Sarma prefaced by A.S. Sarma arranged as books, articles and reviews is very helpful to students. An earlier Felicitation Volume entititled *Bhārati Bhānam* was presented to him in 1980 when he retired from Hoshiarpur.

K.K. RAJA

ASTROLOGICAL BIOGRAPHIES (SEVENTEEN EXAMPLES OF PREDICTIVE INSIGHTS) by BEPIN BEHARI. Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Pvt. Ltd., Delhi, 1998. Pages 376. Price (cloth) Rs. 395 and (paper) Rs. 195/-

This is the revised edition of the text by Bepin Behari, an erudite scholar in astrological and occult sciences. The technical jargon of the science is used only rarely and thus the text reads delightfully. The 17 models chosen include eminent thinkers and pioneers in their field like Rukmini Devi Arundale, J. Krishnamurti, Dalai Lama, and some politicians like Morarji Desai and

Mikhail Gorbachev. The writer's mystic approach to the personalities, their characters and responses to life is evident in each of the studies. The contemporary and historical contexts are also vividly placed before the reader, without imposing any value judgments. The deeper understanding of the writer as to the historical and stellar perspectives is shared well.

N.C. RAMANUJACHARY

LIVING IN GOD by ROY EUGENE DAVIS. Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Pvt. Ltd., Delhi, 1998. Pages 154. Price (cloth) Rs.195 and (paper) Rs. 95/-

This is the first Indian edition of the book by Roy Eguene Davis, a teacher, and director of meditation and spiritual growth. It consists of 366 themes for daily meditative contemplation, one for each day of the year. This idea for each day is recommended to be thought over well so that the needed nurturing for the soul becomes possible. The postures and general attitude for meditation are explained at the outset. Besides the quotes for each day, some useful statements are added at the end of each page. The fulfillment of 'Living in God' is hopefully attained at the end of the year. Once seriously applied and intently practised the instructions are expected to make an aspirant a real seeker of the Universal Energy and understanding.

N.C. RAMANUJACHARY

OFFICE YOGA: TACKLING TENSION WITH SIMPLE STRETCHES YOU CAN DO AT YOUR DESK by JULIE FRIEDEBERGER. Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Pvt. Ltd. Delhi, 1998 (First Indian edn.). Pages 155. Price Rs. 75/-

The author, Julie Friedeberger, a diploma holder in Yoga teaching, attempts to simplify the practices at daily working and presents an understandable technique for the desk offices and office-goers. Besides explaining the theory, she illustrates the book sufficiently well for the postures — positions of body movements. Lead is also given to open before them the channels

of meditation and deeper yoga. Though this would be a helpful guide for the elementary practitioners, they should also be cautioned against undue haste and incidental overstrain. Yoga practice is deceptively simple but would give good results only when practised under the direct supervision of a teacher. Yoga as a therapy has many educative indications. This book kindles interest among men to dive deep into the subject.

N.C. RAMANUJACHARY

A SUFI MASTER ANSWERS: ON THE SUFI MESSAGE OF HAZRAT INAYAT KHAN by ELISABETH KEESING. Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Pvt. Ltd., Delhi, 1997. Pages 262 Price (cloth) Rs. 175 and (paper) Rs. 110.

Hazrat Sufi Inayat Khan, (1882-1927) a famous musician turned Sufi leader, had travelled wide spreading the message of love, harmony and beauty. Considering Indian Sufism as a crowning development he successfully caused the message unifying religion, philosophy and mysticism. He placed before the public lucid parallels between Vedānta and Buddhism, from drawing material from the western religions also.

Dr. Elizabeth Kessing, a writer of both fiction and non-fiction, and a deeply devoted student of the Sufi master has dealt with the teachings in ten long chapters and has vividly dealt with God, Mysticism, Initiation and Life after death. The hope portrayed in man is very appealing in the following statements:

If we all worked in our small way,

we could accomplish a great deal

Man has the key of life in his own hands,

if only he knew it.

'A chronological Survey' of the Master's work provides insights into the laudable service rendered by him to humanity, and 'The Aims of the Sufi Movement' reveals its secular character.

N.C. RAMANUJACHARY

VAIDIKATVA IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION by S.G. MUDGAL. Aarsh Akshardham Centre for Applied Research in Social Harmony, Aksahardham, J. Road, Sector 20, Gandhinagar 382 020, 1996. Pages 194. Price Rs. 90/-

AARSH, is a vital section of Aksharadham, dedicated to understanding and popularization of the ideals set forth by Swami Narayan. The present text is a compilation of ten articles on different topics connected with Veda and Hindu Dharma as presented in Indian philosophy and Religion. The lead article is provided by Sadhu Śrutiprakāśadāsa, both in Sanskrit and in English. This is followed by others discussing Vedic lore as interpreted in Advaita, Dvaita, Vallabhācārya's system and the Navya Viśiṣṭādvaita thought of Bhagavān Swāmi Nārāyaṇa. There are also discussions on the three socio-religious reform movements of 19th century namely Brahmo Samāja, Swāmi Nārāyaṇa Saṃprādaya and Ārya Samaja. The greatness and magnanimity of Vedic knowledge is never denied, what is more relevant is its application and adaptation in daily life. The book covers the topics conceptually.

N.C. RAMANUJACHARY

VISION INTO INFINITY by BARBARA A. BRIGGS. Sterling Publishers Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 1998. Pages x+113. Price Rs. 150/-

In this well designed book, the compiler Barbara A. Briggs places before the reader selective thoughts on the metaphysical and highly philosophic ideas classifying them into three sections as below :

1. The Vedic vision of the process of creation in the universe and the individual. 2. Experience of an artist awakening to the harmonies and symmetries of nature. 3. Insights into the source of creativity.

The sentences are widely drawn from Veda-s, Upaniṣad-s, Śaṃkara, Ṛṣi Vasiṣṭha and Mahesh Yogi. Being a deep student of Maharshi Mahesh Yogi, the writer draws many inspiring

pieces from his presentation and annotations. Her own experiences in meditation and living are put into words. The description of eminent artists, poets and philosophers are added to complete the presentation. This elegant and handsome book will be useful for aspirants for deep meditation.

N.C. RAMANUJACHARY

THE DIVINE MATRIX CREATIVITY AS LINK BETWEEN EAST AND WEST by JOSEPH A. BRACKEN, S.J. Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Pvt. Ltd., Delhi, 1997. Pages 179. Price Rs. 145/-

This is a scholarly presentation of comparative philosophical theology with particular references to infinitude, ultimate Reality and creativity, suggesting that infinite is not a mere entity but 'an ongoing activity' which does not exist in itself but only in the entities which it, empowers to exist in the process. Mr. Bracken draws materials from world religions, starting with the ideas of Aristotle upon motion and its reality, he expounds the thoughts of Thomas Aquinas, Echgart, Schelling, Heidegger and moves into the extensive continuum in the philosophy of Whitehead.

The Second part of the book presents the dynamic identity-in-difference of Brahman and ātman and subsequently examines the Buddhistic Doctrine of Dependent co-arising and the Secret of Tao. The author sums up the text in conclusion very elaborately and says, 'My own understanding of the Infinite as an all-encompassing "Matrix" or "energy-field" for the divine persons and all their creatures is only one possible response', keeping the interreligious dialogue open. The Notes and Bibliography added to the text are rich and purposeful.

N.C. RAMANUJACHARY

SPRING OF JAINA WISDOM by DULICHAND JAIN. Research foundation for Jainology, 18, Ramanuja Iyer Rd., Chennai and Parshvanath Vidyapeeth, ITI Road, Karaundi, Varanasi, 1999. Pages 129. Price Rs. 30/-

Lord Mahāvīra, the 24th Tīrthaṅkara, stood for non-violence and tried to inspire the humanity with his teachings on right

living and conduct. Mr. Dulichand Jain, the compiler of the present book, has picked some 200 noble sayings of the Lord, rendered them into Hindi and English; and got the book elegantly printed. The noble thoughts are divided into different classes, and each is given a pithy heading. The need for such compilations to help the deserving reader cannot be over emphasized.

N.C. RAMANUJACHARY

SRISTHUTHI by SRI VEDANTA DESIKA. Sri Vedanta Desika Research Centre, Mani Mandapam, 40, Sannithi street, Villavakkam. Madras. Pages 38+24+13-13+ 55. (Free).

This laudable attempt to publish Śrīstuti of Śrī Vedānta Deśika in Sanskrit original with translation in English, Hindi, Kanada, Tamil and Telugu and with short commentary will be helpful to the general public.Śrī Vedānta Deśika was an eminent and prolific writer of Vaiṣṇavism, after Sri Ramanujacharya, who tried to bring out the philosophic ideas of his teacher to the arena of the public. The present text succinctly translated by competent people will help to popularize Vedanta Desika's ideas.

N.C. RAMANUJACHARY

KINDNESS, CLARITY, AND INSIGHT by The Fourteenth Dalai Lama H.H. Tenzin Gyatso. translated and edited by Jeffrey Hopkins and Elizabeth Napper. Motilal Banarsidass Publisher Pvt. Ltd., Delhi, 1997 (First South Asian edn.). Pages 232. Price Rs. 150/-

The Fourteenth Dalai Lama His Holiness Tenzin Gyasto visited United States and Canada during 1979-81 and addressed various groups of people at different venues urging upon them to get at the basic principles of the Buddhistic Religion and endeavour to lead a life of righteousness and harmony. Twenty of the lectures are translated into English and edited under the present title.

The Dalai Lama's approach is direct, clear and insightful. He speaks in general terms about the human society, its

responsibility towards values in life, and the meditative process, he besides goes deep into explaining the ancient Buddhist scriptural statements and the treasures of Tibetan Buddhism. His effort is to bring to the contemporary mind the need to fill itself with love, compassion and harmony. After each presentation, the Dalai Lama has also answered the inquirers' questions throwing much light on the needed topics. He has not lost the opportunity to explain the stand of Tibetans as a unique culture and heritage, but he has couched his expressions with all moderation and tolerance, particularly towards those powers who were neutral and unmindful.

N.C. RAMANUJACHARY

THE JOURNAL OF ORIENTAL RESEARCH, MADRAS –THE KUPPUSWAMI SASTRI RESEARCH INSTITUTE GOLDEN JUBILEE COMMEMORATION VOLUME 1994-97. The KSRI, Madras, 1998. Pages 149. Price Rs. 200. Foreign $30 : £25.

The Kuppuswami Sastri Research Institute in Madras celebrated its Golden Jubliee in 1994-96 and a comprehensive report of the celebrations forms the present issue of the Journal. Besides the above, eight papers presented at the seminar on 'Sanskrit and South Indian Languages' held on 9th August 1996 are also included. They are by M.K. Jagannatharaja, Martha Ann Selby, M. Narasimhachary, N.V.P. Unithiri, V. Srivatsankacarya, K.K. Raja, and A. Thiruvengadathan. As usual, a good number of books are also reviewed in the journal. The activities of the Institute 1995-97 added at the end speak for the achievements.

N.C. RAMANUJACHARY

THE DIVINE LIFE OF SRI SRI SITARAMDAS OMKARNATH by C. VARADARAJAN. Kinkar Rameshananda, Akhil Bharat Guru Sampradaya. 1997. Pages 87. Price Rs. 60. U.S. $5.

This lucid book on the life and work of Sri Sri Sitaramdas Omkarnath (1892-1982) who had shown devotional inclinations from his childhood and ultimately started the Akhil Bharat Jai Guru Sampradaya at Calcutta in 1973. This is a non-sectarian

religious association. This process adopted and propagated by the saint was *nāmajapa* and universal love. There is information about his books and his working on miracles. With many colour photographs the book is well produced and will be of interest to devotees and the public alike.

N.C. RAMANUJACHARY

SRI VEDANTA DESIKA'S SRI VARADARAJA PANCHASAT English commentary by Sri K.P. Rangaswamy. Sri Vedanta Desika Research Centre, Villivakkam, Chennai, 1999. Pages 194. (Free.)

Śrī Varadarāja Pañcāśat by Vedānta Deśīka is a Stotra in 50 verses in praise of his *iṣṭadevatā* of Kanchipuram. The lucid English translation with notes is helpful to readers. It describes Viṣṇu's incarnations as Nṛsiṃha, Vāmana, and others.

T.M. RAMANI

MAKING AND REMAKING HISTORY: A STUDY OF TIANTAI SECTARIAN HISTORIOGRAPHY by JINHUA CHEN. The International Institute for Buddhist Studies, Tokyo. 1999. Pages xii+203.

This is Studies Philological Buddhica Monograph Series No. XIV. A series of sectarian propaganda literature advanced by the Tiantai school founded by Zhiyi and Guanding in the Sui to book its prestige and assert its superiority over other Chinese Buddhist traditions like Sanlum are studied objectively with academic aloofness in this book. The propaganda literature initiated by Guanding's disciples in the sixth century was continued by Zhanran; stories were forged and documents fabricated to promote Tianitais' superiority. This book tries to unravel some profound sectarian and polymical agenda underlying the fabrications of Jizang's stories. It also shows how the sectarian propaganda orginated in China was continued in Japan.

The author underlines the need for great caution in reading and using basic Chinese monastic historians'—biographical

works. Exhaustive bibliography and index add to the usefulness of the book.

K.K. RAJA

THE BOOK OF LIFE by ROY EUGENE DAVIS. Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi. Pages 157. Price Rs. 65/-

Subtitled 'Everyone's Common Sense Guide to Purposeful Living and Spiritual Growth into the 21st Century and Beyond' this book attempts to bring out the needed factors for a holistic and spiritual growth of an individual. Men are mere mortals but they have aspirations to acquire divine status ; if it is possible to unfold the capacities and abilities to a great extent.

The author, Roy Eugene Davis, is a follower of Paramahamsa Yogananda and a founder-director of 'Centre for Spiritual Awareness'. Besides explaining the philosophy of life, a detailed programming of practices for the eventual 'awakening' is given. This book will aid those who are serious to understand the processes of life and who decide upon pursuing a path in compliance with the laws of higher life. How one can modulate one's own life inspite of the odds and defeating circumstances is elaborately dealt with. This will be a purposeful addition to the literature on the subject of human regeneration.

N.C. RAMANUJACHARY

SANSKRIT RESEARCH AND MODERN CHALLENGES edited by A. Ramaswamy Iyengar. Chinmaya International Foundation, Veliyanadu, Ernakulam, 1997. Pages 265.

This is a collection of articles presented at a seminar held at Chinmaya International Foundation, Veliyanadu (Kerela) in April 1997. Besides the research articles there is also an account of Chinmaya Foundation, its projects and programmes. This is laudable venture. Among the papers are 'Sanskrit Research and Modern Challenges' by Dr. M. Lakshmi Kumari, 'Ancient Sanskrit and Modern Computers' by Dr. K.P. Rajappan, 'Pūrvamīmāṃsā and Śaṃkara' by Dr. K. Kunjunni Raja, 'Knowledge — Power or Burden' by Swami Chidananda and

'Sanskrit and Culture' by Dr. Srimannarayana Murti.

N.C. RAMANUJACHARY

HINDU ETHICS (A CONSPECTUS) by S.V. ISAN. Harivilas Foundation, Nanganallur, Chennai, 1997. Pages viii+61. Price Rs. 30/-

This is a handbook on Hinduism and deals with ethics as depicted in the Vedic period, the period of Brāhmaṇa-s, in Upaniṣad-s, *Manusmṛti*, *Rāmāyaṇa*, *Mahābhārata*, *Bhagavad Gītā*, in the six systems of philosophy and ethics as explained by modern writers like Tagore, Gandhi, Rajaji, and Dr. Radhakrishnan.

Ethics being the primary foundation for any human society, this introductory book will be interesting to the common people.

N.C. RAMANUJACHARY

THE ADVAITA OF ART by HARSHA V. DEHEJIA. Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Pvt. Ltd., Delhi, 1996. Pages xviii+194, Price (cloth) Rs. 295 and (paper) Rs.195.

The enquiry begins with the concept of *artha* in the Indian tradition. The multiple levels and layers of meaning, the relationship between word and meaning, are investigated anew, moving freely from one philosophic school to other texts of aesthetics and grammar.

The Meaning of meaning, Aesthetic implications of divine consortship, Aesthetics and idealism, *Sākṣādartha*, *parokṣārtha* as applied to aesthetics etc. are discussed in depth. The aesthetic experience in the classical Indian tradition is studied on its own merit without any reference to religion. Bhartṛhari and his *sphoṭa* theory are discussed from different points of views ; naturally there are many provocative statements which help intelligent readers to think and examine them. We welcome this book, because it deals in depth with various theories of meaning, and make readers think about the author's views. Kapila Vatsyayan has given a brilliant Foreword to this book.

Lakṣaṇā is often printed as *lakṣaṇa*. In Contents *Śākṣātartha*

is found for *Sākṣādartha*. '*Śabda* was for Bhartṛhari a "*vṛṣabha*" or a great bull'. Bhartṛhari is referring to a Ṛgvedic statement: *prāhur mahāntam ṛṣabhaṃ.*

K.K. RAJA

KĀṆVAŚATAPATHABRĀHMAṆAM, Vol. III edited and translated by C.R. Swaminathan, General Editor: Kapila Vatsyayan. Indira Gandhi National Centre for the Arts, New Delhi. 2000. Pages xxvii+414, Price Rs. 700/-

The *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* belongs to the *Śukla Yajurveda* and is available in two versions; Kāṇva and Mādhyaṃdina. The Mādhyaṃdina was edited by Weber in 1923 and Eggeling translated it into English. The Kāṇva version of the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* (Vol. I & II) has already been published by the IGNCA in *KMS* series nos. 12 and 22, and now the third volume has come for review. It comprises the fourth and fifth Kāṇḍa-s of the Brāhmaṇa, and vol. IV will comprise Kāṇḍa-s 6-8. The critical edition and English translation are by C.R. Swaminathan. Caland had edited and translated the first eight Kāṇḍa-s of the Kāṇva version.

Eggeling found the work of editing wearisome because of the prolixity of exposition, dogmatic assertion and flimsy symbolism; but as he continued his work he began to recognize the real value of the work, the philosophic and mystical significance of the symbolism of rituals. It was professor Max Muller's timely exhortations and kindly encouragement that helped him to complete his task.

The IGNCA undertook the work on Kāṇva version taking into account the valuable work done by Eggeling and Caland in order to contextualize the text within the larger discourse of Indian tradition, 'specially its system of developing multilevelled and multilayered structures of thought, meaning and form. By coalescing the concepts of Prajāpati, Puruṣa and Agni the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* develops the theme and identifies its symbolic significance in terms of time and space'. Later the

Hindu Temples were concerned as Puruṣa, and the assembling of the architectural members was considered as a ritual.

Professor Caland had published only the first seven Kāṇḍa-s critically; for the remaining Kāṇḍa-s he had only noted the variant readings differing from Eggeling's Mādhyaṃdina version.

The present edition is for the whole text and contains English translation by Swaminathan. The text has also been revised; and the variants have been discussed at the end. A glossary of technical terms related to objects used in performing *yāga-s* with their illustrations have been prepared, and will be published soon.

Vedic scholars are indebted to Kapila Vatsyayan for planning the volumes and to C.R. Swaminathan for executing them properly.

K.K. RAJA

CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY edited by C. Rajendran. Dept. of Sanskrit, Calicut University, Kerala. 1999. Pages 220.

This is a useful collection of 24 papers presented in the seminar held at Calicut University in December 1990 with the help of the U.G.C. Among the papers are those of the late Debi Prasad Chattopadhyaya, the late M.S. Menon V.N. Jha 'Navya-Nyāya Philosophy', K.K. Raja 'Vijñānavāda and Śūnyavāda', A. Kantamani 'Does Prabhāhara's Ramified Contextualism entail Syncategorematicism?', S.R. Bhatt (Delhi), K.N.N. Elayath, D. Prahlada Char, C. Rajendran and N.V.P. Unithiri. We welcome this volume on contemporary Indian Philosophy.

K.K. RAJA

A HUNDRED DEVOTIONAL SONGS OF TAGORE by Mohit Chakrabarti. Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1999. Pages xi+104. Price (cloth) Rs. 250 and (paper) Rs. 150.

This anthology of hundred devotional songs of Tagore from his *Gītāñjali*, *Pujā*, *Gītimālya*, *Gitali* etc. selected and translated from Bengali into English by Mohit Chakrabarti will be

welcomed by all lovers of great poetry, especially devotional and mystic. The orginal text in Bengali given in Roman script is helpful for comparison.

T.M. RAMANI

FACETS OF INDIAN CULTURE edited by Dr. P.C. Muraleemadhavan. New Bharatiya Book Corporation, Delhi, 2000. Pages xxii+542. Rs. 900/-

This collection of research papers on different facets of Indian Culture — Vedic Literature, Philosophy, Literary Criticism, Technical Literature, Performing Arts and Classical Sanskrit — consists mostly of papers presented at a three day International Conference on Sanskrit and Culture conducted at Trichur during January 11, 12 and 13, 1997, under the joint auspices of Sree Sankaracharya Sanskrit University, Kaladi, Kerala Sahitya Akademi, Trichur and Professor Kunhan Raja Birth Centenary Celebration Committee, Madras. The final and seventh session was devoted to higlight the achievements of the two Kerala Sanskrit Scholars Dr. C. Kunhan Raja and Dr. K. Kunjunni Raja, nephew and student of the former, who was nearing his eightieth birthday. The Contributors of the papers are well-known scholars like Fritz Staal, T.S. Rukmini, G.M. Bailey, V.N. Jha, Heidrun Bruckner, Dr. M. Leelavati, C.P. Srinivasan, Zimmermann, Ramanujam, K.V. Sarma, Byrski, Dr. Padma Subrahmanyam, L.S. Rajagoplan, Prof. Brockington, T. Venkatacharya, Kalpakam Sankaranarayanan, K.P.A. Menon, C. Rajendran, Srimannarayana Murti, M. Sambasivan and Leela Omchery.

On C. Kunhan Raja there are papers by Radha Burnier, Sukumar Azhicode and M.S. Menon, and on Kunjunni Raja and his works by N.V.P. Unithiri, T.B. Venugopala Panicker and Muraleemadhavan. Two papers by K. Kunjunni Raja have also been added. *Jaya Jaya Śankara* classical dance form, conceived and performed by Dr. Padma Subrahmanyam was one of the important items of the cultural programme.

This volume is an excellent anthology of research papers on Indian Culture, a fitting tribute to the two eminent scholars from Kerala.

T.M. RAMANI

A STUDY OF JAYANTA BHAṬṬA'S NYĀYAMAÑJARĪ : A MATURE SANSKRIT WORK ON INDIAN LOGIC. Part II by NAGIN J. SHAH. Sanskrit-Sanskriti Granthamālā 3, Ahmedabad, 1995. Pages 10+224. Price Rs. 225/-

ESSAYS IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY by NAGIN J. SHAH, Sanskrit-Sanskriti Granthamālā 6, Ahmedabad, 1998. Pages 8+ 152. Price Rs. 120/-

I. The study on Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's *Nyāyamañjarī* (I & II) deals with the Naiyāyika theory of Knowledge (*Pramāṇa-s*, validity of knowledge, the nature of error etc.). The doctrines of other schools like the Buddhist and Mīmāṃsā are also discussed and refuted systematically exposing the arguments following Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's text.

The book contains two appendices : 'Essentials of Dharmakīrti's theory of Knowledge' and 'Conception of Īśvara in the Early Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika School'. Surprisingly the same appear in the second book under review also published in the same series three year's later.

II. The Second book contains nine essays, the last two repeated from the first book : 1. Nature of Time according to the Hindus, including Bhartṛhari, 2. The Bauddha and Jaina, 3.Buddhist concept of Nīrvāṇa, 4. Īśvara in Yoga and Nyāya Vaiśeṣika Schools, 5. Īśvara denoting a Jīvanmukta who is also a spiritual guide, 6. Jñāna and Darśana in the Sāṃkya yoga, Jaina and Bauddha schools.

The author explains the position of the Bauddha and Vaiśeṣika schools which do not admit Verbal Testimony as an independent means of knowledge.

These two books in the Sanskrit-Sanskriti Granthamālā series are very useful to the students of Indian Philosophy.

Detailed explanations and copious citations in the notes enhance their utility. Unfortunately many printing mistakes have crept into the second work.

USHA COLAS

THE THIRUVEḶUKŪṞṞIRUKKAI of ŚRĪ TIRUMAṄGAI ĀḺVĀR AND THE TIRUVĀŚIRIYAM of ŚRĪ NAMMĀḺVĀR. 1997. Pages 43. Price Rs. 30/-
THE "ĀḶIYEḶA" AND "KAṆṆAṈ KAḶALIṆAI" of ŚRĪ NAMMĀḺVĀR AND THE TIRUMĀLAI of ŚRĪ TOṆḌAR AḌIPPOḌI ĀḺVĀR. Pages 93. Price 50/- Sri Visishtadvaita Pracharini Sabha, Sri Desika Vidya Bhavanam, Mylapore, Chennai 1998.

Sri Visishtadvaita Prachara Sabha, Madras, has done immense help to the non-Tamil knowing Vaiṣṇava devotees and public alike in bringing about readable and understandable comments — verse after verse — of the sacred texts of Drāviḍa Prabandha, in Śrī Vaiṣṇava tradition.

Śrī Nammāḻvār is the great mystic poet who inspired and blessed Śrī Rāmānuja to rework the system, The Āḻvar gave out 'inspired' compositions after the *bhagavad-guṇa-anubhava* and hence their revelations assume supreme importance.

In Tamil there have been numerous commentaries on the Pasurams (Tamil verses) as they are called in tradition and each commentator has enhanced the glory of the sayings. Sri V.K.S.N. Raghavan has taken upon himself the responsibility of rendering the English translations. These books are welcome addition to the Śrī Vaiṣṇava lore in English.

N.C. RAMANUJACHARY

SEEING THROUGH TEXTS : DOING THEOLOGY AMONG THE ŚRĪVAIṢṆAVAS OF SOUTH INDIA by FRANCIS X. CLOONEY, S.J. State University of New York Press, Albany, 1996 (SUNY Series, Towards a comparative philosophy of Religions). Pages xxi+351.

This book is a study of Śaṭakōpaṉ (Nammāḻvār)'s *Tiruvāymoḻi* with commentaries. Chapter I introduces this well-known

portion of the *Nālāyira Divyaprabandham* collection of Vaiṣṇava Tamil poems, its author and six of its commentators. Chapter II attempts at characterizing the *Tiruvāymoḻi* through its major themes, poetic forms and main focus, that is 'temple theology'. Chapter III describes the interpretative reading of the text by the commentators who combine theological and meditative insights with a literary perspective. Chapter IV explores five specific ways of understanding *Tiruvāymoḻi* which Clooney distinguishes in the commentarial tradition. Chapter V widens the interpretative scope by comparing the *Tiruvāymoḻi* with Christian, Mimāṃsā and Vedānta texts.

Clooney adopts 9th century as Śaṭakōpaṉ's date, following G. Damodaran (*Literary value of Tiruvāymoḻi*, 1978) preferably to Fr. Hardy (*Virahabhakti*, 1983, who places Śaṭakōpaṉ one or two centuries earlier). He uses commentaries of the 12th-13th century. Though Clooney stresses that he does not concentrate on historical aspects of the *Tiruvāymoḻi* and its interpretation, his comprehensive approach may help renew more philological and historical perspectives of study of this text.

A little less than twenty years ago Hardy insisted on how post-Rāmānuja commentators had superimposed their own theological views on the *Divyaprabandham*, especially the *Tiruvāymoḻi*. This stand certainly helps building a more objective and historical understanding of the *Tiruvāymoḻi*. By contrast, today, Clooney's study enhances the benefit which can be derived from examining commentaries. While Clooney insists that the *Tiruvāymoḻi* is poetry and does not develop a stable doctrinal system (p. 103), he points out several specific religious and theological views of Nammāḻvār which persist among post-Rāmānuja commentators. He, for instance, remarks that these commentators like the Āḻvar indulged cultivating a sort of practical non-dualism which was to be achieved through grace and was not understood as an ontological reality (p. 169). Clooney also addresses the question of the acceptance of the 'sexual language' of the *Tiruvāymoḻi* by later commentators.

The reader may regret that much interesting observations are often insufficiently developed. Those interested in inter-religions, or more precisely Christian-Hindu dialogue will find useful matter in the last chapter which compares *Tiruvāymoḻi* with *The Song of the Songs* of the Old Testament, the *Spiritual Exercises* of Ignatius Loyola and other texts important to Christian tradition.

With honesty Clooney constantly (sometimes to the verge of being repetitive and verbose) explicitates the method and the limits of his work. His original approach shows the need for further studies of the commentarial tradition associated with the *Divyaprabandham*. Being easily readable, this book addresses not only specialists of Dravidian literature, but also readers interested in the study of Hinduism and religion in general.

G. COLAS

PHILOSOPHY AND THEISTIC MYSTICISM OF THE ĀḺVĀRS by S.M.S. CHARI. Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Pvt. Ltd., Delhi, 1997. Pages xi+263. Price Rs. 300.

The author of this book aims at making explicit the philosophical content of the Āḻvārs (that is, the Tamil saint-poets whose works are collected in the *Nālāyira-Divyaprabandham*) which, he feels, previous modern studies left undisclosed. The first chapter summarizes information on the dates and works of the Āḻvārs who flourished before 9th century. Chapters II-IV examine their doctrine of ultimate Reality (which they identify with Nārāyaṇa) and their definition of God and individual self. Chapter V describes their devotional practices mainly on the basis of Nammāḻvār's poems. Chapter VI and VII distinguish three kinds of *mokṣa*, mainly in Nammāḻvār's poems, and envisage mysticism according to the different views of several Āḻvārs. The last chapter discusses the place of the *Divyaprabandham* in the history of Viśiṣṭādvaita, especially its Vedāntic status and the role of Tirukkurukaippirāṉ Piḷḷāṉ's commentary.

This book in fact mainly examines Nammāḻvār's *Tiruvāymoḻi*, the best-known part of the *Divyaprabandham*. Chari claims to study the *Divyaprabandham* 'in the background of the Upaniṣad-s, the *Vedānta-sūtra*, the Itihāsa-s, the Purāṇa-s and the Āgama-s' (p. 8). While he criticizes traditional and modern Vaiṣṇava Ācārya-s for having superimposed post-Rāmānuja theological views on the *Divyaprabandham* (p. 5), he himself does not escape a similar pitfall. Most of the times, it is impossible to disentangle the original thoughts of the Āḻvars from the Viśiṣṭādvaitic and Pāñcarātra concepts which Chari imposes on them (either by himself or under the influence of commentators, we do not know). Chari in fact makes an extensive use of later authors (like Piḷḷāṉ and Vedānta Deśika) (p. 35) to describe the theology he claims to find in the *Divyaprabandham*. He does not substantiate his assertion that the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa* and the Pāñcarātra Saṃhitā-s preceded the Āḻvārs (p. 12). Though he concedes that the Āḻvārs 'have not explicitly discussed the doctrine [of the Pāñcarātra Āgamas]', he insists on finding in the *Divyaprabandham* the five kinds of *avatāra* concept (*para*, *vyūha*, *vibhava*, *arcā* and *antaryāmin*), but does not provide any plain quotation to sustain this (pp. 91-9).

Despite these shortcomings, the general reader may find useful information and views in this book. The summarized hagiography of the Āḻvārs contain interesting details. Mentions of Bhāgavatas (pp. 118-9) and the distinction of three kinds of *mokṣa* in Nammāḻvār's poems offer stimulating insights. Chari softens Hardy's distinction between 'emotional *bhakti*' (exemplified by the Āḻvārs) and 'intellectual *bhakti*' (exemplified in Rāmānuja's works) ; he argues that the Āḻvārs poems emotional as they are, nevertheless contain 'intellectual *bhakti*' in the form of the spiritual disciples which they advocate (pp. 115-6). However Chari's study in general, because of its low academic standard, can hardly offer a convincing and refreshing challenge to Hardy's views (especially to his rather extreme rejection of any theologizing reading of the *Divyaprabandham*).

The bibliographical apparatus is often clumsy and inconsistent (absence of dates, incomplete references, Western authors often listed according to their forenames). This study presents many interesting connections, between the *Divyaprabandham* and other texts (especially Upaniṣad-s), but its assertions should be taken with care and a critical mind.

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